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The subtitle of this thesis is "An analysis of provisions of the
1968 Brussels and 1988 Lugano Jurisdiction and Judgments
Conventions and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982,
with particular reference to the effects of the provisions in
Scotland". The thesis is divided into two parts.
Part I is concerned with the Conventions and third states,
i ntra-EC/EFTA bloc and intra-UK actions and the courts'
discretionary powers. After a general introduction to the
subject, it examines the effects of the Conventions in civil
proceedings which are linked in one way or another to a state
outside the EC/EFTA bloc. It considers here firstly the effects
of the rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions, secondly the
circumstances in which a court may decline to exercise the
jurisdiction which it has in terms of the Conventions and
thirdly the implications of the Conventions' provisions
concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Consideration is then given to certain problems relating to (a)
actions involving more than one state in the EC/EFTA bloc and
(b) actions purely internal to one state in the bloc; attention
focuses on the effects of the Conventions on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in the United Kingdom. At the end of Part I
the rules concerning the remitting and transferring of actions
between one Scottish court and another are considered in the
light of the Conventions and Act.
Part II concerns the duties of a court in the EC/EFTA bloc to
verify both its jurisdiction and the giving of adequate notice
of the proceedings to the defender. The duties imposed
principally by art 20 of the Conventions are considered from the
point of view of the rules of court which should exist in
Scotland - in both the Court of Session and the sheriff courts -
to facilitate the fulfilling of their duties by the courts.
Consideration is given to the need for a court to be informed of
the factors relating to jurisdiction (a) when an action is
brought and/or (b) if decree in absence is subsequently sought.
The extent of the court's duty to examine its jurisdiction ex
proprio motu is examined. Attention is focused in turn on what
may be different elements inherent in jurisdiction in terms of
the Conventions: the lack of a prorogation agreement in favour
of another court, the lack of identical proceedings in another
court, the domicile of the defender, the factor which links the
defender with the court in which the action has been brought.
The writer sets out model rules of court for the Court of
Session and the sheriff courts concerning (a) averments of
jurisdiction in summonses and initial writs and (b) matters to
be considered if decree in absence is sought.
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Preface
I began the preparation of this thesis by examining the structure of
the Brussels Convention and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
1982. As well as considering the relationship to each other of the
various schemes of jurisdiction and of recognition and enforcement
which are to be found in the Convention and Act, I examined the
relationship to each other of the jurisdiction provisions of the
Convention. My attention then turned to particular provisions of the
Convention and Act, provisions such as art 5(3) of the Convention and
ss 41 - 46 of the Act; I felt that there was scope for further work
on these provisions. In due course I became aware of what I now
regard as the central problems of the Convention: the extent to which
it takes account of the world outside the EC, the impact which it has
on matters internal to one state, the duty which it imposes on courts
to verify their jurisdiction.
Remarkably little work, I found, had been carried out on these
problems. I therefore decided that in this thesis, making use of the
knowledge and understanding which I had acquired of the structure of
the Convention and Act and also of the implications of their
principal provisions, I should try to analyse in a Scottish context
the significance of the Convention in matters concerning non-
contracting states and in matters internal to one contracting state;
I should also examine the courts' duty to examine their jurisdiction,
having particular regard to the rules of court which should exist in
this area in Scotland. I have divided and subdivided the discussion
in what I consider to be the most appropriate way, but on account of
the interrelationship of the various problems and themes much cross-
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referencing and some repetition are inevitable.
In preparing this thesis I have made use of the sources available to
me on 1 May 1991.
This thesis has been prepared on the basis that the latest version of
the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention are both in force
in the United Kingdom.
In the course of the research for this thesis I was given permission
by my supervisor to publish articles and other items on civil
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments. The publications
listed in the Appendix are the result.
I can declare that this thesis has been composed by myself alone and






"the Brussels Convention" means the Convention on jurisdiction and
the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed
at Brussels on 27 September 1968
"the Lugano Convention" means the Convention on jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at
Lugano on 16 September 1988
"the 1978 Accession Convention" means the Convention on the accession
of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the Brussels
Convention, signed at Luxembourg on 9 October 1978
"the 1982 Accession Convention" means the Convention on the accession
of Greece to the Brussels Convention, signed at Luxembourg on 25
October 1982
"the 1989 Accession Convention" means the Convention on the accession
of Spain and Portugal to the Brussels Convention, signed at Donostia
- San Sebastian on 26 May 1989
"the Act" means the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
Unless the context otherwise requires,
"the Convention" means the Brussels Convention
"the Conventions" means the Brussels and Lugano Conventions
The relationship of the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention
to each other is somewhat complex. Article 54B of the Lugano
Convention is concerned with the determination of the applicable
Convention in any particular situation. In any case only one of the
Conventions will be applicable, but as the terms of the two
Conventions are virtually identical, ascertaining the applicable
Convention is rarely of practical importance. If, for example, in an
illustration in the text jurisdiction is being based on the delict in
question having taken place in the territory of the court and the
defender being domiciled in another state in the EC / EFTA bloc, it
will be stated that jurisdiction is founded on art 5(3) of the
Conventions. But it is appreciated that jurisdiction is in fact
founded on only one of the Conventions; in this case the applicable
Convention depends on the domicile of the defender.
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This Part of the thesis is concerned with certain related matters
which are generally not expressly determined by provisions of the
Conventions but which are nevertheless of not inconsiderable
importance in the application of the Conventions. The subject of
Chapters 2 - 4 is the Conventions and non-contracting states. The
Conventions are of course generally seen as concerning legal
relationships within the EC / EFTA bloc. But the bloc is not
surrounded by a vacuum, and many legal relationships concern, in one
way or another, at least one non-contracting state as well as at
least one state in the EC / EFTA bloc. The chapters attempt to
consider the implications of the provisions of the Conventions for
such relationships. The case law in this area is negligible, and very
I
little academic work has been carried out. But the present writer
suspects that in the next few years the European Court and national
courts of member states will be asked to determine questions in this
area. There may very well then be a steady stream of articles on the
case law and on the problems in general. The effective incorporation
of Spain, Portugal and the EFTA states into the schemes of
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments, the increase in
importance of the Community in world trade, and the greater awareness
of the Conventions themselves will all play a part in the development
of case law on the Conventions and non-contracting states.
The effect of the Conventions on the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens will be considered in Chapters 3 and 5. In Chapter 3 the
focus will be on the possibility of declining jurisdiction on the
basis of forum non conveniens in favour of a court of a non-
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contracting state; in Chapter 5 the question will be whether a forum
non conveniens plea may be made in favour of another court in the EC
/ EFTA bloc. Chapter 5 will also examine the relevance of the
Conventions in actions purely internal to the United Kingdom. In
Chapter 6 it will be asked whether the statutory provisions relating
to the remitting and transferring of actions within Scotland are
affected by the entry into force of the Conventions.
As three of the following chapters concern the Conventions and non-
contracting states, and one chapter is in part concerned with the
related subject of the Conventions and Internal actions, it would
seem useful to set out here a short introduction to these subjects as
a whole. It is often said that the Conventions are applicable to
questions of jurisdiction and of recognition and enforcement which
concern more than one state in the EC /EFTA bloc. They are not
applicable, it is said, to questions which are internal to one EC or
EFTA state or which concern an EC state or an EFTA state together
with a non - EC / EFTA state. In an attempt to justify these
statements with regard to the rules of jurisdiction of the
Conventions, reference is generally made to para four of the preamble
to the Brussels Convention / para three of the preamble to the Lugano
Convention and to arts 2-4. With regard to recognition and
enforcement, reference is made to the basic rules concerning the
recognising and enforcing of judgments, which are to be found,
respectively, in arts 26 and 31.
Paragraph four of the preamble to the Brussels Convention states that
the contracting states decided to conclude the Convention partly on
account of the need "to determine the international jurisdiction of
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their courts". Together with certain passages in the Jenard and
Schlosser Reports, this statement is often seen as indicating that
the application of the jurisdiction provisions of the Convention is
restricted to actions with an international element. The general
rules to be found in arts 2-4 are, of course, respectively, that if
a defender is domiciled in a contracting state, he may be sued in the
courts of that state, that a defender domiciled in a contracting
state may only be sued in the courts of another contracting state if
this is permitted by one of the rules of the Convention, and that
whether a defender not domiciled in any contracting state may be sued
in the courts of any one contracting state is a matter for the law of
that state. So, it is said, the Convention is concerned with intra-EC
jurisdiction. The Lugano Convention is of course similarly
structured.
Article 26 of the Brussels Convention provides that "[a] judgment
given in a Contracting State shall be recognised in the other
Contracting States without any special procedure being required"; art
31 provides that "[a] judgment given in a Contracting State and
enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another Contracting
State when, on the application of any interested party, the order for
its enforcement has been issued there". So it is intra-EC recognition
and enforcement with which the Convention is concerned; it is not
concerned with internal recognition and enforcement or with
international recognition and enforcement in general. Again, the
approach of the Lugano Convention is similar.
The question of whether there is indeed a category of actions
internal to one EC or EFTA state which are outside the scope of the
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rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions, and, if so, precisely what
the limits of this category are, is a difficult one; some
consideration will be given to it 1n Chapter 5. The statement made
above, that many proceedings in courts of EC and EFTA states have
links with one or more non - EC / EFTA states, and some of these also
have links with one or more of the other EC and EFTA states, is in
fact a trite one; Chapters 2-4 are concerned with the effects of
the Conventions on these actions and judgments which have links with
non - EC / EFTA states. They will attempt to answer the question: To
what extent is the general view about this matter, referred to near
the beginning of this chapter, correct? States which are not parties
to the Conventions will be referred to as third states. It should be
kept in mind that the effects of the Conventions on proceedings
involving the state of the forum and a third state alone may in
certain circumstances be different from those on proceedings
involving another EC or EFTA state as well as the state of the forum
and a third state.
Chapters 2-4 will attempt to distinguish the various rules of the
Conventions explicitly or implicitly concerning third states. The
perspective of this thesis is of course Scottish, and certain
relevant domestic rules of both Scots law and English law will be
summarised. The effect of the rules of the Conventions on these rules
of Scots law and English law will be considered. As aspects of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens are to be considered in Chapters 3
and 5, it seems useful to say something about forum non conveniens at
the end of this chapter.
There is clearly much merit in first considering the matter of
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jurisdiction, and then turning to recognition and enforcement. But in
fact separating the material into three principal sections seems
appropriate. Chapter 2 will therefore concern the existence of
jurisdiction, Chapter 3 the declining to exercise jurisdiction and
Chapter 4 recognition and enforcement. This division can, 1t is
submitted, be justified by reference to both the Conventions and the
domestic law in Scotland and England; each set of rules makes it
clear that in certain circumstances in which jurisdiction undoubtedly
exists, the court in which proceedings are brought should or may
decline to exercise that jurisdiction. On account of the recent
English case law and the comments of various academic writers, the
lengthiest discussion will in fact be in the chapter on the declining
to exercise jurisdiction.
It may be useful briefly to outline the circumstances in which
proceedings may be linked to a third state. Three sets of
circumstances can, 1t is suggested, be identified here. Firstly, one
of the parties - the pursuer or the defender - may have ties with a
third state; he may be resident or domiciled there, or have its
nationality. Secondly, the locus, or one of the loci, of the subject
matter of the proceedings may be in a third state; for example the
delict may allegedly have taken place in a third state, or the
disputed property may be situated there. And thirdly, a court of a
third state may, loosely speaking, be involved in the matter; its
jurisdiction might have been prorogated by the parties, there might
be proceedings taking place in it, or it might even have given a
judgment in proceedings with the same subject matter and between the
same parties. Of course certain of these connecting factors are of
much greater significance than others. And many actions will be
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linked to a third state by more than one factor; it may be, for
example, that the defender is domiciled in a third state, the
contractual obligation in question was to be performed in that state,
and there is a prorogation agreement in favour of the courts of that
state.
Articles 2 - 4 of the Conventions have already been referred to and,
as is well known, domicile - in particular the domicile of the
defender in a contracting state - is the principal connecting factor
used by the rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions. But the choice
of law rules in arts 52 and 53, which are to be applied in
determining the domicile of natural and legal persons and other
bodies, are of relevance 1n the contexts of the Issues considered in
all three chapters concerning the Conventions and third states. It
therefore seems appropriate to comment on arts 52 and 53 at this
point. Article 52 is of course concerned with natural persons -
individuals - and art 53 with legal persons and other bodies which
can be parties to actions.
Article 52 para three of the Brussels Convention, containing the
infamous rule relating to domiciles of dependence of natural persons,
is being deleted by the 1989 Accession Convention. Paragraph one of
art 52 concerns domicile in the state of the forum, and para two
domicile in another EC or EFTA state; no equivalent provision
2
concerns domicile in a third state. It is 1n fact only in art 59 that
reference is made to parties domiciled in a third state. The effect
of paras one and two is that to determine whether a natural person is
domiciled in a particular EC or EFTA state, the law of that state is
applicable. Unless that law takes account of the person's links with
7
other states, such links are of no significance. An individual who is
domiciled in an EC or EFTA state in terms of the law of that state
may of course also be domiciled in a third state in terms of the law
of that third state and / or of one or more of the EC and EFTA
states. But for the purposes of the rules of jurisdiction of the
Conventions, such a domicile is irrelevant. On account of the
approach of both art 52 and Title II of the Conventions, if, in terms
of the law of a particular EC or EFTA state, an individual is
domiciled in that state on account of his frequent use of a holiday
house in the state, then even if his ties are almost all with a
particular third state, his domicile in that third state will not
affect the application of the rules of jurisdiction of the
Conventions.
The rule relating to the domicile of legal persons and other bodies
is different from that concerning natural persons. Article 53 para
one provides that the lex fori is to be applied to determine whether
or not a legal person is domiciled in a particular state. So the law
of the state in question 1s only applicable if the issue 1s referred
to it by the lex fori. There are of course different approaches to
the localising of a legal person. According to some legal systems, a
legal person has its seat and domicile at the place where its
administration is carried out; according to other systems, the seat
and domicile are at the place designated as the seat in the documents
instituting the legal person. Many legal persons would be held in
terms of one of these approaches, but not the other, to be domiciled
in one of the EC or EFTA states. If the Jex fori considers a legal
person to be domiciled in an EC or EFTA state, as far as the rules of
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jurisdiction of the Conventions are concerned its being considered by
one or more other systems to be domiciled rather 1n a third state is
of no consequence.
There would seem to be much merit in referring to persons not
domiciled in any EC or EFTA state as domici1iarles of third states.
For one thing, although there may be peripatetic individuals who
would not be held to be domiciled in any EC or EFTA state or in any
third state, such cases will be extremely rare. And for an individual
not domiciled in any EC or EFTA state, his being domiciled in a
particular third state is clearly generally much more significant
than his not being domiciled in any EC or EFTA state. Where a
reference is made in this Part to a person domiciled in a third
state, this should be interpreted as a reference to a person not
domiciled in any EC or EFTA state.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens was first developed in Scotland
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in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century it has been
adopted in England, Ireland, the United States and certain
Commonwealth states but is still virtually unknown to the civil law
systems within the EC/EFTA bloc. It has been said that at common law
in Scotland a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if a
defender states a preliminary plea of forum non conveniens and
"satisfies the Court that there is some other tribunal, having
competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried more suitably
for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice".
But if the courts concerned are both in Scotland, the defender should
seek to have the action remitted or transferred rather than sisted or
dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens: "[njormally the plea
9
is taken when the question arises between a Court in this country and
<a
a Court in some other country".
At common law the disposal of the plea is always "a matter for the
discretion of the Court in the light of the whole circumstances". As
Maclaren puts it, "the determination of the question of sustaining or
repelling the plea of forum non conveniens varies with the
s
circumstances of each particular case". If an action with the same
subject matter and the same parties has already been raised 1n a
court outside Scotland, at common law the plea is likely to be
successful; but if the action in the non-Scottish court is only being
contemplated, the result of a plea of forum non conveniens is less
9
certain. It was stated above that a plea of forum non conveniens is
not appropriate in the internal Scottish context; if proceedings with
the same subject matter and the same parties are already taking place
to
within Scotland, the defender should rather plead lis alibi pendens.
The better view seems to be that the plea of forum non conveniens.
rather than lis alibi pendens, should be used in connection with such
u
proceedings in a non-Scottish court.
It has been suggested that, "[w]here the plea is sustained, the
12
action should in the ordinary case be dismissed". But on various
occasions in which the defender has stated his willingness to have
the action heard in a foreign court, the Court of Session has been
prepared initially to sist the Scottish action to give him an
13
opportunity to contest the merits of the case in the foreign court.
There is of course much case law on the circumstances in which, when
it is open to the Scottish court to uphold a plea of forum non
conveniens, it should in fact do so. But that case law does not
10
concern the question of when it is still open to the court to uphold
"t
the plea; as a result it is outside the scope of this thesis.
The relevant rule in Dicey and Morris is this:
English courts have jurisdiction, whenever it is necessary to prevent
injustice, to stay or strike out an action or other proceedings in
England....As a general rule 1n order to justify a stay of English
proceedings (a) there must be another forum to whose jurisdiction the
defendant is amenable in which justice can be done between the
parties at substantially less inconvenience or expense and (b) the
stay must not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or
juridical advantage which would be available to him if he invoked the
jurisdiction of the English court'/
'6
There is discussed in Dicey and Morris the case law which led to the
introduction of the present doctrine of forum non conveniens in
fT
English law. In The Atlantic Star and then in MacShannon v Rockware
18
Glass the House of Lords adopted an increasingly flexible approach to
the staying of actions, but nevertheless refused to adopt the
Scottish doctrine of forum non conveniens. But as Dicey and Morris
state, in MacShannon
it was recognised that the reformation in [The Atlantic Star and
MacShannon1 of the principles on which the English court acted was
not far removed in practice from the doctrine of forum non
conveniens'?
And then in 1984, in Ihe Abidin Paver, Lord Diplock stated that
judicial chauvinism has been replaced by judicial comity to an extent
which I think the time is now right to acknowledge frankly 1s, in the
field of law with which this appeal is concerned, indistinguishable
from the Scottish legal doctrine of forum non conveniens2.'
Three years later, of course, the Brussels Convention became part of
the law in the United Kingdom. In Chapter 3 consideration will be
given to the question of whether as a result, shortly after the
11
introduction of the doctrine into English law in Ihe Abidin Paver,
the courts' powers to stay or strike out an action on the grounds of
forum non conveniens were significantly reduced.
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The Conventions and third states: jurisdiction
Title II of the Conventions 1s entitled "Jurisdiction"; it contains
arts 2 - 24. Of these provisions, arts 19 and 20 are concerned with
the courts' duty to verify their jurisdiction and to ensure that the
defender has been given adequate notice of the proceedings. Articles
21 - 23, entitled "Lis pendens - related actions" are concerned with
the declining of jurisdiction rather than with jurisdiction itself;
they will be considered in Chapter 3. Article 24 makes special
provision with regard to what are described as "provisional,
including protective, measures". Of the remaining articles of Title
II, which contain the actual rules of jurisdiction of the
Conventions, the most important are generally considered to be arts 2
- 4. But other articles contain rules which have priority over the
rules in arts 2-4 and, on account of what he regards as the order
of priority of the rules in Title II, the present writer generally
suggests that, in ascertaining the courts with jurisdiction in any
particular action, practitioners consider the articles in the
following order: 16, 18, 7 - 12A, 13 - 15, 17, 2 - 4, 5 - 6A. This
chapter is of course concerned with the implications of the articles
in actions involving third states, and it is in this order that the
articles will be considered.
Article 16, which is headed "Exclusive jurisdiction" and which
appears to take priority over the other articles containing rules of
jurisdiction, concerns five different types of subject matter:
certain rights in immovable property, certain corporate law matters,
the validity of entries 1n public registers, the registration and
validity of intellectual property rights, and the enforcement of
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judgments. The general approach of art 16 can be Illustrated by
reference to art 16(3). It provides:
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of
domicile:
in proceedings which have as their object the validity of entries in
public registers, the courts of the Contracting State in which the
register is kept.
So if an action concerns the validity of an entry in a public
register in the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom courts will have
jurisdiction; the courts of no other state in the EC / EFTA bloc will
have jurisdiction. The domestic law in the United Kingdom will
determine the particular courts with jurisdiction. Within the EC /
EFTA bloc, in other words, international jurisdiction is determined
purely by the locus of the subject matter of the action. On account
of the perceived desirability of the action taking place in a
particular contracting state - the state whose courts are in the best
position to entertain the proceedings and give an enforceable
judgment - any links which the pursuer or the defender may have with
any EC or EFTA state or any third state are immaterial; so too is the
involvement in the dispute of any court of a third state. Article 16,
in other words, sets out exceptions to the general rule that whether
the defender is domiciled in an EC or EFTA state or in a third state
is of considerable significance in the determining of jurisdiction
within the EC / EFTA bloc. But like the other jurisdiction provisions
which will be considered, it makes no reference to the possibility of
proceedings taking place in a court of a third state too; the
jurisdiction which it confers exists irrespective of whether or not
there are such proceedings.
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Article 16, it should be said, appears only to be applicable if the
subject matter in question is situated in an EC or EFTA state. Is it
of any relevance at all if it is wished to bring an action concerning
the validity of an entry in a public register situated in a third
state? The answer to this question 1s far from clear, but it seems
more appropriate to consider it in Chapter 3.
In the original version of the Brussels Convention, art 16(1) was in
line with the general approach of art 16. It provided:
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of
domicile:
in proceedings which have as their object rights i_n rem in, or
tenancies of, immovable property, the courts of the Contracting State
in which the property is situated.
But in the 1989 Accession Convention provision was made for there in
effect to be added to these words:
however, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of
immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum
period of six consecutive months, the courts of the Contracting State
1n which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction,
provided that the landlord and the tenant are natural persons and are
domiciled in the same Contracting State.
So the domiciles of the parties, as well as the 1 ocus of the
property, may now be of relevance in the context of art 16(1) of the
Brussels Convention. The reference here is of course simply to
domicile in an EC state; the provision can be used to illustrate the
point that domiciles in third states do not affect International
jurisdiction within the EC. It is immaterial whether the defender is
domiciled only in a particular EC state or in both an EC state and
(in terms of the law of any state) a third state. It was considered
that persons who both have a domicile in a particular EC state should
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be able to litigate there in connection with certain matters within
the scope of art 16(1). The domicile link which each one has with the
particular EC state justifies the state's courts having jurisdiction;
this justification is not taken away by the parties also having
domicile links with other states - other EC states or third states.
The proviso in the Lugano Convention, it should be said, is slightly
different from that in the latest version of the Brussels Convention.
It reads:
however, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of
immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum
period of six consecutive months, the courts of the Contracting State
1n which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction,
provided that the tenant is a natural person and neither party is
domiciled in the Contracting State in which the property is situated.
Once again the focus is on domiciles within the contracting states;
any domiciles in third states are of no significance.
Article 18 of both principal Conventions provides that
....a court of a Contracting State before whom a defendant enters an
appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not
apply....where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of
Article 16.
The scope of the rule in art 18 appears to be very wide, but several
writers have in fact doubted whether it operates to confer
XX
jurisdiction irrespective of the domiciles of the parties. As a
general rule the Convention does not determine jurisdiction in
actions against persons domiciled in third states. Does art 18, like
art 16, contain an exception to this general rule? In art 4 the
general rule is stated to be "subject to the provisions of Article
16". There is no reference to art 17 or art 18, but as will be seen
16
below art 17 clearly contains an exception to the general rule in art
4; this point can be used by those who argue that art 18 contains an
exception.
V,
O'Malley and Layton state that "some controversy surrounds the
question whether domicile is relevant for the purposes of this
Article". They mention four possible interpretations of art 18 of the
Brussels Convention: (1) that it applies Irrespective of the
domiciles of the parties, (2) that it only applies 1f the defender is
domiciled in an EC state, (3) that it only applies if at least one of
the parties 1s domiciled in an EC state and (4) that it only applies
if the other provisions of Title II confer jurisdiction on at least
one court in the EC. The first of these interpretations is advanced
24
by Gothot and Holleaux:
.... 1'article 18 ne subordonne sa propre application h aucune
condition de domicile de Tune des parties dans la Communaut6. M8me
si les parties sont toutes domicilides hors de la Communaut6, leur
volont6 implicite d'attribuer competence au juge saisi suffit h
rattacher le procds £ la Convention pour le jeu de l'article 18.
tr
In the context of art 18, the Jenard Report speaks of "a defendant
domiciled in a Contracting State [being] sued in a court of another
Contracting State which does not have jurisdiction under the
Convention". There is an implication that the provision of the
Conventions is only applicable if the defender is domiciled in an EC
or EFTA state. With regard to the third possible interpretation set
out above, reference is made to art 17. As will be seen, art 17 also
comes under the heading "Prorogation of jurisdiction" 1n Title II; 1t
sets out a rule applicable where "one or more [of the parties] is
domiciled in a Contracting State"; it can be suggested that these
17
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words should be considered as implicit 1n art 18 too. The fourth
interpretation set out above is advanced by German writers. It
appears to treat art 18 as a subsidiary rule, applicable only if at
least one of the other rules in Title II provides one or more courts
in the EC / EFTA bloc with jurisdiction against the defender.
The present writer does not find the fourth interpretation
satisfactory. It involves reading a great deal into art 18 itself,
and there do not appear to be good arguments in Its favour based on
the policy of the Conventions. In the English language text of the
Conventions, the opening words of art 18 are of course: "Apart from
jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Convention..."
"Jurisdiction" could be interpreted here as "jurisdiction of other
courts", and seen as supporting interpretation 4. But the French
language text states: "Outre les cas ou sa competence r6sulte
d'autres dispositions de la pr£sente convention...." and the German
one provides: "Sofern das Gericht eines Vertragsstaats nicht bereits
nach anderen Vorschriften dieses ubereinkommens zustandig ist...."
These texts make it clear that "jurisdiction" in the English language
text of art 18 means rather "where its own jurisdiction is".
The first interpretation given above is certainly an attractive one.
After all, art 18 makes no reference to domicile. But of course
articles of the Conventions are not to be interpreted as if they were
sections of an Act of Parliament. In support of the first
interpretation it could be said that the opening words of the French
and German language texts imply that art 18 1s a "mopping up"
provision, giving jurisdiction in any non-exclusive jurisdiction
action in which the defender has appeared (without contesting
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jurisdiction) but the court does not have jurisdiction on account of
any other provision of Title II. But while seeing merit in each of
interpretations (1), (2) and (3), the present writer finds (3) most
attractive.
Outside the category of exclusive jurisdiction proceedings, which are
in any event excluded from the scope of art 18, the Conventions are
concerned almost entirely with determining jurisdiction in actions
against persons domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc. So art 18 is clearly
applicable in the case of such defenders. But there is also an
element of protection given to pursuers domiciled in the contracting
states. Article 4 para two, for example, gives some assistance to
such pursuers. But much more importantly art 17, the other article in
Section 6 of the Conventions, effectively gives validity to a
prorogation agreement even if it is only the pursuer in the ensuing
action who is domiciled in the contracting states. Of course a
distinction can be drawn between art 17 and art 18. In the art 17
context it can be said that special protection should be given to a
pursuer who has relied on a prorogation agreement previously entered
into by the defender. But, it is submitted, there is a strong case
for arguing that a pursuer domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc should be
able to bring proceedings in a court of an EC or EFTA state against a
domiciliary of a third state knowing that if he enters appearance
(without contesting jurisdiction) the court will then have
jurisdiction against the defender. The Conventions, in other words,
should protect pursuers domiciled 1n the EC / EFTA bloc from any
local rules of jurisdiction and procedure which enable questions of
jurisdiction to be raised by defenders at a late stage.
19
There is of course much more that could be said about this matter.
But as art 18 is just one of the provisions of Title II which is
potentially applicable in proceedings against domici1iaries of third
states, and as the practical significance of the problem is probably
small, further discussion here would not be appropriate. The
controversy surrounding this aspect of art 18 has been in academic
circles much more than in litigation. As most of the contracting
states appear to have a domestic provision that as a general rule
there is jurisdiction over a defender who enters appearance, the
court concerned will normally have jurisdiction on account of either
art 18 or the relevant local rule. Which of the provisions is in fact
applicable is not likely to be a matter troubling the practitioners
involved. But this section should be concluded by stating that in
principle the implications of art 18 for parties domiciled in third
states are far from clear. Such uncertainties concerning provisions
of the Conventions are always undesirable, and it is to be hoped that
it will not be long before the European Court is called upon to
interpret the article in the present context.
When the Brussels Convention was being drafted, it was considered
that special sets of rules ought to apply to contracts of insurance
and to consumer contracts. Insured persons and consumers were given
special protection in the domestic law of the various contracting
states, and similar protection should be extended to them in the
2.8
Convention. Articles 7 - 12A of the Conventions, which form Section3,
are entitled "Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance". It is
provided by art 7 that "jurisdiction shall be determined by this
Section, without prejudice to. .. .Article 4". Rules relating to
prorogation of jurisdiction are to be found in arts 12 and 12A; the
20
general rules of jurisdiction are in arts 8 and 11, and what could be
seen as special rules are in arts 9 and 10. It is not appropriate to
consider jurisdiction in insurance matters at length here, but three
points ought to be made.
Firstly, it is clear from their wording that the general rules in
arts 8 and 11 are only applicable in the case of defenders domiciled
in EC or EFTA states. On account of the wording of the rules and the
reference to art 4 in art 7, whether a domiciliary of a third state
can be sued in a particular contracting state in a matter relating to
insurance will normally be a question for the domestic rules of
jurisdiction of the third state. But on the other hand the
application of the rules in Section 3 generally does not depend on
the domicile of the pursuer. Article 8 para one begins: "An insurer
domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued", and art 11 states that
as a general rule "an insurer may bring proceedings only in the
courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled".
However art 8 para two provides that
[a]n insurer who is not domiciled in a Contracting State but has a
branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Contracting
States shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the
branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that
State.
The existence of an establishment of his in an EC or EFTA state, and
the use which he made of it for the transaction giving rise to the
action, are considered to justify a person who is domiciled in a
third state being treated as domiciled in the EC or EFTA state.
Article 5(5) of the Conventions states of course that
[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another
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Contracting State, be sued as regards a dispute arising out of the
operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts
for the place in which the branch, agency or other establishment is
situated.
So the policy of the Conventions is to give special protection to
persons who have, loosely speaking, done business with a "branch,
agency or other establishment". If the person whose branch, agency or
other establishment it is is domiciled in another contracting state,
the courts of the locus of the establishment will have jurisdiction.
The pursuer is likely to be domiciled close to this locus, and so
will find it much more convenient to sue in the courts of the locus.
As stated above, it was also considered that the Conventions should
give special protection to insured persons. Insured persons who had
in effect done business with a branch, agency or other establishment
were therefore to be permitted to bring proceedings against the
insurer in the courts of the state of the establishment even if he,
the insurer, was domiciled in a third state. By setting up the
establishment in the contracting state and carrying out business
there, the insurer domiciled in a third state had in a sense
prorogated the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. The
Conventions should, it was felt, assure insured persons throughout
the EC / EFTA bloc of the right to sue in the courts of the state of
the establishment; this matter should not be left to the national law
of each of the states.
The second point is that art 9 provides that
[i]n respect of liability insurance or insurance of immovable
property, the insurer may in addition be sued in the courts for the
place where the harmful event occurred....
Read on its own, this rule appears to apply to all insurers,
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irrespective of their domicile. But in applying this rule the
reference to art 4 in art 7 must not be forgotten; it is therefore
almost certainly the case that an insurer domiciled in a third state
can only be sued in the courts for the place where the harmful event
occurred if this is permitted by the domestic rules of jurisdiction
3o
of the state in which the place is situated.
Thirdly, there is the interesting question of whether the rules of
prorogation of jurisdiction in art 12 are in principle applicable
regardless of the domicile of the defender, or whether they can only
be applicable in the event of the defender being domiciled or deemed
to be domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc. According to Collins3!
the provisions of Art. 4 can have no application to non-domici1iaries
if there is a valid jurisdiction agreement under Arts. 12, 15 or 17:
Arts. 12 and 17 both expressly contemplate cases where only one of
the parties to the jurisdiction agreement is a domiciliary of a
Contracting State
And O'Malley and Layton express it in this way:
[ I ]t seems to be generally accepted that where there is a
jurisdiction agreement falling within Articles 12, 15 or 17, giving
jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled outside the Community to a
court of a Contracting State, the plaintiff should not be deprived of
the right to pursue his action by some national rule more restrictive
than the rules of the Convention.
In other words, in the opinion of both Collins and O'Malley and
Layton art 12 is in principle applicable regardless of the domicile
of the defender. Of course the applicability of particular provisions
of art 12 might, on account of their terms, depend on the domicile of
the defender. It should be said that in a footnote^O'Malley and
3k
Layton refer to paras 228 et seq of Droz's magnum opus. But these
paragraphs only concern arts 17 and 18 and, as will be seen, there is
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no doubt that what Collins and also O'Malley and Layton state is
correct in the context of art 17. But what about the art 12 context?
Article 12 provides:
The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an
agreement on jurisdiction:
(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen, or
(2) which allows the policy-holder, the insured or a beneficiary to
bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this
Section, or
(3) which is concluded between a policy-holder and an insurer, both
of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or
habitually resident in the same Contracting State, and which has the
effect of conferring jurisdiction on the courts of that State, even
if the harmful event were to occur abroad, provided that such an
agreement is not contrary to the law of that State, or
(4) which is concluded with a policy-holder who is not domiciled in a
Contracting State, except in so far as the insurance is compulsory or
relates to immovable property in a Contracting State, or
(5) which relates to a contract of insurance in so far as it covers
one or more of the risks set out in Article 12A.
It is the view of the present writer that, like the general rules in
Section 3, art 12 as a whole is only applicable in actions in which
the defender is domiciled or deemed to be domiciled in the EC / EFTA
bloc. The "provisions of this Section" referred to at the beginning
of art 12 are the rules in arts 8 - 11. It is stated in art 7 that
these rules are to be read without prejudice to art 4 - in other
words they are only applicable in the case of defenders domiciled or
deemed to be domiciled in the contracting states. Article 12 sets out
rules which are designed to limit the circumstances in which effect
will be given to a prorogation agreement concerning an insurance
matter. It is submitted that the rules have been designed very much
with arts 8 - 11 in mind; they set out the circumstances in which the
24
parties can "contract out" of the provisions of arts 8-11.
The general approach of the Conventions, expressed in art 4, is that
jurisdiction over domici1iaries of third states is a matter to be
determined by the rules of national legal systems; art 7 makes it
clear that this general approach is in principle applicable in the
context of insurance matters. It would be somewhat strange if on the
one hand the Conventions were saying that as a general rule whether
an insurance action could be brought in France against an Argentinian
domiciliary was purely a matter for French law, but on the other hand
were saying that the French courts would be required to give effect
to an agreement entered into by the Argentinian domiciliary falling
within one of the categories in art 12. There is much variety in the
domestic rules of the EC and EFTA states concerning jurisdiction 1n
insurance matters. The various sets of rules cannot all reasonably be
considered to be subject to art 12 in the case of proceedings against
domici1iaries of third states. A further argument for the scope of
art 12 to be considered restricted to proceedings against defenders
domiciled or deemed to be domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc is to be
found below in the discussion of art 17.
The present writer has heard it suggested that if a prorogation
agreement was entered into by a domiciliary of a third state after
the dispute had arisen, conferring jurisdiction on the French courts,
then the French courts would have jurisdiction on account of art
12(1) of the Conventions in proceedings against the third state
domiciliary. But for two reasons this, it is submitted, is not the
case. Firstly, for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph, art
12 as a whole is inapplicable in proceedings against domici1iaries of
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third states. And secondly, where the defender is domiciled in a
contracting state and the Conventions set out rules of jurisdiction
applicable in insurance actions against him, there are good policy
arguments for a provision that these rules may effectively be put
aside by a post-dispute, but not a pre-dispute, agreement between the
parties. It should not be possible at the stage of an insurance
agreement being signed for pressure to be put on the would-be policy¬
holder to "contract out" of the rules of jurisdiction in Section 3.
But once the dispute has arisen the policy-holder is no longer in
need of this protection.
But on the other hand where the defender is domiciled in a third
state and the Conventions leave it to local legal systems within the
EC / EFTA bloc to provide rules of jurisdiction applicable in actions
against him, there are no such arguments for a provision specifically
concerning post-dispute agreements. In this situation, it is
submitted, whether or not the agreement does in fact confer
jurisdiction on the French courts will be a matter for any other
applicable rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions and the domestic
rules of jurisdiction of French law. The general rules of prorogation
set out in art 17 of the Conventions may clearly be applicable; these
will be considered below.
As art 12 as a whole is generally inapplicable in the case of
prorogation agreements in insurance matters in which the defender is
domiciled in a third state, it is clearly not only para (1) which is
inapplicable. Paragraph (5) and art 12A will also generally be
irrelevant in proceedings against such defenders. But of course if
the defender is an insurer domiciled in a third state but the
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business in question took place in an establishment of his in a
contracting state, making art 8 para two applicable, and the
contract of insurance concerned a risk set out in art 12A, in that
case a prorogation agreement would be valid.
So far as paras (2), (3) and (4) are concerned, the following points
seem to be of relevance. The "courts other than those indicated in
this Section" referred to in para (2) are courts of contracting
states. What para two actually means is:
which allows the policy-holder, the insured or a beneficiary to bring
proceedings in the courts indicated in this Section or in other
courts within the Contracting States.
Article 12 is designed to protect policy-holders; its whole purpose
would be defeated if para (2) was interpreted literally as allowing
prorogation agreements in any circumstances to take jurisdiction away
from the courts given jurisdiction by the earlier provisions of the
Section. And the Conventions clearly cannot give effect to
prorogation agreements purporting to give jurisdiction to courts of
third states.
The precise significance of para (3) is outside the scope of this
thesis. All that it is necessary to state here is that, unlike the
other paragraphs of art 12 so far considered, it is inapplicable in
the case of pursuers who are domici 1 iaries of third states - or,
strictly speaking, in the present context, it is inapplicable in the
case of pursuers who are not connected - by domicile or habitual
residence - with the contracting states.
Paragraph (4), on the other hand, is only applicable in the event of
the policy-holder pursuer being domiciled in a third state (ie not
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being domiciled 1n any of the contracting states). It is submitted
that for the provision to be applicable, the policy-holder domiciled
in a third state must be the pursuer. For, as argued above, the
article as a whole is inapplicable if the defender is domiciled in a
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third state. It is presumably art 12(4) to which Collins is referring
when he states that art 12 expressly contemplates a case where only
one of the parties to the agreement is a domiciliary of a contracting
state. But it is submitted that the words of art 12(4) do not cast
doubt on the present writer's interpretation of art 12 as a whole.
There is nothing incongruous about art 12(4) only being applicable
where the policy-holder is the pursuer. Indeed the vast majority of
insurance actions are brought by policy-holders rather than by
insurers.
The Schlosser Report states that "insurance contracts with policy¬
holders domiciled outside the Community account for a very large part
of the British insurance business"; para (4) was added to the
Brussels Convention by the 1978 Accession Convention. Schlosser
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comments on the background to this provision:
In view of the great importance for the United Kingdom of the
question of agreements on jurisdiction with policy-holders domiciled
outside the Community, it was necessary to incorporate the
admissibility in principle of such agreements on jurisdiction
expressly in the 1968 Convention. If, therefore, a policy-holder
domiciled outside the Community insures a risk in England, exclusive
jurisdiction may be conferred by agreement on English courts as well
as on the courts of the policy-holder's domicile or others.
Insurance companies domiciled in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in
the contracting states did not wish to have policy-holder pursuers
domiciled in third states making use of all of the rules of
jurisdicti.on in Section 3 - particularly the special rules in arts 9
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and 10. As the Brussels Convention is designed primarily to protect
persons domiciled in the EC, it was considered not unreasonable as a
general rule to allow these insurance companies to restrict the
choice of forum of policy-holders domiciled in third states. But such
a restriction, it was felt, should not be competent in the event of
the insurance in question being compulsory or relating to immovable
property. In the case of such types of insurance, there were strong
policy arguments for the general rules being in effect unalterable.
It is now appropriate to turn to the other set of rules concerning a
particular type of contract. "Jurisdiction over consumer contracts"
is the title of arts 13 - 15; these articles form Section 4. As in
the case of arts 7 - 12A, it is provided that "jurisdiction shall be
determined by this Section, without prejudice to....Article 4".
Article 13 paras one and three concern the scope of the rules, and
art 15 concerns prorogation of jurisdiction; the general rules of
jurisdiction are to be found in art 13 para two and in art 14. It
seems useful to consider firstly the rules of jurisdiction which may
be used by consumers, secondly the rules which may be used by
suppliers and thirdly the rules of prorogation.
A consumer may base jurisdiction on art 14 para one or, in certain
circumstances, on art 13 para two. Article 14 para one provides:
A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a
contract either in the courts of the Contracting State in which that
party is domiciled or in the courts of the Contracting State in which
he is himself domiciled.
If a consumer is founding on the first part of the paragraph, whether
he is domiciled in a contracting state or a third state is
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immaterial. If he is founding on the second part, is the supplier's
domicile immaterial? It is often assumed that it is, but this is most
certainly not the case. For, as stated above, Section 4 determines
jurisdiction "without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4". So
use can only be made of the second part of art 14 para one if the
defender is also domiciled in a contracting state. If he is domiciled
in a third state, whether or not proceedings can be brought against
him in the state of the pursuer's domicile 1s a matter for the
domestic law of that contracting state.
Article 13 para two provides:
Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not
domiciled in a Contracting State but has a branch, agency or other
establishment in one of the Contracting States, that party shall, in
disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or
establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
This provision is clearly along the same lines as art 8 para two
concerning jurisdiction in insurance matters, quoted above; the
justification for art 13 para two is similar to that for art 8 para
two. On account of art 13 para two a supplier domiciled in a third
state can clearly be treated as domiciled in a contracting state.
Turning to proceedings brought by suppliers, the relevant rule is to
be found in art 14 para two. It states:
Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the other party to
the contract only in the courts of the Contracting State in which the
consumer is domiciled.
This rule clearly does not provide a basis of jurisdiction against
consumers domiciled in third states. And it should be noted that, in
contrast to the position with consumers, a supplier domiciled in the
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EC / EFTA bloc does not have a choice of forum not available to a
supplier domiciled in a third state.
Article 15, concerning prorogation of jurisdiction in consumer
contract actions, provides:
The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an
agreement:
(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen, or
(2) which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other
than those indicated in this Section, or
(3) which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the
contract, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract
domiciled or habitually resident in the same Contracting State, and
which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that State, provided that
such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that State.
The passages from the works of Collins and of O'Malley and Layton set
out above in the context of prorogation agreements in insurance
matters refer to art 15 too; it is apparently their view that art 15
too is potentially applicable 1n all consumer contract actions,
regardless of the domicile of the defender. But it is the view of the
present writer that art 15, like art 12, can only be of relevance in
actions in which the defender is domiciled or deemed to be domiciled
in the EC / EFTA bloc. His reasoning is along the same lines as that
in the context of jurisdiction in insurance matters. Article 15 has
been designed very much with the rules in art 13 para two and art 14
in mind; they are designed to limit the circumstances in which effect
will be given to a prorogation agreement "contracting out" of the
provisions of these articles. Article 15 is not there to limit the
"contracting out" from national rules applicable on account of art 4.
It is only in fact in the context of art 15(1) that the problem is
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likely to arise. Article 15(2), on account of its terms, is clearly
only applicable in consumer contract actions in which the defender is
domiciled or deemed to be domiciled in a contracting state; in other
actions no courts are "indicated in this Section". For art 15(3) to
be of relevance, both parties must be domiciled or habitually
resident in the same contracting state; habitual residence is a
little-used concept and it will be rare for this provision to be used
in proceedings in which either party is domiciled in a third state
without also being domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc. Article 15(1) is
in the same terms as art 12(1), and the present writer would make in
the art 15(1) context the comments which he made in the context of
art 12(1).
Article 17 contains the principal rules of the Convention concerning
prorogation of jurisdiction. Paragraph four of the new version of art
17 of the Brussels Convention, and para three of art 17 of the Lugano
Convention, make it clear that art 17 is inapplicable in the context
of actions which are within the scope of art 16. And it is provided
by these provisions that " [agreements conferring jurisdiction
shall have no legal force if they are contrary to the provisions of
Article 12 or 15". That is why the insurance and consumer contract
rules have been considered before attention is turned to art 17. But
it is worth mentioning that for an agreement in terms of art 12 or
art 15 to be valid, it would appear that there must be compliance
4-'
with the rules of formal validity to be found in art 17.
The first part of art 17 states:
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting
State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State
are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or
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which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship,
that court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction....
Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, none of whom is
domiciled in a Contracting State, the courts of other Contracting
States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the
court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction.
On account of para one, if there is a formally valid agreement
between an individual domiciled in an EC or EFTA state and an
individual domiciled in a third state that the High Court in London
will have jurisdiction in actions concerning their contract, the High
Court will have jurisdiction - within the EC / EFTA bloc exclusive
jurisdiction - in such an action, irrespective of whether or not the
defender is the party domiciled in an EC or EFTA state. So long as
the action does not fall within the scope of art 16, arts 7 - 12A or
arts 13 - 15, the nature and locus of its subject matter are
irrelevant. In other words, a defender domiciled in a third state can
find himself subject to the jurisdiction, 1n terms of the
Conventions, of one or more courts within the EC / EFTA bloc on
account of his prorogation agreement with the pursuer who is
domiciled in an EC or EFTA state. His previously entering into the
prorogation agreement is seen as justifying this assertion of
jurisdiction - he has consented to proceedings being brought in the
court seised. Although art 17 is not referred to in art 4, it clearly
sets out an exception to the general rule in art 4 that jurisdiction
in an action against a domiciliary of a third state 1s a matter for
the domestic law of the contracting state in which it is wished to
bring the action.
What if the action concerns an insurance matter within the scope of
Section 3 or a consumer contract matter within the scope of Section
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4? It is commonly believed that, on account of the reference to arts
12 and 15 in art 17, the opening sentence of art 17 cannot be of any
relevance in such actions. But the present writer considers this view
to be wrong. As stated above, he considers arts 12 and 15 only to be
applicable in proceedings against defenders domiciled or deemed to be
domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc. In the case of such defenders, the
first sentence of art 17 is probably inapplicable, but that is a
matter outside the scope of this thesis. If on the other hand the
defender in an action concerning an insurance matter or a consumer
contract is domiciled in a third state, and therefore art 12 / 15 is
inapplicable, there is no reason to suppose that art 17 is not
applicable. So if in a consumer contract action the pursuer is a
Frenchman and the defender is an Argentinian, and there is a
prorogation agreement formally valid in terms of art 17 in favour of
the tribunal d'instance de Paris, the tribunal will have jurisdiction
to hear the action - within the EC / EFTA bloc it will in fact have
exclusive jurisdiction.
It is submitted that this interpretation of arts 12, 15 and 17 is in
line with the policy of the Conventions to provide protection to
persons domiciled within the EC / EFTA bloc. For this interpretation
ensures that, provided that the necessary formalities are complied
with, any prorogation agreement entered into by a domiciliary of an
EC or EFTA state in a contract of insurance or a consumer contract
will be recognised and the domiciliary will therefore be able to
bring the proceedings within the EC / EFTA bloc - even though the
defender 1s domiciled in a third state.
But if, on the other hand, contrary to the view of the present
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writer, arts 12 and 15 were applicable regardless of the domicile -
or deemed domicile - of the defender, in that case a pursuer
domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc might very well have a problem 1f the
defender was domiciled in a third state and the prorogation agreement
had been entered into before the dispute arose. For art 12(1) / art
15(1) would be inapplicable and, assuming no other provision of art
12 / art 15 to be applicable, the pursuer would be required to find a
domestic rule of jurisdiction which enabled him to bring proceedings
in one of the contracting states. To be able to rely on art 17 para
one in the event of the action concerning a commercial contract (not
being a contract of insurance), but not in the event of it concerning
a consumer contract, would be anomalous.
The second paragraph of art 17 set out above contains a negative
rule. It has been suggested that the various language versions of
this provision are not all to precisely the same effect, but it is
probably correct to state that, on account of the provision, if two
individuals who are domiciled in third states enter into a contract
with a prorogation clause in favour of the English High Court, and an
action concerning the contract subsequently becomes necessary, unless
and until the English court has been given an opportunity to
entertain the proceedings and has declined to do so, jurisdiction in
a court of another EC or EFTA state cannot be based on a rule of
4-3
domestic law of that state. Whether the English court can entertain
the proceedings is a matter for English law alone, but whether a
court of another EC or EFTA state can do so is to be determined by
reference to both the local law and the provision of the Conventions
set out above. This negative rule set out above constitutes another
exception to the general rule in art 4 that jurisdiction in actions
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against domici1iaries of third states is purely a matter for the
domestic law of the EC or EFTA state where it is wished to bring the
action. For although in this context the Conventions do not impose
jurisdiction, they can nevertheless effectively take it away.
Article 17 makes no reference to prorogation agreements in favour of
courts of third states. Are such agreements of any relevance in
considering the jurisdiction of courts of states within the EC / EFTA
bloc? This question cannot be answered with any certainty; it will be
considered in Chapter 3.
It is appropriate at this point to return to arts 2-4; the rules to
which their provisions are subject have now been referred to. On
account of its importance, art 2 should be set out in full:
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a
Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the
courts of that State.
Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are
domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable
to nationals of that State.
The effect of para one is clearly that if an individual is domiciled
in an EC or EFTA state, as a general rule - in other words, if
jurisdiction is not determined by one of the sets of provisions which
have been considered - proceedings can be brought against him in the
courts of that state. So far as the jurisdiction of the courts of the
state as a whole is concerned, whether he is also resident or
domiciled in, or is a citizen of, a third state (or another EC or
EFTA state) is of no consequence. And if on the other hand the
defender is a legal person domiciled in an EC or EFTA state, any
domicile which it may also have in another state is of no
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consequence. In either case, the residence, domicile and nationality
of the pursuer are inconsequential. So too is the 1 ocus of the
subject matter of the proceedings.
Three problems should be mentioned here; the first two have in fact
already been alluded to. The first problem arises if the subject
matter of the action falls within one of the five categories listed
in art 16, but is situated in a third state. If the defender is
domiciled in an EC or EFTA state, are the courts of that state
obliged to entertain the proceedings on account of art 2? Secondly,
if there is a prorogation agreement in favour of a court of a third
state, must a court of the EC or EFTA state in which the defender is
domiciled nevertheless, on account of art 2, allow the proceedings
brought in it (the court of the EC or EFTA state) to go ahead?
Finally, if proceedings involving the same subject matter and the
same parties - which the present writer refers to as identical
proceedings - are taking place in a court of another EC or EFTA state
or in a court of a third state, is an otherwise competent court of
the EC or EFTA state in which the defender is domiciled nevertheless
obliged to entertain the proceedings brought in it? All three
problems are commonly regarded as concerning the courts' right to
decline to exercise jurisdiction rather than the existence of
jurisdiction; they will therefore be considered in Chapter 3.
As a general rule it is for the domestic law of the EC or EFTA state
in which the defender is domiciled to determine the particular courts
with jurisdiction, but in this context para two of art 2 is of
relevance. In the United Kingdom nationality is not a ground of
jurisdiction in actions within the subject matter scope of the
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Conventions; this provision is therefore of no real relevance there
and indeed causes some puzzlement. But the effect of para two seems
to be that, in determining the particular courts with jurisdiction in
the state in which the defender is domiciled, if either party is
domiciled in the state concerned but is not a citizen of it, he is to
be treated as a citizen as well as a domiciliary of the state. Of
course the defender will be domiciled in the state; the pursuer may
or may not also be so domiciled. This provision is principally
concerned with domici 1 iaries of states in the EC / EFTA bloc rather
than of third states, and in any event its significance is very
limited, only concerning the internal allocation of jurisdiction in
certain Continental contracting states. It will not be considered
further here.
In art 3, para one contains the general rule that proceedings may
only be brought against a domiciliary of an EC or EFTA state in an EC
or EFTA state in which he is not domiciled if jurisdiction can be
based on one of the grounds set out in Title II of the Conventions.
There are listed in para two various rules of exorbitant jurisdiction
to be found in EC and EFTA states which cannot provide the basis of
jurisdiction in the case of a defender domiciled in another EC or
EFTA state. This list is without prejudice to the generality of para
one. The article has no significance for domici1iaries of third
states.
Article 4 has already been referred to at various points. Its precise
terms are as follows:
If the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the
jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State shall, subject
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to the provisions of Article 16, be determined by the law of that
State.
As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a Contracting
State may, whatever his nationality, avail himself in that State of
the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular those
specified in the second paragraph of Article 3, in the same way as
the nationals of that State.
Paragraph one makes it clear that, as a general rule, if a defender
is domiciled in a third state, whether proceedings can be brought
against him in a particular EC or EFTA state is purely a matter for
the domestic law of the EC or EFTA state concerned. Whether the locus
of the subject matter of the proceedings is of any significance is a
matter for that domestic law. It is stated that exceptions to the
general rule are to be found in art 16; as has been noted, there are
also exceptions to the rule in art 17, and there is a strong argument
for art 18 also to be considered as containing an exception. The
present writer very much doubts whether further exceptions are to be
H
found in arts 12 and 15.
It should be noted that, on account of art 4 para one, exorbitant
rules of jurisdiction may be used not only in proceedings against
persons who are domiciled in and citizens of third states, but also
against persons who are domiciled in third states but citizens of
contracting states. To a Continental lawyer, accustomed to
nationality being a significant connecting factor, this may well at
first sight seem unfair: Should nationals of EC and EFTA states not
be entitled to protection from the various rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction? There is in fact a good argument why nationals who are
not domici1iaries should not be entitled to this protection. It is
that if they were protected in this way, a pursuer might be
unreasonably hindered in his attempts to bring proceedings against a
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defender in this category. In Jenard's example,
a Belgian national domiciled outside the Community might own assets
in the Netherlands. The Netherlands courts have no jurisdiction in
the matter since the Convention does not recognize jurisdiction based
on the presence of assets within a State. If Article 14 of the French
Civil Code could not be applied, a French plaintiff would have to sue
the Belgian defendant in a court outside the Community, and the
judgment could not be enforced in the Netherlands if there were no
enforcement treaty between the Netherlands and the non-member State
in which judgment was given.
Of course the basing of jurisdiction on exorbitant grounds can be
criticised in principle, but it is submitted that on account of the
general approach of Title II, the omission of a special rule
concerning citizens of contracting states domiciled in third states
was appropriate. For otherwise a pursuer wishing to bring proceedings
against a "non-domiciled citizen" would have been in a significantly
less favourable position than a pursuer wishing to sue a domiciliary
of a contracting state or a national and domiciliary of a third
state. Putting non-domiciled citizens into a privileged position
could not have been justified. The class of persons who can be sued
in the EC / EFTA bloc on account of the basic rule of the Conventions
is that of domici1iaries of EC and EFTA states; it would be wrong to
have the protection from certain rules given to persons in a larger
class.
Like art 2 para two, art 4 para two is somewhat puzzling to British
readers. In the United Kingdom there are no rules of jurisdiction
designed purely for use by would-be pursuers who are British
citizens. Article 4 para two is therefore of no relevance in the
context of the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom courts. But its
significance can be explained by reference to art 14 of the French
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Code civil. Article 14 states that
1'Stranger, m§me non r6sidant en France pourra 8tre traduit devant
les tribunaux de France, pour les obligations par lui contract6es en
pays 6tranger envers des Franqais.
A French citizen, in other words, may bring proceedings 1n a French
court, concerning a contractual obligation entered into abroad,
against a foreigner who is not resident in France. And case law has
extended the scope of art 14 well beyond actions concerning
4-6
contractual obligations. On account of art 4 para two, a British
citizen domiciled in France may, in effect basing jurisdiction on art
14 of the Code civil, also bring proceedings against an individual
domiciled in a third state. Indeed any foreigner domiciled in France
may make use of art 14 - art 4 para two allows citizens of third
states just as much as citizens of other states in the EC / EFTA bloc
to do so. It should be said that the rule in art 4 para two, which
4*
Jenard attempts to justify on various grounds, was the subject of
much criticism when it was drafted; as will be seen in Chapter 4, it
was partly on account of art 4 para two that art 59 was included in
the Conventions.
Jenard makes the point that the rule set out in art 4 para two
constitutes part of the rule already set out in art 2 para two. It is
"a positive statement of the principle of equality of treatment
4-3
already laid down". He states that "[a]n express provision was
4-3
considered necessary in order to avoid any uncertainty". Of course
art 2 para one focuses on defenders, and it is often assumed that
para two does too. What are Jenard's justifications for pursuers who
are domici1iaries but not citizens being equated with pursuers who
are citizens for the purposes of the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction
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applicable against domici1iaries of third states?
Si
Firstly, Jenard states that the rule complements the right of
establishment to be found in art 52 et seg of the Treaty of Rome.
Article 52 states that ". ..restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of
another Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages " It
is indeed the case that if citizens of one EC state are to be able
fully to carry on business in another EC state they must not be at a
disadvantage when they are required to bring an action against a
domiciliary of a third state. But of course this does not justify the
rule in art 4 para two applying, as it certainly seems to do, to
nationals of third states as well as to nationals of other EC states.
(Neither art 4 para two nor art 2 para two contains any words which
provide that it is inapplicable in the case of nationals of third
states.)
Secondly, Jenard justifies the provision on what he terms "economic
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grounds". He states that
[s]ince rules of exorbitant jurisdiction can still be invoked against
foreigners domiciled outside the European Economic Community, persons
who are domiciled in the Member State concerned and who thus
contribute to the economic life of the Community should be able to
invoke such rules in the same way as the nationals of that State.
This is of course a good argument for art 4 para two applying to
nationals of third states as well as to nationals of other EC states.
Jenard also comments that as the Brussels Convention "uses domicile
&
as the criterion for determining jurisdiction", it is natural for the
Convention to provide that all the domici1iaries of a particular
contracting state will have the same rights to bring proceedings in
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that state. National and non-national domici1iaries were already
treated equally in thir respect in four of the first six contracting
states; the practical effect of art 4 para two was therefore simply
to enable nationals of both other EC states and third states
domiciled in the contracting state concerned to make use of art 14 of
the French and Luxembourg Codes civils.
Two English cases concerning arts 2-4 should be mentioned here.
They both focus on the United Kingdom rules of domicile and seat of
legal persons and other bodies, to be found in s 42 of the Act. The
relevant parts of s 42 are as follows:
(1) For the purposes of this Act the seat of a corporation or
association (as determined by this section) shall be treated as its
domicile.
(6) Subject to subsection (7), a corporation or association has its
seat in a state other than the United Kingdom if and only if -
(a) it was incorporated or formed under the law of that state and has
its registered office or some other official address there; or
(b) its central management and control is exercised in that state.
(7) A corporation or association shall not be regarded as having its
seat in a Contracting State other than the United Kingdom if it is
shown that the courts of that state would not regard it as having its
seat there.
In Ihe Deichland the company in question had been incorporated in
Panama and had an official address there. But its central management
and control was exercised in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
German courts would have regarded it as having its seat in Germany.
It was held by the Court of Appeal that the company was domiciled in
an EC state - FRG - and so jurisdiction in the High Court could not
be based on a ground not found in the Brussels Convention; the
company's other domicile - in Panama - was irrelevant. In the other
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case, The Rewia, the company concerned had been incorporated in
Liberia and had an official address there; its central management and
control was exercised in FRG, and it was not shown that the German
courts would not regard it as domiciled there. The High Court
followed the decision in The Deichland. The present writer of course
considers these decisions to be correct. On account of art 53 para
one of the Conventions, it is for each state to determine whether a
legal person is domiciled within the contracting states. If it is so
domiciled, certain consequences follow regardless of whether in terms
of the law of any state it is also domiciled in a third state.
Before concluding this chapter by considering the significance in the
context of the Conventions and third states of the rules of "Special
jurisdiction" in arts 5 - 6A, one further point should be mentioned.
The question is this: If the pursuer, as well as the defender, to an
action is domiciled in a third state, are the rules of jurisdiction
which constitute exceptions to the general rule in art 4 para one of
any relevance? Putting it another way, if both parties to an action
are domiciled in third states, is Title II as a whole applicable or
not in determining jurisdiction? This question, together with another
which will be examined in Chapter 3, was considered in S & W
£8
Berisford v New Hampshire Insurance Co.
This was an action in the English High Court against an insurance
company which was incorporated in the United States. The company had
no domicile in any EC state in terms of the domestic law of that
state. It had an office in the City of London, and the dispute
concerned contracts of insurance which had been made as part of the
business of the London office. The defendant sought to have the
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action stayed so that identical proceedings could go ahead in a New
York court. It made a forum non conveniens application, arguing that
in the circumstances the court should not exercise the jurisdiction
which it had in terms of English law. The plaintiffs, on the other
hand, maintained that the court had jurisdiction on account of art 8
para two and art 2 para one of the Brussels Convention. The
defendant, they argued, was deemed to be domiciled in the United
Kingdom by operation of art 8 para two, and so could be sued there by
virtue of art 2 para one. The Convention, in their submission, did
not allow the court to stay the action on the basis of forum non
conveniens.
The judge considered three principal questions. Firstly, in actions
such as Berisford where neither of the principal parties is domiciled
in an EC state, does Title II of the Convention have any application?
Secondly, if Title II is applicable, is it open to the court to stay
the action? And thirdly, if a stay is competent, should the
discretion be exercised in favour of a stay in the particular
circumstances of the case? The first question is of relevance here;
the second question will be considered in Chapter 3.
The judge asked what the objects of the Convention are, but his
discussion of this matter was unfortunately not particularly well
thought-out. He made reference to the desire of those drawing up the
Convention as far as possible to regulate jurisdiction within the EC,
and to the fact that art 16 is clearly applicable even if neither
party is domiciled in an EC state. He concluded that neither in the
Convention nor in the 1982 Act "is there to be found expressly or
implicitly the restriction that the defendants seek to impose on the
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application and scope of the convention". This, in the present
writer's opinion, is correct; there is no significant school of
thought that actions in which neither party is domiciled in the EC
are outside the scope of Title II of the Brussels Convention as a
whole. No words of the Convention suggest that this is the case, and
anyone arguing that the scope of Title II is restricted in this way
must explain the significance to him of the rule in art 17 concerning
prorogation agreements "concluded by parties, none of whom is
domiciled in a Contracting State".
The principal effect of the rules of special jurisdiction in arts 5 -
6A is that in certain circumstances a defender domiciled in an EC or
EFTA state may be sued in particular courts of another EC or EFTA
state. For example, art 5(1) provides that
[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another
Contracting State, be sued:
in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of
performance of the obligation in question
For art 5(1) to be applicable, the defender must clearly be domiciled
in an EC or EFTA state, and the locus in question must be in an EC or
EFTA state - another EC or EFTA state. But, as with the general rule
of jurisdiction in art 2 para one, whether the defender is also
resident or domiciled in, or a citizen of, a third state is of no
consequence. And the residence, domicile and nationality of the
pursuer are inconsequential. Whether the court of the locus may in
certain circumstances decline to exercise jurisdiction, holding that
it would be more appropriate for the proceedings to take place in a
court of a third state, will be considered in Section 3. Although it
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does not seem necessary to go through each of the parts of arts 5 -
6A, art 6(1) should perhaps be mentioned. It provides:
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued:
where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the
place where any one of them is domiciled.
This provision can clearly enable a defender domiciled 1n one EC or
EFTA state to be sued in another EC or EFTA state by a pursuer
domiciled in a third state, in connection with events which took
place in a third state.
To conclude this chapter, it might be said that although the rules of
jurisdiction of the Conventions are principally applicable in
proceedings against persons domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc, the
Conventions nevertheless contain a significant group of rules which
can be of relevance in proceedings against persons domiciled in third
states. And the Conventions go as far as to provide that nationals of
third states domiciled in the EC / EFTA bloc may bring proceedings in
the state in which they are domiciled against domici1iaries of third
states, making use of national rules of exorbitant jurisdiction which
purport to be available only to the citizens of the state. The locus
of the subject matter of the proceedings in a third state is in the
ordinary case irrelevant, and is never specifically deemed to be a
bar to jurisdiction. Whether or not identical proceedings are taking
place, or may on account of a prorogation agreement be about to take
place, in a court of a third state are matters which have no place in
the rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions. And, finally, a pursuer
who is domiciled in a third state will find that one or two rules of
jurisdiction are not available to him.
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3 Ihe Conventions and th1 rd states: the decl 1ning of .jurisdiction
It was stated at the beginning of Chapter 2 that arts 21-23 concern
the declining of jurisdiction rather than jurisdiction itself. What
these articles are providing is that in certain circumstances in
which a court has jurisdiction on account of the provisions of the
Conventions, it must decline to exercise that jurisdiction; in
certain other circumstances it may decline to do so. In this chapter
attention will be focused on these articles and also on two or three
other jurisdictional issues which it appears to be appropriate to
describe as concerning the declining of jurisdiction.
(a) Identical actions
Article 21 concerns what the present writer refers to as identical
actions, and art 22 concerns what are described as related actions;
art 23 contains a special rule relating to the exclusive jurisdiction
provisions in art 16. Article 21 states that
[w]here proceedings involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties are brought in the courts of different Contracting
States [and] the jurisdiction of the court first seised is
established, any court other than the court first seised shall
decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
It is provided by art 22 that
[w]here related actions are brought in the courts of different
Contracting States....[a] court other than the court first seised
may....on the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction
if the law of that court permits the consolidation of related actions
and the court first seised has jurisdiction over both actions.
Article 22 para three contains a definition of "related action";
actions are deemed to be related "where they are so closely connected
that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the
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risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate
proceedings". One effect of art 21 is clearly that if an action
falling within the subject matter scope of the Conventions is brought
in a court of another contracting state, and an attempt is then made
to bring an identical action in Scotland, the Scottish court must,
provided that the jurisdiction of the foreign court is established,
decline to exercise its jurisdiction. It no longer has a discretion
to allow the action to proceed or to uphold a plea of forum non
conveniens. But on the other hand in the context of related actions
the second court seised is in certain circumstances given a
discretion to decline jurisdiction.
It will have been noted that arts 21 and 22 refer to concurrent
proceedings in the courts of two states in the EC / EFTA bloc. One of
the questions which is most often asked about these articles is
whether, despite their wide terms, they are only applicable if the
defender is domiciled in an EC or EFTA state. Reference is sometimes
made to art 4 para one: Do the articles contain further exceptions to
the rule in this provision? It is submitted that they are applicable
in the case of defenders domiciled in third states just as much as in
the case of defenders domiciled in EC and EFTA states. And there is
no need for them to be regarded as containing exceptions to the rule
in art 4 para one. For this provision concerns the existence of
jurisdiction, not the declining to exercise a jurisdiction which
exists. The English language version of the articles in question
talks about the courts declining jurisdiction rather than not having
jurisdiction, and in the French version the courts must or may "se
dessaisir" rather than declare themselves lacking in "competence".
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In the English case of Overseas Union Insurance v New Hampshire
CI
Insurance it was held by the High Court that the art 21 duty to
decline jurisdiction exists whether or not the defendant is domiciled
in the EC. The case has been referred to the European Court by the
Court of Appeal, but the reference concerns jurisdiction in insurance
matters rather than art 21. In the subsequent High Court case of
63
Kloeckner & Co v Gatoi1 Overseas it appears to have been accepted by
all concerned that the application of art 21 is not restricted to
actions against persons domiciled in the EC. And then in S & W
Berisford v New Hampshire Insurance Co Hobhouse J stated that he
agreed with the decision of Hirst J in Overseas Union Insurance on
the application of art 21 to domici1iaries of third states.
a
In a note on the Overseas Union Insurance case, Hartley states that
the decision "is almost certainly right....[It] is consistent with
the general structure of the Convention". But, he adds, "[t]hat
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general structure is open to question". Article 21 is designed to
prevent there arising the situation in which a court is asked to
enforce two irreconcilable judgments. And on account of the
provisions of Title III of the Brussels Convention a judgment given
by a court of one EC state must be recognised and enforced in the
other states irrespective of whether the defendant is domiciled in an
EC state or a third state. So it is necessary for the scope of art 21
not to be restricted to actions against persons domiciled in the EC.
Hartley points out that art 21 "could produce unfortunate
consequences in some cases". An action might be brought in France
against a domiciliary of a third state, with jurisdiction based on
To
art 14 of the Code civil. The defendant in the French action then
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wishes to bring an action in the English High Court against the
plaintiff in the French action. Is it fair for him to be precluded
from doing so, regardless of the circumstances in which the French
action was brought against him?
So far as the "general structure" of the Convention is concerned,
there is a "lack of internationalism (outside the narrow circle of
Contracting States)". Article 4 enables domici1iaries of third states
to be sued on account of rules of jurisdiction not available in the
case of defendants domiciled in the EC, art 21 does not allow the
exorbitant nature of a rule of jurisdiction to be taken into account
in the case of concurrent actions, and Title III in principle
requires the enforcement throughout the EC of all judgments -
including judgments resulting from the use of an exorbitant rule of
jurisdiction - against domici1iaries of third states. The thinking of
the present writer on this matter is along the same lines as that of
Hartley; art 21 highlights what can be seen as one of the principal
weaknesses of the Conventions, a discrimination against domici1iaries
of third states.
This section may be concluded with a reference to some comments made
by Jenard. He state^that
if a French court is seised of an action between a Frenchman and a
defendant domiciled in America, and a German court is seised of the
same matter on the basis of Article 23 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, one of the two courts must in the interests of the proper
administration of justice decline jurisdiction in favour of the
other.
In other words, art 21 must be applicable regardless of the domicile
of the defender. This is in fact his second justification for art 4
para one. The article "may perform a function in the case of Us
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pendens". The problem contained in his example
cannot be settled unless the jurisdiction of those courts derives
from the Convention. In the absence of an article such as Article 4,
there would be no rule in the Convention expressly recognizing the
jurisdiction of the French and German courts in a case of this kind.'H
The present writer is not convinced that, had there been no art 4,
art 21 would not have been operative in the case of actions against
domici1iaries of third states. But the inclusion of art 4 leaves no
room for doubt. If it is the policy of the Conventions (a) as a
general rule to leave contracting states to determine the
jurisdiction of their courts in proceedings against domici1Iaries of
third states, and (b) to provide for the free movement of judgments
within the EC / EFTA bloc, then art 21 must be applicable to all
actions, irrespective of the domicile of the defender.
What is the position if, when an action is brought in a court of an
EC or EFTA state, there is an identical or related action already
taking place not in a court of another EC or EFTA state but in a
court of a third state? At common law the Scottish and English courts
have been prepared to consider preventing the proceedings before them
continuing in such situations. In England the defendant would
probably seek to have the proceedings stayed on the grounds of lis
alibi pendens. But if the proceedings in the United Kingdom were
brought instead in a Scottish court, the question would be treated
rather as coming under the general heading of forum non conveniens:
the defender would seek to have the proceedings sisted. Despite the
terminological differences, in both Scotland and England the court
would exercise a discretion. Each case has turned on its own facts,
but a consideration of the circumstances held to justify the staying
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/ sisting of the proceedings is outside the scope of this thesis.
T?
In the recent English case of Sohio Supply Co v Gatoi1 (USA). in
which the concurrent proceedings were taking place in Texas and the
defendant was domiciled in one or more third states, it was stated by
Staughton L J in the Court of Appeal that "it is inherently
undesirable that there should be concurrent proceedings in different
jurisdictions, about the same subject matter"; he referred to art 21
of the Brussels Convention but held that, in the circumstances, the
proceedings in England, rather than those in Texas, should go ahead.
But if the defendant had been domiciled instead in the United
Kingdom, is it the case that, on account of art 2 of the Convention,
there would have been no scope for argument and an English or
Scottish court would have been required to allow the action before it
to go ahead? There is no decision of the European Court on this
matter, and the question is unfortunately not considered in the
Official Reports. The most authoritative dicta may well therefore be
those of Droz:
[U]n tribunal competent au sens des articles 2 et suivants de la
Convention peut toujours surseoir & statuer ou se dessaisir & raison
de la 1itispendance existant au profit d'un tribunal Stranger & la
CommunautS.... que son droit commun 1'admette en l'espSce.^
In other words, a court with jurisdiction on account of art 2 or
another article of the Convention may decline that jurisdiction in
favour of a court of a third state 1n which an identical action has
already been brought - assuming, of course, that the domestic law of
the EC state concerned permits the declining of jurisdiction in these
circumstances. Droz was writing, of course, well before the admission
of the United Kingdom into the scheme of jurisdiction of the Brussels
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Convention; his words certainly suggest that the declining of
jurisdiction in favour of a foreign court on account of lis alibi
pendens is a course open, in terms of their national law, to courts
in at least one or two of the Continental contracting states. Droz
has considered the situation in which there is a convention between
the EC state and the relevant third state, and also the situation in
which there is no such convention:
[I]l faudra.... respecter les conventions internationales qui peuvent
lier des Etats membres de la Communaut6 & d'autres partenaires et qui
pr6voient justement l'exception de 1itispendance Mais m§me en
dehors de tout Trait6, on ne voit pas pourquoi on empScherait les
Etats dont le droit commun admet la 1itispendance de la respecter et
de parvenir ainsi, dans les relations internationales g6n6rales, &
cette bonne administration de la justice que la Convention de
Bruxelles cherche & r6aliser dans le cadre de la Communaut6.So
So conventions between EC states and third states should be
respected, but even where there is no such convention the declining
of jurisdiction in cases of lis alibi pendens will contribute to the
achieving of justice and should not be prohibited. This seems to be a
widely accepted position. Making reference to the works of
81
Continental writers, O'Malley and Layton state that
[t]he compulsory nature of the Convention's jurisdictional rules
probably does not operate to prevent a court of a Contracting State
from staying its proceedings in favour of a court first seised in a
non-Contracting State.
The question arose in the English High Court in Arkwright Mutual
81
Insurance Co v Bryanston Insurance Co: the judgment has dicta on
other questions too, and can more conveniently be summarised below.
There are now also dicta of the English Court of Appeal in In re
83
Harrods (Buenos Aires) on this point and on the next point to be
considered; these dicta will be set out below.
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(t) Prorogation agreements
Let us now suppose that no identical or related action 1s taking
place in any court of a third state, but the parties to the action in
a court of an EC or EFTA state have previously entered into a
prorogation agreement in favour of a particular court of a third
state. Article 17, it will be recalled, appears only to be concerned
with prorogation agreements in favour of courts of states in the EC /
EFTA bloc. At common law a Scottish or English court might very well
sist / stay the proceedings before it on account of a prorogation
agreement in favour of a court elsewhere. According to Cheshire and
North, there is a prima facie rule that an action brought in England
in defiance of an agreement to submit to a foreign jurisdiction will
SS
be stayed". At common law the Scottish approach is similar. Rule 5(1)
of Sched 8 to the Act states that
[i]f the parties have agreed that a court is to have jurisdiction to
settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, that court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction.
It is not clear if this rule is applicable in the event of the chosen
court being situated outside Scotland. It may well only apply where
the chosen court is Scottish, for no provision effectively extends
its application outside Scotland. If one compares rule 4, which
concerns exclusive jurisdiction and which will be referred to again
below, one will note that, in that rule, sub-rule (3) effectively
extends the principal rule in sub-rule (1) to proceedings where the
locus in question is outside Scotland. But s 49 of the Act states
that
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[n]othing in this Act shall prevent any court in the United Kingdom
from....sisting or dismissing any proceedings before it, on the
ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise, where to do so is not
inconsistent with the 1968 Convention.
So provided that the Conventions allow it to do so, a Scottish court
is still able, on the basis of forum non conveniens, to decline
jurisdiction in circumstances where there is a prorogation agreement
in favour of a foreign court - that is, of course, if it is not
required to do so by rule 5(1) of Sched 8. If there is a prorogation
agreement in favour of a court of another EC or EFTA state, a
Scottish or English court clearly must now apply art 17 of the
Conventions rather than its domestic law. But if the agreement is in
favour of a court of a third state, and the defender is domiciled in
the United Kingdom, must the Scottish or English court apply art 2
and entertain the proceedings? Fortunately the Official Reports are
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not totally silent on this matter. Schlosser states that
[tjhere is nothing in the 1968 Convention to support the conclusion
that such agreements must be inadmissible in principle. However, the
1968 Convention does not contain any rules as to their validity
either. If a court within the Community is applied to despite such an
agreement, its decision on the validity of the agreement depriving it
of jurisdiction must be taken in accordance with its own lex fori.
8? 38
Schlosser refers to the relevant passage in Droz's opus:
II est certain qu'un.... accord [qui dbsigne le tribunal ou les
tribunaux d'un Etat non contractant] n'est pas n6cessairement privy
d'effet. L'int6r£t des parties peut les conduire h yiire un for situ6
hors de la Communauty pour des raisons de neutrality ou de haute
technicity de la juridiction.
La validity d'un tel accord sera fonction d'une part de certaines
rygles impyratives de la Convention, et d'autre part des rygles du
droit commun ou conventionnel classique de l'Etat intyressy.
II est certain que si 1'yiection d'un tribunal situy hors de la
Communauty dyroge aux rbgles de compytence exclusive dont
bynyficierait un Etat de la Communauty, ou viole les dispositions
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imp6ratives des articles 12 et 15 en mati6re d' assurances et de
ventes et pr§ts k temp6rament, on ne pourra pas en tenir compte. Mais
si 1'accord ne d6roge qu'& des rdgles ordinaires de compbtence, il
pourra £tre respect6 ce qui, dans la pratique, conduira le tribunal
exclu k se d6c1arer incomp6tent.
Making reference to the dicta of Schlosser and Droz, O'Malley and
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Layton state that
[i]n general, a court of a Contracting State faced with....a
jurisdiction agreement [conferring jurisdiction on a court or courts
outside the Contracting States] will be free to decide whether to
give effect to the agreement, and to make that decision according to
its own law including its conflicts rules.
So there would seem to be little doubt that, if its domestic rules of
jurisdiction allow it to do so, a court of a contracting state may,
as a general rule, decline jurisdiction in favour of a court of a
third state which has previously been chosen by the parties. Droz's
words, particularly those in the second paragraph set out above, do
imply that declining jurisdiction in these circumstances is something
permitted by the domestic rules of certain of the Continental
contracting states. It may therefore be a little surprising that
Schlosser did not refer to the practice of these states in his
passage quoted above. His conclusion, derived apparently simply from
the lack of specific guidance either way in the Brussels Convention,
is in its context far from convincing.
But, it is submitted, there is indeed a strong case for arguing that
where (i) the parties have previously agreed that a court of a third
state will have jurisdiction over disputes between them, (ii) the
action does not concern any one of the three types of subject matter
in which, in the intra EC / EFTA bloc context, prorogation agreements
are not recognised at all or are only recognised in limited
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circumstances, and (iii) the court agreed upon is prepared to
exercise jurisdiction, the court of the EC or EFTA state should,
notwithstanding the provisions of the Conventions, be entitled to
decline to exercise jurisdiction. Unless there are overriding policy
considerations such as exist in the art 16 context, should each party
not be required to abide by the agreement which he has previously
entered into?
(c) Exclusive jurisdiction proceedings
Before turning to the recent English case law on the Conventions and
the courts' discretion to decline jurisdiction - there is as yet no
Scottish case law on the subject - something should be said about
what can be seen as an indirect effect of the rules of exclusive
jurisdiction in art 16. The problem can be explained by reference to
art 16(1), which of course concerns, inter alia, actions relating to
the ownership of land within the EC / EFTA bloc. It appears settled
that at common law the ownership of land outside Scotland could not
be the subject of an action in the Scottish courts. According to
Erskine, if the subject in question be immoveable, the judge of the
territory where it is situated is the sole judge competent". Duncan
12
and Dykes stated that the
fundamental rule....that the courts within whose territory the
[immoveable] property is situated have exclusive jurisdiction.... has
met with general, perhaps universal, recognition among modern jurists
and legal systems.
They regarded as being relevant in Scotland as well as in England the




There appear to me, I confess, to be solid reasons why the courts of
this country should.... have refused to adjudicate upon claims of
title to foreign land.
It is generally assumed that the inability of the Scottish and
English courts to entertain actions relating to the ownership of
foreign land has not been altered by the Brussels Convention becoming
part of Scots and English law. So far as Scotland is concerned, it is
felt that the rule is now to be found in rule 4 of Sched 8 to the
Act. Rule 4 provides that
(1) ....the following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction -
(a) in proceedings which have as their object rights i_n rem in, or
tenancies of, immoveable property, the courts for the place where the
property is situated;
(3) No court shall exercise jurisdiction in a case where immoveable
property is situated outside Scotland and where paragraph (1)
above would apply if the property....were situated in Scotland.
But s 20 of the Act provides that, in any conflict between the
Conventions and Sched 8, the Conventions are to prevail. So is it the
case that if an action concerns the ownership of land in a third
state, and the defender is domiciled in the United Kingdom, a
Scottish court must apply art 2 of the Conventions, rather than rule
4 of Sched 8 to the Act, and entertain the proceedings?
The Official Reports provide no assistance on this matter, and when
the Brussels Convention became part of the law in the United Kingdom
the present writer felt that, as in the context of lis pendens in a
third state, the most useful comments were probably those of Droz.
But before turning to Droz's opus. it is worth mentioning that
%
Collins expressed the view that
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if the land is situated outside the Contracting States and the
defendant is domiciled in a Contracting State, then it would seem




if the land is in a non-Contracting State and the defendant is
domiciled in England.... it would seem that effect must be given to
art 2.
Collins clearly regarded such a result as undesirable, and Hartley
thought it would be "very unfortunate", but can it be avoided?
According to Droz, the problem was not noticed when the Brussels
98
Convention was being drafted. But he believes that
ce serait aller trop loin que de tirer du caract^re impdratif des
regies de competence posees dans la Convention l'idee qu'en aucun cas
un tribunal d6sign6 par les regies ordinaires de competence pourrait
refuser cette competence et cela meme si les elements retenus &
1'article 16 sont situds hors de la Communaute. En effet, les raisons
qui ont conduit h 1'enumeration du catalogue de l'article 16
subsistent dans le cas ou les elements de rattachement sont situes
hors de la Communaute. Si le droit commun frangais veut que les juges
frangais soient incompetents pour trancher un litige relatif h un
immeuble situe h l'etranger, les raisons qui militent en France pour
cette solution conservent leur valeur.^
On account of art 4 an EC or EFTA state may of course, in the event
of the defendant being domiciled in a third state, continue to apply
its domestic rule prohibiting actions concerning the ownership of
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foreign land. Droz makes the valid point that
[o]n ne voit pas pourquoi on traiterait le d6fendeur domicilii en
France moins bien que le d6fendeur domicilii hors de la Communaut6
alors que l'esprit de la Convention est pr§cis6ment d'dtablir des
regies protectrices pour les personnes int6gr6es h la Communaut6.
ioi
Droz's conclusion is that
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si les 616ments de rattachement figurant & 1'article 16 sont situ6s
hors de la Communaut6, les juridictions des Etats contractants, qui
seraient comp6tentes en vertu d'un chef ordinaire de competence,
pourront n£anmoins se declarer incomp6tentes si leur droit commun les
y autorise.
In other words, notwithstanding the terms of art 2 of the
Conventions, courts of contracting states may still, if their
domestic law allows them to do so, decline jurisdiction on account of
an "exclusive jurisdiction" locus in a third state just as they can
do so on account of an identical action in a court of a third state
or a prorogation agreement in favour of a court of a third state. The
present writer explored this matter in an article in the Scots Law
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Times. He indicated that he agreed with Hartley that
[i]t would....be a very unfortunate state of affairs if English
courts were obliged to give judgments on questions of title to
foreign land just because the defendant was domiciled in
Engl and.... and it is to be hoped that the European Court will
interpret the Convention so as to allow national courts to apply
their own rules in this matter.
There is no jurisdiction in "foreign land" actions if the defender is
domiciled in a third state; in that situation rule 4(3) of Sched 8 is
clearly applicable in a Scottish court. To insist on jurisdiction
being exercised in "foreign land" actions in which the defender is
domiciled in the United Kingdom hardly seems in line with the general
policy of the Conventions to give protection to persons domiciled in
the EC / EFTA bloc. In his Scots Law Times article the present writer
lOlf.
considered four possible interpretations of provisions of Title II of
the Brussels Convention which would enable Scottish and English
courts to continue to refuse to entertain any proceedings relating to
the ownership of land in third states. He rejected an interpretation
of art 16 which considered part (1) as applying no matter where in
61
the world the land in question was situated: such an interpretation
would be regarded by the European Court as too liberal. He also
rejected interpreting art 2 as empowering and not requiring national
courts to entertain proceedings; it is generally accepted that the
rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions are mandatory. The
interpretation which he felt was most likely to find favour with the
European Court was this:
Article 2 in general requires the courts of Contracting States to
hear actions where the defender is domiciled in the State and the
action is not specifically prohibited by Art. 16, but it does not
extend to actions where the subject-matter is within one of the
general categories which are covered in part by the provisions of
Art. 16 - at any rate where there is a rule of domestic law
prohibiting all actions within the general category. (In this case
the general category is foreign land; the sub-category is foreign
land inside the Contracting States....)'°5
In other words, certain types of actions - such as "foreign land"
actions in which the locus is in a third state - are outside the
scope of art 2. But having given the matter further thought, the
writer is now happier with the last of the four possible solutions
which he tentatively put forward. It is this:
Article 2 in general requires the courts of contracting states to
hear actions where the defender is domiciled in the state and the
action is not specifically prohibited by art 16, but it does not go
as far as to prevent a court in a contracting state declining to hear
a case where the subject matter is within one of the general
categories which are covered in part by the provisions of art 16 - at
any rate where there is a rule of domestic law prohibiting all
actions within the general category.'°6
Because Continental courts traditionally have not had a general
discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction - the doctrine of
forum non conveniens being at least as a general rule confined to
common law systems - in 1987 the writer felt that this last solution
would not be likely to appeal to the European Court. But in view of
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the academic support on the Continent for the proposition that a
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction against a defender
domiciled in its territory if there is an identical action taking
place in a court of a third state, or if there is a prorogation
agreement in favour of a court in a third state, the writer now feels
that that the European Court might very well be prepared to regard
art 16, like art 21 and art 17, as containing a "signpost" or
"springboard" to the declining of jurisdiction in favour of a court
of a third state.
It should be mentioned that there is a curious passage in Anton's
<07.
work on international private law. After wrongly attributing to the
present writer the view that Scottish and English courts must now
entertain proceedings relating to the ownership of foreign land which
are brought against persons domiciled in the United Kingdom, it
states that such proceedings need not be entertained because
[t]he Convention is not concerned either to regulate the jurisdiction
of the Contracting State in matters which are not within its terms or
to regulate the internal jurisdiction of Contracting States in
relation to their own domici1iaries.'08
Precisely what is meant by "matters.... not within its terms" is
unclear; in any event the first part of the quotation seems somewhat
tautological. So far as the reference to internal jurisdiction is
concerned, whether or not this is correct it is irrelevant. For the
question which is at present under consideration is not one of
internal jurisdiction. The subject matter is situated in another
state, a third state, and the pursuer may be domiciled in another
state - another EC or EFTA state or a third state. It is very
different from the question which arises if an action is brought by
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an individual in London against an individual in Edinburgh concerning
events which took place in Manchester. Can an individual who is
domiciled in, and a citizen of, Germany not, at least as a general
rule, rely on art 2 in order to sue in the United Kingdom someone who
is domiciled there? In all the questions concerning the courts'
discretion to decline to entertain proceedings, the crucial point may
well be that the "competing" court is in a third state rather than
another state in the EC / EFTA bloc, but the issue cannot be
described as internal.
It may be thought that the question of whether art 16 has a
"springboard" effect is unlikely to come before the European Court;
on account of the traditional approach in many, if not all, of the
contracting states, it will be assumed that, irrespective of the
domicile of the defender, "foreign land" actions still cannot be
brought in national courts. Not only the serious doubts which there
would be as to the existence of jurisdiction, but also the problems
involved in the proof of foreign law and the difficulties which would
be encountered in trying to enforce a judgment abroad would
discourage litigation in the defender's domiciliary courts if the
land was situated in a third state.
But it must not be forgotten that art 16 is concerned with much more
than the ownership of foreign land. At least certain matters
concerning tenancies are covered by art 16(1), but it has not yet
been resolved if a straightforward action for payment of rent falls
/o<?
within the scope of the provision. Article 16(2) concerns inter alia
the validity of the dissolution of companies, and art 16(3) the
validity of entries in public registers. In Sched 8, rules 4(1) (b)
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and (c) and 4(3) purport to prohibit in Scottish courts art 16(2)—
type proceedings and art 16(3)-type proceedings in which the relevant
locus is outside Scotland. So the general problem which has been
illustrated by reference to the ownership of foreign land may become
the subject of judicial decision in the context of a tenancy, the
dissolution of a company or a public register.
It should finally be mentioned that there was in fact the opportunity
for the whole matter to be considered by a Scottish court. But that
HO
opportunity was not taken. In Ferguson's Tr v Ferguson a trustee in
sequestration sought to have a bankrupt interdicted inter al ia from
selling any property in Spain vested in the trustee. It was held that
the proceedings had as their object rights i_n rem in immoveable
property and that on account of art 16(1) of the Brussels Convention
the court had no jurisdiction. But at the time of the proceedings
Spain was a third state, and so art 16(1) cannot have been directly
relevant.
(d) The case law on the three particular problems
Having outlined the doctrine concerning identical actions,
prorogation agreements and exclusive jurisdiction, all in the context
of third states, it is now appropriate to turn to the case law in the
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United Kingdom. In Arkwright it was accepted by the defendants that
they were domiciled in the United Kingdom in terms of English law.
They argued that the action should be stayed in favour of proceedings
in a New York court. The New York proceedings had begun first, and so
the 1 is alibi pendens doctrine was applicable. Moreover, they
maintained, the New York court was the appropriate forum and so this
was also a case of forum non conveniens. The question of forum non
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conveniens will be considered below. So far as the 1 is alibi pendens
case is concerned, reference was made in the High Court by Potter J
to arts 16 and 17 of the Brussels Convention as well as to art 21. He
contrasted art 21 with arts 16 and 17. Looking first at arts 16 and
17, he said that in the case of these provisions
the Convention deals with particular features of certain types of
action in respect of which it recognises as a matter of principle
that (a) the status and/or nature of the subject matter of the action
and (b) the free agreement or consent of the parties as to forum,
transcend the otherwise mandatory system and structure of the
Convention founded on the defendant's domicile and make it
appropriate for one particular jurisdiction only to hear the case. "3
But, on the other hand,
[i]n the case of art. 21, (lis pendens) the Convention does not
identify the peculiar suitability of any particular Court to hear the
action by reference to its subject matter or the choice of the
parties.... It simply requires any Community Court to decline
jurisdiction or stay an action where another Community Court is
already seised of it. This seems to me no more than a simple order of
priority, imposed as a necessary aspect of the certain and orderly
regime of jurisdiction and enforcement in and between the Courts of
the Community. "3
The judge's conclusion was that art 21 cannot
be read as more than a circumscribed and necessary component of the
scheme of the Convention to simplify enforcement in relation to
judgments of the Courts of Contracting States, rather than as a
signpost to an exception to the provisions of that scheme [but] it
appears that the discretion remains in respect of non-Contracting
States in the various categories of case comprehended by arts. 16 and
17."+
In short, unlike the academic writers such as Collins, Hartley and
Kaye to whom he had referred, the judge did not consider "that art.
21 is to be regarded in a similar light to arts. 16 and 17 as
iif
"signposts" in favour of a discretion to stay". Unfortunately no
reference appears to have been made in the proceedings to Droz or to
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any of the other Continental writers. The value of preventing the
giving of irreconcilable judgments, one by a court within the EC /
EFTA bloc and the other by a court of a third state, appears to have
been lost on the judge. It should be mentioned that Collins, in a
116 UT
note on the decisions in Arkwri ght and Ber i sford. was far from
convinced with regard to the distinction made by Potter J in
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Arkwright. He stated that
[i]f the parties have agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of a non-Contracting State, [the judge in Arkwright] seems to
accept that the principles of the Convention may be relied on to
allow a stay of English proceedi ngs.... But if he is right about lis
alibi pendens then it is hard to see why it should not follow that
the English court would have no power to stay proceedings brought in
breach of a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on (say) the New
York courts.
II9
Finally here, in In re Harrods (Buenos Aires). which will be
considered more fully in the context of forum non conveniens. Dillon
L J, the Court of Appeal judge who gave the leading judgment,
referred to the decisions in Berisford and Arkwright and then stated:
Articles 21 and 22 of the Convention are only concerned with the
position where proceedings involving the same cause of action and
between the same parties, or related actions, are brought in the
courts of different Contracting States....Again Article 17 of the
Convention provides that if the parties have agreed that the courts
of a particular Contracting State shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to settle any disputes which may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, then the courts of that State shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to settle such disputes.... But if Article
2 has the full mandatory effect which [the judge in Berisford]
thought it has, the English courts would be bound to hear and decide
an action against a person domiciled in England even though both
parties to the action had agreed that the courts of some non-
Contracting State - be it New York or Argentina - should have
exclusive jurisdiction. Such results would, in my judgment, be
contrary to the intentions of the Convention.
The opinion of the Court of Appeal is then that, notwithstanding the
terms of art 2 of the Conventions, the English courts are entitled,
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on account of a prorogation agreement in favour of a court of a third
state, to stay an action brought against a United Kingdom
domiciliary. It may be felt that there is an implication in Dillon L
J's dicta quoted above that, contrary to what was held in Arkwright.
the English courts may also effectively decline jurisdiction in
favour of a court of a third state on account of an identical action
already taking place in that court. But the reader need not remain in
doubt about this matter, or about any implication resulting from the
lack of a reference to art 16 and the related third state problem.
For as will be seen, the Court of Appeal in fact went very much
further than simply holding that, despite the defender's United
Kingdom domicile, jurisdiction may be declined on account of a
prorogation agreement in favour of a court of a third state.
(?) Forum non conveniens: the academic writing
There was of course no need for the doctrine of forum non conveniens
to be considered when the Brussels Convention first entered into
force; it is not mentioned in the Jenard Report. But in his book on
the Convention Droz did state that "[l]a Convention de Bruxelles
no
rejette la th6orie du forum conveniens et on s'en f61icitera". When
the United Kingdom and Ireland entered the schemes of jurisdiction of
the Convention, it was then appropriate for consideration to be given
to the question of whether the Convention had effectively restricted
the ability of the United Kingdom and Irish courts to refuse to
entertain proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens. In his
article commenting on the 1978 Accession Convention, Droz - perhaps
not surprisingly in the light of his earlier comment - stated that in
the United Kingdom "la doctrine du forum non conveniens [a 6t6]
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abandonee". Believing this to be something of an exaggeration, the
IU
present writer published in the Juridical Review an article in which
he examined the matter at some length. He considered the various
circumstances in which a plea of forum non conveniens may be made;
the Court of Session may, for example, be asked to sist proceedings
in favour of a court in another law district of the United Kingdom, a
court in another state in the EC / EFTA bloc or a court in a third
state. He referred to the passage on forum non conveniens in the
Schlosser Report and to various unoffical sources.
Before considering the significance of the academic writing in the
context of the Conventions and third states, it seems appropriate to
make the point that if the common law rules of forum non conveniens
summarised in Chapter 1 were modified on 1 January 1987, this can
only have been on account of the Brussels Convention itself. For s 49
of the Act provides that
[n]othing in this Act shall prevent any court in the United Kingdom
from....sisting or dismissing any proceedings before it, on the
ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise, where to do so is not
inconsistent with the 1968 Convention.
And it is stated in s 22(1) that
[n]othing in Schedule 8 shall prevent a court from declining
jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens.
/13
In the Schlosser Report it is stated that
[a]ccording to the views of the delegations from the Continental
Member States of the Community [the] possibilities [of declining
jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens] are not open to
the courts of those states when, under the 1968 Convention, they have
jurisdiction and are asked to adjudicate....
The view was expressed that under the 1968 Convention the Contracting
States are not only entitled to exercise jurisdiction in accordance
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with the provisions laid down in Title 2; they are also obliged to do
so.
The delegations from the Continental states referred to are those to
the working party set up to consider what adjustments would be
required to the Brussels Convention as a result of the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joining the European Community. The
words "to the courts of those States" might be somewhat ambiguous,
but in the French text the expression used is "aux tribunaux d'un
Etat membre de la Communaut6", making it clear that the delegations
had in mind the courts of the United Kingdom as well as those of
their own states. Through reading the whole section it becomes clear
that Schlosser supports the delegations' view, and in setting out the
arguments for the discretion to decline jurisdiction not being
ai<-
permitted he states that
[a] plaintiff must be sure which court has jurisdiction. He should
not have to waste his time and money risking that the court concerned
may consider itself less competent than another Where the courts
of several States have jurisdiction, the plaintiff has deliberately
been given a right of choice, which should not be weakened by
application of the doctrine of forum conveniens.
11 5
In Schlosser's opinion
the fact that foreign law has to be applied, either generally or in a
particular case, should not constitute a sufficient reason for a
court to decline jurisdiction The practical reasons in favour of
the doctrine of forum conveniens will lose considerably in
significance, as soon as the 1968 Convention becomes applicable in
the United Kingdom and Ireland.
It is submitted that Schlosser's comments generally suggest that the
United Kingdom and Irish courts should not decline jurisdiction on
the basis of forum non conveniens on account of a court in either
another state in the EC / EFTA bloc or a third state being a more
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appropriate forum. But his reference in the second sentence of the
second last quotation to circumstances in which the plaintiff has
been given a right of choice can of course be used by those who wish
to argue that Schlosser was all along thinking in terms of the
declining of jurisdiction in favour of a court in another contracting
state no longer being permitted, and that the declining of
jurisdiction in favour of a court of a third state is still
permissible.
But that is not the view of Droz. Two sentences of his have already
been quoted. In his article concerning the 1978 Accession Convention,
Droz agrees with Schlosser that the basic approach of the Brussels
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Convention has not been changed and states that
[l]orsqu'il y a integration du litige dans la Communaute en raison du
domicile du d£fendeur. ... 1 a Convention....etablit des regies
uniformes de competence qui ont un caractere
imperatif....[T]raditionnellement, les systemes juridiques anglais,
ecossais, voire irlandais, laissent au juge un tr6s large pouvoir
d'appreciation en matiere de competence internationale selon la
doctrine du forum (non) conveniens. On peut estimer que....il n'y a
plus lieu de tenir compte d'une telle doctrine.
/2T
It is clear from his principal work that he regards the rule in art 2
as being one of the rules which have "un caractere imperatif". He is
certainly not encouraging the reader to believe that a Scottish or
English court which has jurisdiction on account of the defender's
domicile in the United Kingdom and in the law district concerned may
decline that jurisdiction in favour of a court of a third state.
But what are the views of British writers? It would not be
appropriate to survey the whole of the literature on the Conventions
and forum non conveniens here, and only the significant points made
by the more influential writers will be set out. But it should be
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said that it would appear to be the case that whereas the general
view is that - irrespective of the rule of the Conventions on which
jurisdiction is based - the declining of jurisdiction in favour of a
court of another EC or EFTA state is no longer a course open to the
Scottish Court of Session or the English High Court, there is no
consensus of opinion on the question of whether jurisdiction may be
declined in favour of a court of a third state.
»28
In a well-known passage Hartley concerns himself with the general
issue of the Brussels Convention and forum non conveniens. He
believes that Schlosser's arguments are
unconvincing to anyone familiar with the way in which English,
Scottish and American courts operate the doctrine....The case against
the English position does not seem....very strong [But] as the
European Court consists mainly of Continental lawyers, it is by no
means certain that the English courts will be allowed to retain their
discretion to stay.
And after setting out in his own words the rules in arts 2, 5 and 16,
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Anton states that
where a court has jurisdiction under the rules referred to above,
it must exercise its jurisdiction whenever required to do so. The
court has no general discretion to decline jurisdiction on the
principle of forum non conveniens.
It is worth mentioning that, somewhat curiously, the section on the
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Brussels Convention and forum non conveniens in Dicey and Morris is
only concerned with the question of whether jurisdiction may still be
declined in favour of a court of another EC state.
Cheshire and North would not appear to support the English High Court
attempting to decline jurisdiction in favour of a court of a third
state:
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There are powerful arguments against using a forum non conveniens
discretion where the Convention applies, whatever the situation....
It is clear that as the law stands at the moment the court of a
Contracting State which has been allocated jurisdiction has no
discretionary power to refuse to take it. Moreover, it would not be
desirable, in the context of the Convention, to have such a
discretion.
And Lasok and Stone make their position clear:
[E]ff1ciency should be promoted by requiring a court which is
properly seised to proceed to determine the dispute, and prohibiting
it from considering whether some other forum is in some (or even
every) way more suitable.
Article 2 merely confers jurisdiction on the courts in general of [a]
Member State [T]he State may provide that in certain cases more
than one of its courts shall be competent, and that one of its
courts, when competent and seised in such a case, may exercise
discretion, in accordance with a doctrine of forum non conveniens, to
decline jurisdiction in favour of another competent court of the same
State, though not in favour of a court of another Member or non-
member State. '35
But, on the other hand, Kaye feels that a distinction can and should
be drawn between declining jurisdiction in favour of a court of
another EC state and declining jurisdiction in favour of a court of a
third state:
The Community does not exist in a vacuum: it cannot simply ignore the
existence of competing claims to jurisdiction of non-Contracting
States' courts, and conferment of jurisdiction under the Convention
upon a Contracting State's courts may also therefore be regarded as
bestowal of control over the exercise of that jurisdiction upon those
courts, including the power to decline in favour of non-Contracting
State jurisdiction [Jurisdiction [in terms of inter alia art 2]
may be regarded as only being obligatory in relation to competing
jurisdiction claims within the Community and under the Convention
system, not as regards the entire outside world.
The present writer's own conclusion in his Juridical Review article
was that, although the effect of the 1978 Accession Convention on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was not as great as Droz imagined,
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if called upon, the European Court is likely to give a ruling to the
effect that, in an action in a Scottish court where jurisdiction is
being based on the defender's domicile in the territory of the court,
a significant connection - whatever exactly that may mean - with any
state other than the United Kingdom will render the Convention
applicable and, consequently, the upholding of a plea of forum non
conveniens a course unavailable to the court.
It is conceded that, where the defender is an individual and
jurisdiction is being based on his domicile in the territory of the
court, the possibility of a plea of forum non conveniens succeeding,
even if it is still competent, can at best be described as remote.
However, where the defender is a public limited company and is
domiciled in the territory of the court merely because one of its
many places of business is situated there, the problems are much
more likely to occur.'3^
The unlikelihood of the problem occuring in the context of a defender
who is an individual may have been exaggerated. Until case law
develops on the meaning of "substantial connection" in s 41 of the
Act, the possibility of an individual being held to be domiciled
where, for example, he has a holiday home is unclear. The present
writer referred to Kaye's passage quoted above and submitted that
it is misleading to speak of courts' competing claims. The parties to
an action have a much greater interest than the possible forums have
in the question of where it should be heard. And, if a United Kingdom
court could decline jurisdiction in favour of a United States court,
the certainty which Schlosser feels ought to exist within the
European Community would clearly be lacking.'35
(f) Forum non conveniens: the case law
The Juridical Review article was written in the absence of any
relevant Scottish or English case law, but shortly after it was
published the English High Court decisions in Berisford and Arkwright
were reported. As has been seen, in each of these cases the stay was
sought in favour of a court of a third state - a New York court. In
each case the judge's thinking was along the same lines as that of
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the present writer expressed in the Juridical Review article: if the
defendant is domiciled in England, the court cannot allow the
proceedings to be sisted on the grounds that a court of another state
- another EC state or a third state - would be a more appropriate
forum. In Berisford Hobhouse J stated that there is
nothing in the convention which contemplated any application of a
remedy of stay on the ground of forum non conveniens....[T]here is no
provision which so much as hints at the exercise of the power invoked
by the defendants. The defendants met this point by explaining that
under the legal systems of most of the contracting states there is
no concept of discretionary jurisdiction....
The defendants' acceptance of this situation is fatal to their case.
It is clear that the convention is designed (subject to art 4) to
achieve uniformity and to "harmonise" the relevant procedural and
jurisdictional rules of the courts of the contracting states. The
convention leaves no room for the application of any discretionary
jurisdiction by the courts of this country; the availability of such
a discretion would destroy the framework of the convention and create
lack of uniformity in the interpretation and implementation of the
convention.
In Arkwright the dicta in Berisford were considered; reference was
also made to the relevant passages in four English works on the
13*
Brussels Convention. Potter J concluded:
After careful consideration of the rival arguments, I agree with the
decision reached by [Hobhouse J] in the Berisford case to the effect
that, for the English Court to retain its former wide discretion in
respect of the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be inconsistent
with the Convention.'38
As has already been noted, in Arkwright the defendants' argument
concerned lis alibi pendens as well as forum non conveniens: the
judge went on to consider art 21 in comparison with arts 16 and 17.
The question of the effect of the Brussels Convention on the doctrine
of forum non conveniens has now been considered by the English Court
»3<?
of Appeal in the case of In re Harrods (Buenos Aires). In this case
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there was a petition under s 459 of the Companies Act 1985. Ladenimor
sought either an order that Intercomfinanz buy its (Ladenimor's)
shares in the Harrods (Buenos Aires) company (Harrods), or the
compulsory winding-up of Harrods. Intercomfinanz and Harrods were
effectively defendants. Intercomfinanz was a Swiss company; Harrods
was incorporated or formed under English law and it had its
registered office in England, but its central management and control
and all its business activities were in Argentina. Intercomfinanz
sought to have the proceedings stayed on the basis of forum non
conveniens in favour of an Argentinian court. As Intercomfinanz was
not domiciled in the EC, so far as it itself was concerned the
question was simply one of whether a stay would be appropriate. But
with regard to Harrods, which in terms of English law was domiciled
in the United Kingdom as well as in Argentina, the initial question
posed in the Court of Appeal was whether it was open to the court to
stay the proceedings.
The court was conscious that 1t was being asked to stay the
proceedings in favour of a court of a third state, not another EC
state; it was in fact conceded by counsel for Intercomfinanz that it
would not have been open to the court to stay the proceedings in
favour of a court of another EC state. The court considered the
various provisions of the Brussels Convention and the High Court
decisions in Berisford and Arkwright. It appreciated that the
question of the availability of the forum non conveniens defence
depended on the construction of the Convention, and that that was a
matter for European law. It made reference to art 220 of the Treaty
Hi.o
of Rome and to passages in the Jenard and Schlosser Reports. Dillon L
J stated that he found it
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difficult to give much weight to the reports in relation to the
question with which we are concerned because I do not think that Mr
Jenard or Professor Schlosser had that question in
contemplation.... [T]he Professor was only concerned.... wi th the
protection of persons domiciled in the Contracting States and with
choices, which should not be on the ground of forum conveniens,
between the courts of several Contracting States having jurisdiction.
He had noted that the jurisdiction provisions of the Convention were
designed to complement the provisions concerning the recognition and
enforcement of judgments, and he continued:
For the English court to refuse jurisdiction, in a case against a
person domiciled in England, on the ground that the court of some
non-Contracting State is the more appropriate court to decide the
matters in issue does not in any way impair the object of the
Convention of establishing an expeditious, harmonious, and, I would
add, certain procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments,
since ex hypothesi if the English court refuses jurisdiction there
will be no judgment of the English court to be enforced in the other
Contracting States. Equally and for the same reason such a refusal of
jurisdiction would not impair the object of the Convention that there
should, subject to the very large exception of Article 4, be a
uniform international jurisdiction for obtaining the judgments which
are to be so enforced.
Moreover, he said, if the court did not have the power to decline
jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens, neither would it
have the power to do so on the ground of lis alibi pendens or on
account of a prorogation agreement in favour of a court of a third
state. In his judgment, such results "would be contrary to the
intentions of the Convention". He concluded:
I do not agree with [the judge in the Berisford case] that the
framework of the Convention would be destroyed if there were
available to the English court a discretion to refuse jurisdiction,
on the ground that the courts of a non-Contracting State were the
appropriate forum, in a case with which no other Contracting State is
in any way concerned. I do not accept that Article 2 has the very
wide mandatory effect which [the judge] would ascribe to it where the
only conflict is between the courts of a single Contracting State and
the courts of a non-Contracting State.
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Stocker L J simply agreed with Dillon L J. Bingham L J, who stated
that he was in "full agreement" with Dillon L J, said that the
question which the court was required to answer was "never squarely
addressed" in the Jenard and Schlosser Reports. The "thrust of the
reports", in his opinion, supported Intercomfinanz's case much more
than Ladenimor's. "I give one example", he continued:
Both reports consider in detail the existence of earlier bilateral or
trilateral conventions between contracting states, some of which are
indeed listed in Article 55 of the 1968 Convention. Yet, save for
[one irrelevant reference], there is (so far as I can trace) no
reference to any convention between any contracting state and any
non-contracting state. On [the argument of counsel for
Intercomfinanz] this is understandable: in the absence of any
conflict or potential conflict of jurisdiction between contracting
states, the Conventions have no role. If, however, the Conventions
govern relations between a contracting state and a non-contracting
state even when there is no conflict or potential conflict between
contracting states one would expect all conventions to fall for
consideration and examination.
It is respectfully submitted by the present writer that, whether or
not the European Court would in effect hold that it is open to the
High Court to stay proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens
in favour of a court of a third state, the justifications for this
being permitted which were put forward by the Court of Appeal judges
in Harrods are far from satisfactory. With regard to the first two
quotations from the judgment of Dillon L J, one might first make the
point that it is far from clear that Schlosser "was only
concerned....with choices.... between the courts of several
Contracting States having jurisdiction"; this matter has already been
"H
referred to.
A further point which can be made with much justification, it is
submitted, is that, although the convention which was originally
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envisaged was simply a recognition and enforcement convention, in the
convention which was finally signed the jurisdiction part and the
recognition and enforcement part are of equal weight. Although each
part of the Convention may be of guidance in interpreting the other,
the role of the rules of jurisdiction in providing litigants with
uniformity and certainty throughout the EC is at least as great as
their role in providing a satisfactory background to the rules of
1^3
recognition and enforcement. A particular practice which runs counter
to the provisions of Title II cannot be justified on the basis that
it does not result in there being given judgments which are
enforceable in terms of Title III!
In addition it should not be forgotten that proceedings in a court of
an EC state in which the alternative forum is in a third state may
nevertheless be linked to another EC state; although it was not the
case in Harrods, the pursuer might, for example, be domiciled in a
third state. Are such pursuers not entitled to "protection" - to use
Dillon L J's word - against jurisdiction being declined?
Dillon L J then stated that if the court could not stay proceedings
on the basis of forum non conveniens, it could not do so either on
the basis of lis al ibi pendens. This, with respect, just does not
follow. Article 21 of the Convention contains a rule relating to lis
alibi pendens, just as art 17 contains a rule relating to prorogation
agreements; a strong case can therefore be made for national courts
being entitled to decline jurisdiction on account of either identical
proceedings in, or a prorogation,agreement in favour of, a court of a
third state. But there is no one article of the Convention to which
there can be linked a general power to decline jurisdiction on the
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basis of forum non conveniens in favour of a court of a third state.
Bingham L J refers to the bilateral and trilateral conventions signed
by EC states which are mentioned in the Convention and in the
Official Reports. But the explanation for conventions with third
states not being mentioned in art 55 is simply that the article lists
the recognition and enforcement conventions which are in effect
replaced by Title III of the Convention; because Title III concerns
recognition and enforcement within the EC, conventions with third
states are not replaced by Title III. And there is absolutely no
justification for expecting "all conventions to fall for
consideration and examination" in the Official Reports if the
Convention does not allow a court of an EC state to decline
jurisdiction in favour of a court of a third state. For if the courts
of the EC states have no discretionary power to stay proceedings in
favour of courts of third states, that is the end of the matter.
There is no need for the Reports to consider arrangements for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments which EC states have entered
into with third states.
In his note on the decisions in Arkwright and Berisford, Collins
makes it clear that he is not happy with the decisions. He makes the
point that it was not in fact necessary in either case for the court
to answer the question of whether it was open to it to stay the
proceedings. For in each case it was held that the High Court was the
appropriate forum. He clearly believes that decisions such as those
in Berisford and Arkwright were not foreseen by those who represented
the United Kingdom in the negotiations which led up to the 1978
Accession Convention; he suggests one or two procedural devices which
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could be used by the English High Court to mitigate the effects of
the decisions. His conclusion is this:
The Convention was intended to regulate jurisdiction as between the
Contracting States....Once a court in a Contracting State has
jurisdiction it is entitled, vis-^-vis other states, to exercise that
jurisdiction and other courts cannot. But the States which were
parties to the Convention had no interest in requiring a Contracting
State to exercise a jurisdiction where the competing jurisdiction was
in a non-Contracting State. The Contracting States were setting up an
intra-Convention mandatory system of jurisdiction. They were not
regulating relations with non-Contracting States.14-*
Collins will undoubtedly be much more satisfied with the decision in
Harrods. In fact it is obvious from the judgments in Harrods that
Collins' comments were taken into account by the court.
Forum non conveniens: concluding comments
In the light of the English case law and the recent academic writing,
the present writer has reflected on whether he ought to modify the
view which he expressed in the Juridical Review article. But he has
not become convinced that the existence of a discretion to decline
jurisdiction in favour of a court of a third state is in keeping with
the provisions of the Conventions. Schlosser speaks of both the
mandatory nature of the rules of jurisdiction and the need for
certainty. If an individual who is domiciled in, and a citizen of,
one state in the EC / EFTA bloc wishes to sue an individual who is
domiciled in another in one of the courts of the state of the would-
be defender's domicile, and there is an alternative forum in another
state, it is difficult to see what justification there is for a state
of affairs in which it is only if the alternative forum is in another
EC or EFTA state that the would-be pursuer can be certain that the
domiciliary court will entertain the proceedings.
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Let us imagine two reparation actions being brought in the High Court
in London; in both cases the defendant is domiciled in the United
Kingdom and the plaintiff is domiciled in another state in the EC /
EFTA bloc. The harmful event which gave rise to one of the actions
took place in another EC or EFTA state; the harmful event giving rise
to the other took place in a third state. Is it fair for the High
Court effectively to be able to send the plaintiff in one action to a
court of a third state, but not to be able to send the plaintiff in
the other to a court of another EC state? There would in fact appear
to be a case for saying that if the declining of jurisdiction is to
be permitted at all, it should be permitted in intra EC / EFTA bloc
actions but not in actions in which the alternative forum is in a
third state; decisions of national courts of EC states - and even of
EFTA states - can be supervised in a way in which decisions of courts
of third states can not. But there is little doubt that the European
Court would not sanction the declining of jurisdiction in favour of a
court of another EC state.
An argument that the declining of jurisdiction on the basis of forum
non conveniens in favour of a court of a third state is still
permissible may be based on the decision of the European Court in
'V>
Kongress Agentur Hagen v Zeehaghe. In this case it was held that a
national court could apply its own rules of procedure and refuse to
entertain proceedings against a third party in terms of art 6(2) of
the Brussels Convention. But it is the present writer's view that the
European Court's separation of procedural matters from matters
determined by the Convention must be seen in its context. Article
6(2) is setting out a somewhat special ground of special
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jurisdiction; the significance of art 2, which contains the principal
ground of jurisdiction in the Convention, is immeasurably greater.
Moreover in applying the relevant procedural rules in Kongress
Agentur Hagen the national court was, it would appear, simply
mechanically applying what had been laid down some time before. But
in Harrods, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal was exercising a
discretion, with all the uncertainty which that entailed for everyone
concerned.
It is submitted that it is possible to make a case for distinguishing
between proceedings which are brought by individuals who are
domiciled in EC or EFTA states on the one hand, and proceedings
brought by individuals who are domiciled in third states on the
other. It can be argued that the protection of the Community and of
the EC / EFTA grouping as a whole need not be extended to persons who
do not have strong links with an EC or EFTA state and that, in
proceedings brought by such a person, a national court of an EC or
EFTA state should be able to decline jurisdiction in favour of a
court of a third state. But such a discriminatory approach could be
attacked as both wrong in principle and unworkable in practice. The
Conventions and the Official Reports place very little emphasis on
pursuers' ties, and the effective setting up of two categories of
Jtf 8
pursuers could lead to a cumbersome body of case law.
Because of this, because being able effectively to require pursuers
to turn to courts of third states but not to courts of other states
in the EC / EFTA bloc can lead to anomalous situations, because forum
non conveniens is only known to the legal systems of two of the EC
states, and because there are good arguments against the doctrine of
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forum non conveniens as a whole, the present writer does not believe
that the European Court is likely to hold that national courts are
entitled to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens
in favour of courts of third states in any actions in which they have
jurisdiction on account of art 2 or another provision of the
Conventions. But on account of the existence of the provisions of
arts 21 - 23, 17 and 16 concerning intra EC / EFTA bloc matters,
there is indeed a very strong case for national courts being entitled
to decline jurisdiction in the event of there already taking place an
identical action in a court of a third state, there existing a
prorogation agreement in favour of a court of a third state, or there
being raised a question which would be resolved by art 16 in the
event of the relevant locus being in an EC or EFTA state.
In conclusion it might be said that much uncertainty surrounds the
question of the extent to which courts within the EC / EFTA bloc may
decline jurisdiction in favour of courts of third states; it might be
argued that the Conventions contain hidden rules allowing
jurisdiction to be declined in three particular types of situation.
Whether United Kingdom courts can decline jurisdiction on the basis
of forum non conveniens in favour of a court of a third state in the
event of the defender being domiciled in the United Kingdom, and the
pursuer being domiciled in a third state or even in another state in
the EC / EFTA bloc, is a matter which has yet to be resolved by the
European Court.
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If. Ihe Conventions and th1 rd states: the recognition and enforcement of
.judgments
Recognition and enforcement is the subject of Title III of the
Conventions. The Title contains arts 25 - 49. Article 25 defines a
"judgment" as "any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a
Contracting State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a
decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the
determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court".
Articles 26 and 31, quoted in Chapter 1 of this Part , set out the
principles of recognition and enforcement of judgments in terms of
the Conventions. Articles 27 - 29 and 34 are concerned with the
grounds on which the recognition and enforcement of a judgment may be
refused, and procedural matters are the subject of arts 30, 32 and
33, and 35 - 49.
It is clear from arts 26 and 31 that, as a general rule, provided
that the various procedural requirements are satisfied, a judgment
given by a court of one EC or EFTA state should be recognised and
enforced in another EC or EFTA state. This principle is of course in
keeping with both art 220 of the Treaty of Rome and the Preamble to
the Conventions. It was on account of art 220 that the negotiations
which led to the Brussels Convention were instituted. The relevant
part of the article provides that
Member States shall, so far as 1s necessary, enter into negotiations
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their
nationals:
the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and
of arbitration awards.
85
And then in the Preamble to the Brussels Convention it is stated that
[t]he High Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community,
Desiring to implement the provisions of Article 220 of that Treaty by
virtue of which they undertook to secure the simplification of
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments of courts or tribunals;
Considering that it is necessary for this purpose....to facilitate
recognition and to introduce an expeditious procedure for securing
the enforcement of judgments....
Have decided to conclude this Convention....
For the European Economic Community fully to come into effect, it was
considered that general rules relating to recognition and enforcement
would be necessary. Certain exceptions to these general rules would
be inevitable, but these should be as few as possible. The
nationality, residence and domicile not only of the pursuer but also
of the defender should at least as a general rule be irrelevant. So
too should be the ground of jurisdiction of the court which gave the
judgment. The Common Market could not function properly if certain
pursuers were at a disadvantage when it came to the enforcing of
judgments, or if pursuers were at a disadvantage when it came to the
enforcing of judgments against certain classes of defenders. Finally
here, it need hardly be specifically stated that Title III is not
concerned with the recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts
of third states; whether a judgment of a court of a third state
should be recognised and enforced in a particular EC or EFTA state is
purely a matter for the law of that state.
At least as a general rule, a court of an EC or EFTA state may not
refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment of a court of another EC
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or EFTA state on account of a local rule of recognition and
enforcement. Article 34 para two provides that an "application [for
enforcement of a judgment] may be refused only for one of the reasons
specified in Articles 27 and 28"; it seems highly likely that the
European Court would hold that, in the normal case, recognition of a
judgment too may be refused only on account of one of the provisions
of arts 27 and 28. The words "in the normal case" are used because
there are probably highly unusual circumstances not envisaged by arts
27 and 28 in which it would be open to - perhaps in fact necessary
for - the appropriate court of the state in which enforcement is
Ho
sought to refuse to allow that enforcement.
It will be seen that there is no exception in art 27 or 28 which
specifically provides that a judgment need not be recognised and
enforced if it was given in an action against a defender domiciled in
a third state and jurisdiction had been based on a rule of exorbitant
jurisdiction. So in principle such judgments given in one contracting
state can be recognised and enforced in any other contracting state
just as easily as judgments given against domici1iaries of
contracting states. In the section of his Report on art 4, Jenard
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states that
in order to ensure the free movement of judgments, this Article
prevents refusal of recognition or enforcement of a judgment given on
the basis of rules of internal law relating to jurisdiction. In the
absence of such a provision, a judgment debtor would be able to
prevent execution being levied on his property simply by transferring
it to a Community country other than that in which judgment was
given.
The present writer is not convinced that the absence of art 4 from
Title II would have had the effect of judgments given against
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domici1iaries of third states not being enforceable in terms of Title
III. Articles 26 and 31 do not appear to contain any express or
implied limitation on recognition and enforcement. But reading art 4
along with arts 26 and 31 makes it quite clear that as a general rule
judgments are to be enforced irrespective of the ground of
jurisdiction and the domicile of the defender.
What are the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement which
are relevant in a work on the Conventions and third states? It should
perhaps first be mentioned that art 29, which concerns recognition,
provides that "[u]nder no circumstances may a foreign judgment be
reviewed as to its substance". Article 34 para three, concerning
enforcement, is in virtually identical terms. It is provided by art
28 para three that, other than in certain limited circumstances which
will be considered below, "the jurisdiction of the court of the State
of origin may not be reviewed". This provision could be regarded as
making it clear that the omission from arts 27 and 28 of a general
ground of refusal of recognition on account of the ground of
jurisdiction was deliberate. There are in all seven grounds for
refusal of recognition and enforcement of a judgment set out in arts
27 and 28.
Of the five grounds in art 27, the first one is that recognition and
enforcement would be "contrary to public policy in the State in which
[they are] sought". But it should be noted that art 28 para three
provides that "the test of public policy referred to in point 1 of
Article 27 may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction".
Article 28 para three, in other words, makes it clear that art 27(1)
does not justify the refusal of recognition and enforcement of a
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judgment against a domiciliary of a third state on the ground that it
would be contrary to public policy to recognise and enforce the
judgment on account of the jurisdiction of the court of the state of
origin having been based on an exorbitant rule. It should, however,
be said that, despite the terms of art 28 para three, it is not
unknown for courts of EC states to enquire into the jurisdiction of
the court of the state of origin in circumstances other than those in
which this is permitted by the Convention. Recognition and
enforcement, it seems, are in practice from time to time refused on
account of the exorbitant nature of the ground of jurisdiction used
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in the proceedings against a domiciliary of a third state. Such
refusal would appear to provide good grounds for a motion that the
case be sent to the European Court for interpretation of certain
provisions of Title III.
The second ground for refusal in art 27 arises where the judgment
"was given in default of appearance"; it is that the defender "was
not duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings or
with an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to
153
arrange for his defence". The particular significance of this
provision in the context of actions concerning third states is this.
In Title II, art 20 para two provides:
The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown that
the defendant has been able to receive the document instituting the
proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable
him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been
taken to this end.
It should be mentioned at this point that, on account of art 20 para
three, if the document in question has been transmitted abroad in
accordance with the provisions of the 1965 Hague Convention on the
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service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or
commercial matters, art 20 para two is in effect replaced by art 15
of the Hague Convention; the relevant terms of art 20 of the Brussels
Convention and art 15 of the Hague Convention are very similar. Where
the Hague Convention is inapplicable, art 20 para two appears to be
applicable regardless of the domicile of the defender. But art 20
para one begins: "Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting
State 1s sued in another Contracting State and does not enter an
appearance....", and it is generally believed that these words should
be considered as coming at the beginning of para two too.
If this is correct, the rule that the proceedings should be stayed
until it is shown that the defender has had an opportunity to take
the necessary steps to defend the action is not applicable in the
case of a defender domiciled in a third state. But even if an action
against a defender domiciled in a third state can proceed to judgment
without his having had an opportunity to prepare his defence, such a
judgment cannot be enforced in another EC or EFTA state. For art
27(2) contains a provision generally parallel to that of art 20 para
two, and the art 27(2) provision is neither expressly nor implicitly
limited in scope to actions against defenders domiciled in EC and
EFTA states.
The third and fourth grounds for refusal in art 27 are of no
particular significance in the present context. But art 27(5), which
was introduced into the Brussels Convention by the 1978 Accession
Convention, provides:
A judgment shall not be recognized if the judgment is irreconcilable
with an earlier judgment given in a non-contracting State involving
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the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that
this latter judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its
recognition in the state addressed.
So if a United Kingdom court is asked to recognise and enforce a
judgment of a court of another EC or EFTA state, recognition and
enforcement should be refused if the judgment cannot be reconciled
with a judgment which (a) was given by a court of a third state, (b)
was given prior to the giving of the judgment by the court of the EC
or EFTA state, (c) has the same cause of action, (d) is between the
same parties and (e) is entitled to recognition in the United
I Sif.
Kingdom. In the Schlosser Report it is stated that this provision
arose out of the need to avoid the "diplomatic complications" which
would ensue if an EC state was obliged, in terms of a bilateral
convention, to recognise a judgment of a third state and, in terms of
Title III of the Brussels Convention, to recognise a later judgment
of another EC state which was in conflict with that judgment.
In Schlosser's example
[a] decision dismissing an action against a person domiciled in the
Community is given in non-contracting State A. A Community State, B,
is obliged to recognize the judgment under a bilateral convention.
The plaintiff brings fresh proceedings in another Community State, C,
which is not obliged to recognize the judgment given in the non-
contracting State. If he is successful, the existing text of the 1968
Convention leaves it open to doubt whether the judgment has to be
recognized in State B.,ss
But the new text of Title III leaves the court in no doubt. The wide
terms of art 27(5) in fact mean that certain judgments given by
courts of other states in the EC / EFTA bloc should not be recognised
even though their recognition would not lead to "diplomatic
complications" with third states. For the judgment of the court of
the third state has priority even if it is only entitled to
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recognition in the EC or EFTA state concerned on account of a rule of
domestic law of that state - in other words, even if no bilateral
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convention is involved. Schlosser explains that, in order to avoid
unnecessary discrepancies, the text of art 27(5) has been based on
art 5 of the 1971 Hague Convention on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.
The two remaining grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement
are to be found in art 28 para one. The first is that the judgment
"conflicts with the provisions of Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Title II".
These sections concern, of course, respectively, jurisdiction in
insurance matters, consumer contract jurisdiction and exclusive
jurisdiction. This exception to the general rule that the court in
which recognition and enforcement are sought should not review the
jurisdiction of the court of the state of origin is justified in the
1ST-
Jenard Report on the basis that in the original six contracting
states the rules of jurisdiction concerning the subject matter of
sections 3, 4 and 5 of Title II are "either of a binding character or
matters of public policy". The effect of this ground of refusal is
clearly that by submitting that, on account of Section 3, 4 or 5 of
Title II, the first court could not have jurisdiction over him, the
defender against whom judgment has been given can require the second
court involved to consider the jurisdiction of the first court. Such
a consideration could, of course, result in a considerable delay in
the giving of the decision by the second court as to whether
enforcement can take place. Admittedly, art 28 para two provides that
[i]n its examination of the grounds of jurisdiction referred to in
the foregoing paragraph, the court or authority applied to shall be
bound by the findings of fact on which the court of the State of
origin based its jurisdiction.
But even a debate on the law cannot take place at a few days' notice.
It is clearly possible that in the second court a defender will try
to thwart the intended smooth operation of Title III by making one or
more dubious points concerning the relevance of Section 3, 4 or 5 to
the jurisdiction of the first court. Such an abuse of the rule in art
28 para one might be most likely to be made by a defender domiciled
in a third state who had been sued on the basis of a rule of
exorbitant jurisdiction, who felt that the approach of the
Conventions to domici1 iaries of third states was unfair and who
wished at the very least to prolong the proceedings. If an abuse of
the rule of this nature were to occur, but it was felt that the rule
in art 28 para one should remain in the Conventions, it would
probably be most appropriate for consideration to be given to whether
a more expeditious procedure for resolving disputes of this nature
could be introduced in the court concerned and, perhaps, in courts in
other contracting states.
Finally, art 28 para one provides that "a judgment shall not be
recognized.... in a case provided for in Article 59". The text of art
59 is as follows:
This Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from assuming,
in a convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, an
obligation towards a third State not to recognize judgments given in
other Contracting States against defendants domiciled or habitually
resident in the third State where, in cases provided for in Article
4, the judgment could only be founded on a ground of jurisdiction
specified in the second paragraph of Article 3.
However, a Contracting State may not assume an obligation towards a
third State not to recognize a judgment given in another Contracting
State by a court basing its jurisdiction on the presence within that
State of property belonging to the defendant, or the seizure by the
plaintiff of property situated there:
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1 if the action is brought to assert or declare proprietary or
possessory rights in that property, seeks to obtain authority to
dispose of it, or arises from another issue relating to such
property; or
2 if the property constitutes the security for a debt which is the
subject-matter of the action.
As stated above, the recognition and enforcement of a judgment of a
court of an EC or EFTA state should not be refused in another EC or
EFTA state on the ground that jurisdiction against the defender
domiciled in a third state was based on an exorbitant rule. If the
defender is domiciled in a third state, the judgment should be
recognised and enforced even though the jurisdiction of the court of
the state of origin was based, for example, on the pursuer being a
citizen of the state in which the court is situated. This effect of
the provisions of arts 4 and 28 of the Brussels Convention has been
described as constituting "discrimination against the outside world"
on the part of the EC. If an individual domiciled in a third state is
sued in an EC state, with jurisdiction being based on an exorbitant
rule, and he has assets in another EC state, as a general rule he
cannot ignore the proceedings. For any judgment given against him can
be enforced in terms of Title III in the state in which his assets
are situated. "Such unfairness to the defendant as there may be in
his being subjected to an exorbitant jurisdiction", it has been said,
"is multiplied by the judgment-extending effect of Title III."
When the Brussels Convention was being drafted, concern about this
matter was expressed by the United Kingdom (which of course was not a
party to the negotiations) and, more strongly, by the United States.
The response of the original six contracting states was to include
16o
art 59 para one in the Convention. This provision enables an EC state
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to conclude a convention with a third state, agreeing not to
recognise and enforce judgments of courts of other EC states which
are against persons domiciled or habitually resident in the third
state and which have resulted from the use of an exorbitant rule of
jurisdiction listed in art 3 para two. Article 59 para one can be
seen as a "compromise solution", designed to "lessen the effects
within the Community of judgments based on rules of exorbitant
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jurisdiction". There is now to be found in art 59 of the Lugano
Convention provisions identical to those of art 59 of the Brussels
Convention. Article 59 sets out an exception to the general rules of
recognition and enforcement in arts 26 and 31, and to the rule in art
28 prohibiting review of the jurisdiction of the state of origin; it
was therefore appropriate for a reference to art 59 to be included in
art 28.
Six points concerning art 59 para one seem worth making here.
Firstly, as stated above, art 52 of the Conventions contains no
choice of law rule to be applied in ascertaining whether or not a
natural person is domiciled in a third state. Nor is there any
provision of relevance in art 59 itself. It appears to be left to the
EC or EFTA state and the third state to agree on a meaning of
domicile in their "article 59" convention. Whether this was
deliberate or an oversight is not clear. Secondly, the term habitual
residence was included because in certain third states - particularly
common law ones - the concept of habitual residence is much closer
than the concept of domicile is to the Continental concept of
domicile. So the EC or EFTA state can agree not to recognise and
enforce judgments given against persons habitually resident in the
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third state concerned where these judgments are the result of
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jurisdiction being based on an exorbitant ground.
Thirdly, "domiciled....in the third State" means of course "domiciled
in the third State and not in any EC / EFTA State". For if an
individual is domiciled in a state in the EC / EFTA bloc and also in
a third state, he cannot in any event be sued in an EC or EFTA state
in which he is not domiciled on the basis of a rule of jurisdiction
listed in art 3 para two. For these rules cannot be used in the case
of defenders domiciled in any of the contracting states. And if an
individual who is domiciled in a state in the EC / EFTA bloc and also
in a third state is sued in a particular court of the EC / EFTA state
on account of a rule of exorbitant jurisdiction listed in art 3 para
two which which links him with the territory of that court -
something which would appear to be competent in terms of the
Conventions and which is probably most likely to occur in the United
Kingdom context - the use of the rule of exorbitant jurisdiction
would not, it is submitted, allow the ensuing judgment to be refused
recognition and enforcement on account of an "article 59" agreement.
For at the international level the judgment was founded on art 2, not
the rule of exorbitant jurisdiction, and in addition the policy of
the Conventions is to allow domici1iaries of contracting states to be
sued within the EC / EFTA bloc regardless of their ties with third
states.
Fourthly, a defender can only make use of art 59 if jurisdiction
against him in the court of the EC or EFTA state was based on an
exorbitant rule listed in art 3 para two and could not have been
based on any other rule. The list in art 3 para two is far from
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exhaustive. Fifthly, the extent to which the wording of the "article
59" convention must follow that of art 59 is not clear; there
certainly seems to be no need for the "article 59" convention to
refer to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. Finally, it has been
suggested that the agreement between the EC or EFTA state and the
third state can be restricted in its scope to certain exorbitant
I64.
rules of jurisdiction and certain categories of defenders.
Paragraph two of art 59 was added to the Brussels Convention by the
1978 Accession Convention; it is of course also to be found in the
Lugano Convention. On account of art 59 para two, an EC or EFTA state
may not undertake to refuse recognition and enforcement of judgments
which have been given in certain circumstances. According to the
J6?
Schlosser Report, para two was added "further to limit the
possibility of recognition and enforcement". But of course its effect
is precisely the opposite - to limit the possibility of refusing
recognition and enforcement. But on the other hand the comment which
!6(,
O'Malley and Layton make on art 59 para two seems reasonable. After
stating that exorbitant jurisdictions listed in art 3 para two for
Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom "permit jurisdiction to be
founded on the location of property", they continue:
[W]here that property is connected with the dispute in a way which is
not capricious, the policy of Article 59 does not regard the
jurisdiction as sufficiently unfair to allow Contracting States to
contract out of it by way of a bilateral convention with a third
country.
But of course the point can be made that the amendment in the 1978
Accession Convention has not provided a satisfactory solution to one
of the central problems of art 59. There are rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction not listed in art 3 para two, and a strong case can, it
is submitted, be made for a provision that an "article 59" agreement
may cover any rule of exorbitant jurisdiction, or any rule of
exorbitant jurisdiction other than one which involves the arrestment
or the situation of property with which the action is closely
concerned. It seems useful at this point to set out the provisions of
art 3 para two which concern rules of exorbitant jurisdiction in the
United Kingdom. They are:
the following provisions shall not be applicable as against [persons
domiciled in a Contracting State]:
- in the United Kingdom:
the rules which enable jurisdiction to be founded on:
(a) the document instituting the proceedings having been served on
the defendant during his temporary presence in the United Kingdom; or
(b) the presence within the United Kingdom of property belonging to
the defendant; or
(c) the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated in the United
Kingdom.
One combined effect of paras one and two of art 59 is that another EC
or EFTA state may agree with a third state that it will not recognise
and enforce any judgments which have been given in Scotland against
persons domiciled or habitually resident in that third state and
which have been given in actions in which jurisdiction was based on
one of various rules in Sched 8 to the Act. In the Scottish context,
part (a) of the United Kingdom section of art 3 para two might well
be held to relate to rule 2(1) in Sched 8, that a person may be sued
"where he has no fixed residence, in a court within whose
jurisdiction he is personally cited". Admittedly the category of
circumstances envisaged by the provision in art 3 para two is
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different from that referred to 1n rule 2(1). But there is an
overlap, and if rule 2(1) was used in circumstances envisaged by the
words in art 3(2) then it might very well be that recognition and
enforcement could be refused. But this is not a serious practical
problem; the number of occasions on which rule 2(1) will be used is
clearly extremely small.
So far as part (b) at the end of art 3 para two is concerned, rule
2(8)(b) in Sched 8 appears to be of relevance:
[A] person may....be sued where he is not domiciled in the United
Kingdom, in the courts for any place where any immoveable property in
which he has any beneficial interest is situated.
And rule 2(8)(a) appears to correspond to part (c):
[A] person may....be sued where he is not domiciled in the United
Kingdom, in the courts for any place where any moveable property
belonging to him has been arrested
It might at first sight be wondered whether actions in which
jurisdiction is based on rule 2(9) or 2(11) could in certain
circumstances be considered to be within the ambit of part (b) at the
end of art 3 para two. Rule 2(9) states that a person may be sued
in proceedings which are brought to assert, declare or determine
proprietary or possessory rights, or rights of security, in or over
moveable property, or to obtain authority to dispose of moveable
property, in the courts for the place where the property is situated.
And the equivalent words in rule 2(11) are:
in proceedings concerning a debt secured over immoveable property, in
the courts for the place where the property is situated.
But the problem is theoretical. For on account of art 59 para two
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another state in the EC / EFTA bloc cannot enter into an "article 59"
convention agreeing not to recognise and enforce judgments given in
actions in which jurisdiction was based on one of these grounds.
With regard to the English rules of jurisdiction, it should be said
that there may be an agreement that the state in the EC / EFTA bloc
will not recognise and enforce any judgments which have been given in
England against persons domiciled or habitually resident in the third
state and which have been given in actions in which jurisdiction was
based on the defendant's being served with the summons during his
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temporary presence in England. But of course it is only as regards
actions which are not concerned with the property that the other EC
or EFTA state can agree not to recognise and enforce judgments which
result from jurisdiction being based on the presence in England of
property belonging to the defendant.
The United Kingdom has now entered into "article 59" conventions with
Canada and Australia, states with which it has of course many ties.
The convention with Canada, which came into force on 1 January 1987,
is in fact concerned with much more than art 59 of the Brussels
Convention; it is a general convention for the reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judgments, effectively given force of law in the
United Kingdom by Statutory Instrument made in terms of the Foreign
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. In addition to the
provisions which are to be expected in a bilateral recognition and
enforcement convention, there is to be found as art IX:
1 The United Kingdom undertakes, in the circumstances permitted by
Article 59 of the 1968 Convention, not to recognise or enforce under
that Convention any judgment given in a third State which is a Party
to that Convention against a person domiciled or habitually resident
in Canada.
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2 For the purposes of paragraph (1)
(a) an individual shall be treated as domiciled in Canada if and only
if he is resident in Canada and the nature and circumstances of his
residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with Canada;
and
(b) a corporation or association shall be treated as domiciled in
Canada if and only if it is incorporated or formed under a law in
force in Canada and has a registered office there, or its central
management and control is exercised in Canada.
The definition in para 2(a) is of course along the same lines as that
concerning domiciles of natural persons in third states which is to
be found in s 41(7) of the Act. And, apart from the omission of the
words "or some other official address" after "a registered office",
the definition in para 2(b) is along the same lines as that
concerning legal persons and other bodies which is to be found in s
42(6) of the Act.
Section 9(2) of the Act provides that
Her Majesty may by Order in Council declare a provision of a
convention entered into by the United Kingdom to be a provision
whereby the United Kingdom assumed an obligation of a kind provided
for in Article 59.
/To
As a result, art 7(b) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments (Canada) Order 1987 states:
It is hereby declared that Article IX of the Convention....is a
provision of a Convention whereby the United Kingdom assumes an
obligation of the kind provided for in Article 59 of the Convention
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters, signed at Brussels on 27th September 1968.
Article XII of the convention provides that Canada "shall designate
the provinces or territories to which [the] Convention shall extend",
but it would appear that this provision only concerns the enforcement
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of Canadian judgments in the United Kingdom and vice versa. So the
United Kingdom, in other words, will refuse to recognise and enforce
certain judgments of courts of other EC states given against persons
1*1
domiciled or habitually resident in any part of Canada.
The "article 59" convention with Australia, which is termed an
agreement rather than a convention, was signed on 23 August 1990 but
is not yet in force. Like the convention with Canada, the agreement
with Australia is primarily concerned with the reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judgments. Article 3 contains provisions virtually
identical to those of art IX of the convention with Canada, but there
appears in addition as para (2)(c) of art 3:
in the case of an individual who -
(i) is resident in Australia; and
(ii) has been so resident for the last three months or more,
the requirements of Article 3(2)(a) shall be presumed to be fulfilled
unless the contrary is proved.
This presumption is along the same lines as the presumption in s 41
of the Act. The effect of subsections (2) and (6) of s 41 is of
course that an individual who is, and has been for the last three
months, resident in the United Kingdom is to be presumed to be
domiciled in the United Kingdom.
Lengthy negotiations for an "article 59" convention took place
between the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1970s. The
United States, frightened of the possibility of pursuers domiciled in
France taking advantage of art 4 para two of the Brussels Convention
and art 14 of the French Code civil, referred to in Chapter 2, and
obtaining judgments which could be enforced in other EC states, was
anxious in particular to conclude an "article 59" convention with the
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United Kingdom. A draft convention was produced, but the negotiations
then broke down and fresh negotiations have not yet been instituted.
What was being considered was in fact an ambitious convention
covering enforcement as well as the refusal of enforcement. But there
was much opposition in the United Kingdom to the possibility of its
courts being required to enforce hugh awards of damages made by
American juries, and this seemed to prove an insurmountable stumbling
l"H
block for the negotiations as a whole.
Very few "article 59" conventions appear to have been concluded by EC
states. A convention between Germany and Norway was signed on 17 June
1977; art 23 is of relevance. Each state agreed not to enforce a
judgment given by a court of a third state if it was given against a
person domiciled or habitually resident in the other state and
'"H
jurisdiction was based on one of six listed grounds. Of course on
account of the reference to art 3 para two in art 59, Germany can
only refuse, in terms of the Brussels Convention, to enforce a
judgment of a court in another EC state given against a person
domiciled or habitually resident in Norway if the relevant ground of
jurisdiction is one of those set out in art 3 para two as well as
being listed in the convention between it (Germany) and Norway. The
five Nordic states - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden -
signed a convention on 11 October 1977. In this convention, which is
not in force with regard to Iceland, art 2 is of most relevance; it
<9-5
appears closely to follow the terms of art 59. But these two
conventions will be superseded by the Lugano Convention.
It is submitted that it may very well be that on account of the
political and economic developments in the EC, EFTA and Eastern
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Europe, and also on account of the entry into force of the Lugano
Convention, further interest will be shown by third states in the
possibility of entering into "article 59" conventions with certain
states in the EC / EFTA bloc. The United States in particular might
feel that the time was right to recommence negotiations. There is of
course also the possibility of states outside the EC / EFTA bloc
becoming parties to the Lugano Convention itself; the Lugano
Convention, unlike the Brussels Convention, is not a "closed"
convention. At the present time the question of whether various
states in Europe outside the EC / EFTA bloc are more likely to enter
into "article 59" conventions with major states in the bloc, or to
become parties to the Lugano Convention itself, must remain an open
one.
In concluding this chapter it will simply be reiterated that one
result of the straightforward system of recognition and enforcement
of judgments contained in the Conventions is that, as a general rule,
at the stage of enforcement of a judgment against a domiciliary of a
third state, account cannot be taken of his domicile or of the
possibly exorbitant nature of the national rule of jurisdiction which
enabled proceedings to be brought against him. But there is an as yet
little used power given to contracting states to agree with third
states in certain limited circumstances not to recognise and enforce
judgments given in other contracting states against domici1iaries of
the third states concerned.
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5 Intra - EC / EFTA bloc and intra-UK actions: particular problems
(a^ Intra - EC / EFTA bloc actions
The first of the two related questions which are the subject of this
section is whether, in proceedings within the subject matter scope of
the Conventions, a United Kingdom court may apply the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and decline jurisdiction (or simply stay / sist
the proceedings) in favour of a court of another state in the EC /
EFTA bloc. The doctrine of forum non conveniens was summarised in
Chapter 1, and in Chapter 3 the comments of Schlosser, Droz and other
writers on the doctrine were set out. It is submitted that the
possibility of the European Court sanctioning the staying / sisting
or dismissing of an action by a United Kingdom court in favour of a
court of another contracting state is virtually non-existent.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is of course, at any rate as a
general rule, unknown to the Continental contracting states, and it
is rare to find a Continental writer favourably disposed towards it.
Near the beginning of his note on the decisions in Arkwright and
Berisford, Collins indicates that it may be appropriate to make a
distinction between actions in which the alternative forum is in
another contracting state and actions in which it is in a third
state:
Where the Brussels Convention applies and where the jurisdictional
question is in which Contracting State the case should proceed, it is
generally accepted that forum conveniens principles play no partJ'T-S"
Schlosser is of course clearly unenthusiastic about forum non
conveniens as a whole. While his stance with regard to declining
jurisdiction in favour of courts of third states cannot be said to be
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totally free from doubt, it is obvious that he is opposed to forum
non conveniens within the EC or the EC / EFTA bloc. His reference to
plaintiffs having deliberately been given a right of choice makes
this clear. Droz's hostility to forum non conveniens has been clear
1^8
and consistent since 1972. There is unanimity, or near unanimity,
among the British writers that, however unfortunate this may be felt
to be, the Court of Session could not, for example, decline
jurisdiction on the grounds of forum non conveniens in favour of a
court in France or Finland, Spain or Sweden.
On the Continent a lone dissenting voice may be that of Verheul, who
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stated that
the question whether forum non conveniens is consistent with the
Convention, and if so, to what extent is still open.... [W]hen in a
specific case justice demands an ad hoc deviation from the general
rules because of particular circumstances, it is and remains the task
of the judge to do justice.
The present writer has read nothing elsewhere which leads him to
believe that Verheul's approach is shared by other Continental
writers. It is submitted that the European Court might, in order to
do justice, be prepared effectively to introduce into the provisions
of the Brussels Convention one or two specific exceptions of
relevance in the intra-EC context. It was of course submitted in
Chapter 3 that it might very well be prepared effectively to
introduce certain exceptions in the context of actions concerning
third states. But on account of the perceived importance of
certainty, the other arguments put forward by Schlosser and the
general lack of a forum non conveniens doctrine on the Continent, the
Court would not be prepared to give United Kingdom and Irish courts
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carte blanche to decline jurisdiction in the intra-EC context on the
basis of forum non conveniens.
The second question to be considered in this section is this. At
common law a Scottish court has of course been able to decline
jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens in favour of an
English court. And an English court could do so in favour of a
Scottish court. In the preceding paragraph it was submitted that a
United Kingdom court can no longer, in proceedings within the subject
matter scope of the Conventions, decline jurisdiction in favour of a
court of another state in the EC / EFTA bloc. Can it still do so in
favour of a court in another of the United Kingdom's law districts?
Would the European Court consider it acceptable for a French or
German pursuer to be told by the Court of Session that he should go
and bring his action against a United Kingdom domiciliary in the
English High Court instead?
The question cannot, it is submitted, be answered with any certainty.
On the one hand it can be said that art 2 of the Conventions simply
allocates jurisdiction in proceedings against the United Kingdom
domiciliary to the United Kingdom courts in general; it leaves it to
English and Scots law to determine the particular courts with
jurisdiction. So long as the second United Kingdom court involved
does not also decline jurisdiction, there is compliance with art 2.
But on the other hand it can of course be pointed out that Schlosser
believes that a pursuer should not be required to waste his time and
money through effectively being sent from one court to another. Going
from one court to another within a contracting state may be no less
wasteful of time and money than going from a court in one contracting
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state to a court in another. The envisaged state of affairs could not
arise if the Frenchman brought an action in a German court against a
German domiciliary or in an Italian court against an Italian
domiciliary. Is a court composed largely of Continental lawyers
likely to be happy about the prospect of the first court seised
declining jurisdiction - or even staying / sisting the proceedings -
when an action is brought in the United Kingdom against a United
Kingdom domiciliary?
If the defender is domiciled in the United Kingdom, the United
Kingdom courts in general certainly appear to have jurisdiction in
terms of art 2 of the Conventions irrespective of the domicile of the
pursuer. But it may be that, on account of the perceived role of the
Conventions in strengthening the "legal protection" of persons in the
EC / EFTA bloc, the European Court would be less sympathetic to a
pursuer domiciled in a third state than to a pursuer domiciled in
another EC state or in an EFTA state.
(b\ Intra-UK actions
The question to be considered in this section is whether actions
which are purely internal to the United Kingdom or any other
contracting state are outside the scope of the Conventions as a
whole. If such actions are outside the scope of the Conventions as a
whole, the question then arises of what the circumstances are in
which an action is internal. Or, putting it another way, what are the
factors which make an action international rather than internal? It
should be said that it is assumed by very many practitioners that if
an action is totally "British", the Conventions are irrelevant and
can be ignored; consideration need only be given to Scheds 4 and 8 to
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the Act. Is this correct? If so, what do we mean here by "British"?
The problem, it should be said, only arises in connection with the
jurisdiction provisions in Title II of the Conventions. For Title III
is concerned with the recognition and enforcement in one contracting
state of a judgment given in another; this is made clear by arts 26
18©
and 31. The Title has no application in questions of recognition and
enforcement which are internal to one state. In considerations of the
effect or lack of it of Title II in questions of jurisdiction which
are internal to one state, the starting point is usually the
preambles of the Conventions. The preamble of the Brussels Convention
states that the parties to the Treaty of Rome decided to conclude the
Convention
Anxious to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of
persons therein established;
Considering that it is necessary for this purpose to determine the
international jurisdiction of their courts....
In the Lugano Convention, the preamble states that the parties to the
Convention decided to conclude it
Anxious to strengthen in their territories the legal protection of
persons therein established,
Considering that it is necessary for this purpose to determine the
international jurisdiction of their courts....
Reference is generally then made to the Jenard and Schlosser Reports.
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According to Jenard, the Brussels Convention
governs international legal relationships....As is stressed in the
fourth paragraph of the preamble, the Convention determines the
international jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States.
It alters the rules of jurisdiction in force in each Contracting
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State only where an international element is involved. It does not
define this concept, since the international element in a legal
relationship may depend on the particular facts of the proceedings of
which the court is seised. Proceedings instituted in the courts of a
Contracting State which involves [sic! only persons domiciled in that
State will not normally be affected by the Convention; Article 2
simply refers matters back to the rules of jurisdiction in force in
that State. It is possible, however, that an international element
may be involved in proceedings of this type. This would be the case,
for example, where the defendant was a foreign national, a situation
in which the principle of equality of treatment laid down in the
second paragraph of Article 2 would apply, or where the proceedings
related to a matter over which the courts of another State had
exclusive jurisdiction (Article 16), or where identical or related
proceedings had been brought in the courts of another State (Articles
21 to 23).
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And then Schlosser states that
[a]s already discussed in the Jenard report, the
the scope of the 1968 Convention contain
elements....They are:
1. Limitation to proceedings and judgments on
international legal relationships.
The accession of the new Member States to the 1968 Convention in no
way affects the application of the principle that only proceedings
and judgments about matters involving international legal
relationships are affected....
It is appropriate at this point to ask: What is the practical
significance of the discussion concerning the question of whether
proceedings internal to one contracting state are outside the scope
of Title II as a whole? If one considers the various provisions of
Title II, one sees that the practical effect is small. For most of
the provisions are concerned with situations where there is an
international element. Title II contains arts 2 - 24. It seems useful
to consider the various articles in reverse order. The effect of art
24 is that the local rules are always applicable in the event of an
urgent matter arising and an interim award being sought; this article





Articles 21 and 22, and arguably art 23 too, are concerned with the
situation where there are identical or related actions taking place
in different contracting states; they cannot in any event be
applicable in purely internal disputes. Articles 19 and 20 do not set
out rules of jurisdiction; instead, they lay down the duty of the
court in actions also involving another contracting state. Articles
17 and 18, concerning prorogation of jurisdiction, will be considered
below.
Article 16 concerns exclusive jurisdiction. On account of the
approach of art 16, allocating jurisdiction to the courts of a
particular state, if a defender is invoking art 16 it is because
there is - at any rate in his submission - an international element
in the dispute. Section 4, containing arts 13 - 15, concerns consumer
contract matters; Section 3, containing arts 7 - 12A, concerns
insurance matters. These sections will be referred to again below.
Articles 6 and 6A contain little-used rules of special jurisdiction.
Article 5 begins: "A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in
another Contracting State, be sued:"; it can therefore only be
applicable in proceedings with an international element. Finally,
there are arts 2-4. These contain the general rules that a defender
should be sued in the courts of the contracting state in which he is
domiciled (art 2), a defender should only be sued in the courts of
another contracting state if this is permitted by the Conventions
(art 3), and a defender not domiciled in any of the contracting
states may be sued in any state in which this is permitted by the
national rules of jurisdiction (art 4). Article 4, like art 24, does
not contain a prohibitory rule, and art 3 is clearly only of
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relevance where there is an international element.
On account of the existence of rules of jurisdiction in Scheds 4 and
8 of the Act generally parallel to those of art 2 and of Sections 3
and 4, in the United Kingdom there is not likely to be a conflict
involving art 2, Section 3 or Section 4 of the Conventions on the one
hand and national rules on the other, a conflict which can only be
resolved by determining whether the Conventions are applicable in
purely internal actions. There are, however, two contexts in which
the problem is much more likely to arise in practice. The first
concerns certain of the provisions of prorogation of jurisdiction,
and the second concerns the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The rule of prorogation by appearance, to be found in art 18, has
counterparts in Scheds 4 and 8 and, as a result, is highly unlikely
to cause any practical problems in the present context. But in art 17
it is provided that
[i]f the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting
State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State
are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or
which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship,
that court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
The remaining provisions of art 17 contain qualifications to this
principle and also rules of formal validity. The question arising
from art 17 in the present context is clearly this: If the two
parties are domiciled in the same contracting state, and the action
has no connection with any other state, is it the case that -
assuming the agreement to be formally valid - the chosen court(s) has
/ have exclusive jurisdiction in terms of the Conventions? If the
Conventions as a whole are applicable to the matter, then on account
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of the wording of art 17 the chosen court(s) would indeed seem to
have exclusive jurisdiction. But if the Conventions as a whole are
not applicable to the matter, art 17 clearly cannot be applicable and
the matter must be determined by the local law alone.
It is important to note that in the United Kingdom context the
question is not devoid of practical significance. For in Sched 4, art
17 begins:
If the parties.... have agreed that a court or the courts of a part of
the United Kingdom are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes
which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular
legal relationship ....that court or those courts shall
have....jurisdiction....
The matter has not yet been the subject of a decision by a superior
court, but it may very well be the case that whereas the jurisdiction
conferred by art 17 of the Conventions is exclusive, that conferred
by art 17 of Sched 4 is - assuming the Conventions not to be
applicable - non-exclusive. But of course s 16(4) of the Act provides
that Sched 4 is to be read subject to the Conventions. So it might
very well be that if there is an internal action in the United
Kingdom, and the Conventions as a whole are not applicable to
internal actions, the jurisdiction conferred by the prorogation
agreement is not exclusive. But if the Conventions as a whole are
applicable in internal as well as international actions, in that case
the jurisdiction is exclusive.
It is interesting that this question has in a sense been anticipated
by Jenard and Schlosser. It may well be that in certain of the
original contracting states the domestic rules of prorogation are
different from those in art 17 of the Conventions. Jenard state; at
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art 17 para one
does not apply where two parties who are domiciled in the same
Contracting State have agreed that a court of that State shall have
jurisdiction, since the Convention, under the general principle laid
down in the preamble, determines only the international jurisdiction
of courts.
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Schlosser begins his discussion of art 17 with the words "Article 17,
applying as it does only if the transaction in question is
international in character...." Both Jenard and Schlosser are clearly
aware that the question of the application of Title II of the
Conventions in internal actions is a "live issue" in the context of
art 17. In fact, until the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the
original contracting states in 1 987 it was probably only in the
context of art 17 that the problem was at all likely to arise in
practice. On account of the way in which the rules of jurisdiction of
the Conventions have generally been framed, and the similarity
between the rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions and the rules of
national legal systems, there were few if any other contexts in which
the problem was likely to arise.
But there is now also the interesting question of whether, in actions
totally internal to the United Kingdom, the powers of the courts to
decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens in favour
of a court of another United Kingdom law district have been
restricted. If the Conventions do not apply to internal actions, the
courts' powers have clearly not been reduced. But if they do apply to
internal as well as international actions, their powers may have been
reduced. For it can of course be argued that the United Kingdom
courts have jurisdiction in such actions on account of art 2 of the
Conventions, and that when the Conventions leave it to contracting
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states to determine the particular courts with jurisdiction, it
expects these courts to exercise that jurisdiction. This point has
already been made in the context of the declining of jurisdiction on
the basis of forum non conveniens in favour of a court in another
United Kingdom law district in proceedings against a United Kingdom
domiciliary brought by a domiciliary of another state in the EC /
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EFTA bloc or of a third state.
All those who wish to have the scope of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens reduced as little as possible would undoubtedly wish to
see the European Court give a ruling concerning the non-applicability
of the Brussels Convention in internal actions along the same lines
as the passages in the Jenard and Schlosser Reports quoted above. It
/ST
is interesting to note that Cheshire and North assert that
the preamble indicates that the Convention is only concerned with the
international jurisdiction of Contracting States. It follows that it
will not apply where a dispute involves no foreign element or where
the foreign element only involves another part of the United Kingdom.
This short passage is of course in line with the first passages of
the Jenard and Schlosser Reports quoted above. And the view which is
expressed in it will have been welcomed by, among others, the
practitioners who wish to be able with justification to ignore the
Conventions when they are considering the question of jurisdiction in
the vast majority of their actions. For of course there is always the
possibility that there may exist "conflicts" between the Conventions
on the one hand, and Scheds 4 and 8 on the other, other than those
outlined above concerning art 17 para one of the Conventions and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. But is the thinking of leading
Continental writers other than Jenard and Schlosser to the same
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effect as that of Cheshire and North? And, if so, in what
circumstances do they consider an action to be purely internal to one
contracting state?
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Weser asks: "La convention ne s'applique-t-elle que dans l'ordre
international?" She begins by referring to the preamble, and then
asks: "Que signifient les termes 'la competence de leurs juridictions
dans l'ordre international'?" Her answer is this:
Au premier abord, l'on pourrait croire que ces termes ont une
signification importante et que le juge saisi d'un litige devrait,
chaque fois avant de se declarer competent en vertu de la Convention,
examiner la question de savoir s'il s'agit ou non d'une competence
"dans l'ordre international".
En fait, en raison de la construction meme de la Convention, cette
distinction n'a pratiquement que tres peu d' importance.
She refers to various articles of the Convention, and then asks:
Un litige entre un demandeur beige et un defendeur beige domicilid en
Belgique et porte devant les tribunaux beiges, serait-il r6gi par la
Convention?
Her answer is that
[ 1 ]a question n'a qu'un interet purement theorique.
En effet, d'aprds 1'article 2 de la Convention, d6s qu'un defendeur
est domicilii dans l'Etat dont les tribunaux sont saisis, sont
applicables les regies de competence de l'Etat du for, c'est-e-dire,
dans notre exemple, les regies de competence prevues par le Code
judiciaire beige.
Quelle difference y a-t-il en pratique si, lorsque le defendeur est
domicilie en Belgique, le juge beige applique dans un proces entre
deux Beiges, les regies de competence pr6vues au Code judiciaire par
1'application de son droit national ou en vertu de la Convention
C.E.E. qui renvoie express6ment h ce droit national?1*"
Weser was of course writing well before the United Kingdom, a state
with three law districts and a doctrine of forum non conveniens.
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became a party to the Convention. On account of these passages, it
might very well be thought that Weser considers that in principle
each action is either internal or international, but that in practice
the distinction has very little significance. But then she continues:
Le concept de base de la Convention est le domicile du d6fendeur....
C'est un progres important que l'on ne doit pas diminuer en raison
des termes employes par le pr6ambule de la Convention.
L'ingeniosite de la structure de la Convention est pr6cis6ment d'y
faire rentrer, lors du proems d'origine, pratiquement tous les proems
port6s devant les tribunaux des Etats contractants ce qui a permis,
en contrepartie, de faciliter notablement la reconnaissance et
1'execution des decisions ainsi rendus dans les autres Etats de la
Communaute.,qj
It is submitted that what she is arguing here is that, loosely
speaking, the articles of the Convention take priority over the words
of the preamble. The Convention is so structured that it applies to
practically all civil actions in courts of contracting states which
come within its subject matter scope. Title III is concerned with the
recognition and enforcement in one contracting state of any judgment
given in any other; Title II is therefore concerned with jurisdiction
in any proceedings which might lead to the giving of a judgment
enforceable in the other contracting states. The civil actions which
she states might be outside the scope of the Convention as a whole
are those where there is exclusive jurisdiction. Presumably she has
in mind art 16; on account of its subject matter a judgment given in
proceedings in which jurisdiction was based on art 16 will almost
certainly be enforced in the state in which it was given. But her
conclusion is 1n fact that "les competences exclusives sont devenues
des competences exclusives communautaires; tous les 1itiges....sont
done regis par la Convention". Weser then concludes her section on
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the Convention and internal actions by stating:
En fait, 1'application de la Convention dans "l'ordre international"
n'aurait - et encore - d'int6r§t qu'en mati6re de prorogation de
juridiction.
Cette precision nous paratt importante parce qu'elle 6vitera, aussi
bien aux parties qu'au juge, de se poser la question si le litige se
meut ou non dans l'ordre international.
It is submitted that the first of these sentences is unexceptional,
but the second somewhat clouds the picture. For two or three
paragraphs earlier she appeared to be asserting that no actions are
outside the scope of the Convention and yet here she is stating that
those involved in litigation can in practice almost always avoid the
question of whether an action is international. If she considers the
question to be in principle irrelevant, why does she not specifically
say so here? Some light is shed on this matter in the section by
Jenard and Weser on civil jurisdiction in Van der Elst and Weser's
textbook on international private law published in 1985; the relevant
section of the chapter can perhaps more usefully be considered below
in the particular context of prorogation agreements.
It seems appropriate to mention at this point an argument in favour
of an internal action / international action distinction which is
based on general principles of Community law. For, after all, a
national court required to decide whether the Convention is in
principle applicable in the context of a prorogation problem or a
forum non conveniens problem in a purely internal action might be
heavily influenced by the words of the Jenard and Schlosser Reportr.
But on the other hand the European Court would seek to give a
judgment which was in accordance with Community law as a whole. It
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would be very conscious of art 220 of the Treaty of Rome linking the
Convention to the Community treaties and other instruments.
Part Two of the Treaty of Rome is headed "Foundations of the
Community". Its four Titles are concerned with "Free movement of
goods" (Title I), "Agriculture" (Title II), "The free movement of
persons, services and capital" (Title III) and "Transport" (Title
IV). Title III is divided into chapters on "Workers", "Right of
establishment", "Services" and "Capital". The full implementation of
these provisions is essential for the completion of the internal
market within the EC. The Brussels Convention can be seen as
providing a further freedom - the free movement of judgments - a
freedom which is required to complement the freedoms enshrined in
Part Two of the Treaty of Rome.
Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, to be found in Chapter 1 of Title
III of Part Two, states that "[f]reedom of movement for workers shall
be secured within the Community...." It goes on to explain what is
meant by "freedom of movement". R v Saunders concerned a requirement
imposed on a British citizen by an English criminal court that during
a three-year period she remain in Northern Ireland, or at any rate
not set foot in England and Wales. After the question of whether this
requirement was contrary to art 48 was referred to the European
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Court, it was held that
[t]he provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers
cannot....be applied to situations which are wholly internal to a
member-State, in other words, where there is no factor connecting
them to any of the situations envisaged by Community law. [This] is a
wholly domestic situation which falls outside the scope of the rules
contained in the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers.
m
Article 48 was also considered in Moser v Land Baden-Wurttemberg:
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reference was made here to R v Saunders. On account of his membership
of a particular political party, Moser, a German, was refused
permission to undertake teacher-training in Baden-Wurttemberg. It
would therefore be difficult for him to teach in a school in another
EC state. The European Court was asked whether, as a result, there
m
was a contravention of art 48. It was held that
Article 48 of the EEC Treaty does not apply to situations which are
wholly internal to a member-State, such as the situation of a
national of a member-State who has never resided or worked in another
member-State. Such a national may not rely on Article 48 to contest
the application to him of the legislation of his own country.
2.00
Bekaert v Procureur de Ta R6publigue, Rennes, concerned art 52. This
article, to be found at the beginning of Chapter 2 in Title III,
states that
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member
State in the territory of another Member State shall be
abolished....Such progressive abolition shall also apply to
restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries
by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any
Member State.
Bekaert, a Frenchman, argued that French regulations effectively
restricting his extending his business were contrary to art 52 and
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certain related EEC regulations. Not surprisingly, it was held that
the present case involves a situation which is purely internal in one
member-State Article 52....prohibits, as a restriction on freedom
of establishment, any discrimination on grounds of nationality.
Therefore, if a particular case contains no element which goes beyond
a purely national framework, this has the effect that, so far as the
freedom of establishment is concerned, the provisions of Community
law do not apply to such a situation.
Therefore....neither Article 52 nor [the related
regulations].... apply to situations which are purely internal to a
member-State, such as the situation of a national of a member-State
who has never resided or worked in another member-State.
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So a strong case, based on the preamble to the Convention, certain
short passages in the Jenard and Schlosser Reports, the general
approach of Community law to matters internal to one contracting
state and these three decisions can therefore be made for the
separation of actions, for the purposes of the Brussels Convention,
into internal ones and international ones, with only international
ones within the scope of the Convention. On the other side, of
course, there appears to be the approach of Weser. As has been said,
if a distinction can be made, it may very well only be of practical
importance in the context of art 17 and of forum non conveniens. It
is therefore appropriate to consider the dicta of the leading writers
on the internal / international distinction in the context of art 17
and of forum non conveniens. Of course more has been written in the
art 17 context; until 1 January 1987 the effect of the Convention on
forum non conveniens was theoretical.
2o2
Writing in his Report about art 17, Jenard states that the article
applies
where the agreement conferring jurisdiction was made either between a
person domiciled in one Contracting State and a person domiciled in
another Contracting State, or between a person domiciled in a
Contracting State and a person domiciled outside the Community, if
the agreement confers jurisdiction on the courts of a Contracting
State; it also applies where two persons domiciled in one Contracting
State agree that a particular court of another Contracting State
shal1 have jurisdiction, lot
According to Schlosser,
the mere fact of choosing a court in a particular State is by no
means sufficient to establish [that the matter is international ]. loif.
There certainly appears to be a difference of opinion here. But if
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one turns to the joint work by Jenard and Weser on civil
ZC5
jurisdiction, one finds Jenard asserting that
si un litige ne met en cause que des personnes domiciliees dans un
meme pays, la seule designation d'un tribunal etranger ne peut
revetir 1'element d'extraneite permattant de d6roger aux regies
imperatives ou exclusives de competence en vigueur dans ce pays.
In other words, if two parties domiciled in the same contracting
state prorogate the jurisdiction of a court of another state, this
does not have the effect of making the ensuing action international
and therefore within the scope of the Convention. Why Jenard has
changed his mind on this point - if indeed he has - is not clear. It
should be noted at this point that in the joint work the two authors
separately set out their views on the significance of the words
"international jurisdiction" in the preamble to the Convention. They
16 i
state that they "ont des avis l§g6rement diff6rents en ce qui
concerne 1'importance et 1' i nterpretation du pr6ambule". What these
slight differences are cannot unfortunately be identified with
lo+
certainty. Weser repeats, virtually word for word, the case which she
2o8
made in her 1973 article. Jenard, on the other hand, quotes from his
own Report and then, immediately before the last sentence set out
above, states:
Les regies de competence imperatives et exclusives prevues par la loi
d'un Etat continuent....h s'appliquer si le litige se situe dans
1'ordre interne de cet Etat, ces regies de competence etant
gen6ralement justifi6es par des considerations d'ordre social.
While the whole matter is far from free from doubt, it would not
appear to be unreasonable to state that one can find much more
support for the notion of a distinction between internal actions and
international ones in the work of Jenard than one can in the work of
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Weser. So far as art 17 is concerned, Droz's position appears to be
that where the two parties to the prorogation agreement are domiciled
in the same contracting state, the Convention is nevertheless in
principle applicable either if the chosen court is situated in
another state or if the subject matter of the action is or was
11o
situated in another state. He asserts that
[1'^numeration [de Jenard] est juste, mais incomplete....[S]i deux
parties domiciliees dans un Etat contractant eiisent un tribunal de
cet Etat....le caractere international....peut r6sulter du litige
1ui-meme.
an
Later on he states that
si pour 1'application de la Convention la clause d'eiection de for
doit presenter un caractere international, ce caractere provient,
dans l'hypothese 6tudi6e, du seul choix d'un tribunal etranger.
If there is some doubt about what makes an action international in
the context of art 17, there is much more doubt in the context of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. The recent entry into force of the
Convention in the United Kingdom, the hostility of Continental
writers to the doctrine and the reluctance on the part of British
writers to see a cherished tradition eroded have no doubt all
contributed to the lack of serious discussion of this issue. One
might make reference to the sentence in Droz's Pratique that
[o]n peut estimer que la Convention s'applique des que le litige, par
son objet, le domicile ou la volonte des parties, pourrait mettre en
jeu la competence des tribunaux de deux ou plusieurs Etats dont l'un
au moins serait un Etat contractant.
But of course this was written well before the entry into force of
the Convention in the United Kingdom. It is submitted that this
sentence should not be considered as any more than a useful
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generalisation for practitioners and students - particularly as it
immediately follows the statement that the reference to international
jurisdiction in the preamble "n'a en pratique d'int^ret qu'en ce qui
concerne les accords d'61ection de for".
So there is much room for doubt about the whole matter of whether a
distinction between internal actions and international actions should
be made and, if so, just where the line should be drawn. The writers,
one feels, have not always made themselves as clear as they might
have done. And Jenard's appearing to change his own mind on one point
does not make things any easier. The weight of authority certainly
favours the making of an internal / international distinction, but
until the European Court rules on whether such a distinction should
be made, and if so where it should be made, both at the stage of the
drawing up of prorogation agreements and at the stage of the
beginning of litigation practitioners must take care in advising
clients on questions of civil jurisdiction where the "European" rule
may be different from the national or local one. Beyond advising in
each case a reading of Scheds 1, 4 and 8 to the Act together with
caution, it may not be possible usefully to suggest a general
approach to Scottish practitioners; they must look at each case
individually. It is very much to be hoped that the European Court
will soon have the opportunity to give a ruling on a problem which,
although in principle central to Title II of the Convention, has -
despite the arrival of the United Kingdom on 1 January 1987 - managed
to remain dormant since 1 February 1973.
To conclude this section, it is suggested that a distinction between
internal actions and international ones should be made, and that the
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principal connecting factor used in the making of the distinction
should be domicile. At this stage in the development of the European
Community matters purely internal to any one member state are, at
least as a general rule, to be resolved by the legislature, executive
and judiciary of that state alone. There is no good reason for an
exception to be made in the context of civil jurisdiction. The
existence of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the internal
United Kingdom context, for example, is not harming the operation or
even the development of the Community as at present constituted. But
if the political nature of the Community is to change, with decision¬
making becoming more centralised, then there might very well be a
much stronger case for the scope of the Convention extending to
actions unconnected with more than one member state.
It is submitted that on account of the policy considerations
involved, Title II of the Convention should apply to any action
within the subject matter scope of art 16. But outside the art 16
context an action should be considered international - in other words
within the scope of the Convention - if both parties are not
domiciled in the same contracting state. Two points should be made in
justification of this assertion. The first is that parties have an
interest in the initiation and the outcome of litigation; places and
courts do not. So the fact that the events which caused the action to
be brought took place in another state should not be considered to
make the action international. Nor should the existence of a
prorogation agreement in favour of a court of another state; it
should be left to the law of the state in which the action is brought
to determine whether effect is to be given to the agreement.
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The second point concerns the use of the connecting factor of
domicile. It is hardly necessary for justification to be given for
the proposition that if the defender is not domiciled in the state in
which the action is brought, the action should be considered
international. It is a trite point that the Convention is concerned
with the circumstances in which a natural or legal person can be sued
in a state in which he or it is not domiciled. So far as the pursuer
is concerned, the argument here is that the Convention was designed
"to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of persons
therein established". "[Ejstablished" can be interpreted as
"domiciled". Pursuers, as well as defenders, are entitled to
protection; a pursuer domiciled in one contracting state wishing to
sue an individual domiciled in another contracting state should be
entitled to rely on the provisions of the Convention such as art 2. A
pursuer domiciled in a third state, but not in any contracting state,
it might be said, is not entitled to this protection. But it is
submitted that it would not be appropriate to have a rule which
allowed a French domiciliary to sue a United Kingdom domiciliary in
the United Kingdom on account of art 2, but did not allow an American
domiciliary to do so. Such an approach would be politically and
diplomatically inexpedient and would be liable to have a detrimental
effect on trade between EC states and third states.
It should finally be said that, on account of art 2 para two of the
Convention, there is an argument that it ought to be held by the
European Court that an action falls within the international category
if the pursuer - or possibly if either party - is not a citizen of
the state in which the parties are domiciled and the action is
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brought. But the practical significance of art 2 para two is at most
very small, and whether such a ruling ought to be made by the
European Court is a matter which could only be settled after
consideration of the current national rules of jurisdiction in each
of the Continental contracting states.
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The remitting and transferring of actions
For some time now certain statutory provisions have enabled a
sheriff, in particular circumstances, to remit an action to the Court
of Session or to transfer an action to another sheriff court. And a
recent statutory provision enables a Court of Session judge to remit
an action to a sheriff court. The purpose of this chapter is to
consider the extent to which the discretionary power to remit or
transfer an action in terms of one of the statutory provisions may
have been restricted by the Conventions or the Act itself.
Section 37(1) of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971, as amended
by section 16(a) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)
(Scotland) Act 1980, states:
In the case of any ordinary cause brought in the sheriff court the
sheriff... (b) may...on the motion of any of the parties to the cause,
if he is of the opinion that the importance or difficulty of the
cause make it appropriate to do so, remit the cause to the Court of
Session.
Provisions for the transfer of actions from one sheriff court to
another are set out in Rule 19 of the Ordinary Cause Rules and in
Rule 22 of the Summary Cause Rules. It is now provided by Rule 2(2)
and Appendix 3 of the Small Claim Rules that Rule 22 of the Summary
Cause Rules is applicable to small claims.
Rule 19(1)(d) of the Ordinary Cause Rules states: "The sheriff may
upon sufficient cause remit any cause to another sheriff court".
Paragraph (a) of Rule 19(1) states that, where there are two or more
defenders and an action has been raised in the sheriff court of the
residence or place of business of one of them, the action may be
transferred by the sheriff to any other sheriff court which has
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jurisdiction over any of the defenders. But para (c) states that such
a transfer shall not be made unless the sheriff "considers it
expedient to do so having regard to the convenience of the parties
and their witnesses". In other words, a para (a) transfer should not
be made as a matter of course whenever it is sought. It may be
doubted in fact if there is any situation in which a transfer could
be made by virtue of para (a) but not by virtue of para (d).
It is generally considered that the transfer may be made to another
sheriff court in the sheriffdom or to a sheriff court in a different
sheriffdom. Another point is that although a s 37(1) remit may only
be made "on the motion of any of the parties", the sheriff may
transfer a cause in terms of rule 19 either on the motion of one of
the parties or ex proprio motu.
It should be remarked in passing that it seems unfortunate that the
reference in Rule 19(1)(a) to the court of the "residence or place of
business" of a defender has not been amended. In actions falling
within the subject matter scope of Sched 8 to the Act, jurisdiction
cannot of course be based on the defender being resident in, or
having a place of business in, the sheriff court district. The number
of actions in which jurisdiction is still determined by s 6 of the
Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907, rather than by Sched 8 to the
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, is extremely small.
So far as summary causes are concerned, Rule 22 states:
A cause may be transferred to any other court, whether in the same
sheriffdom or not, if the sheriff considers that it is expedient that
this be done.
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It seems that the sheriff court to which a transfer is made in terms
of Rule 19 or Rule 22 need not be a court which otherwise has
jurisdiction in the action. Rule 20 of the old Ordinary Cause Rules
began: "The sheriff may upon sufficient cause, by interlocutor
stating his reasons, remit any cause to another sheriffdom", and
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Dobie stated that
this rule appears to authorize a transfer on grounds of expediency to
another Court irrespective of the question whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the defenders or any of them, and it is understood
to be so acted on in practice".
It should be mentioned that s 37(1) of the 1971 Act refers to
ordinary causes. Can a summary cause be remitted to the Court of
Session? An argument that it can might be based on Rule 22 of the
Summary Cause Rules, but it is submitted that the better
interpretation of the words "any other court" in Rule 22 is "any
zi s
other sheriff court". This interpretation is supported by the words
"whether in the same sheriffdom or not" and by the lack of any
reference to the Court of Session.
Certain specialised provisions relating to the transfer of particular
types of actions are outside the scope of this thesis.
The provision enabling actions to be remitted by the Court of Session
to a sheriff court is to be found in s 14 of the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985. It states:
The Court of Session may in relation to an action before it which
could competently have been brought before a sheriff remit the action
(at its own instance or on the application of any of the parties to
the action) to the sheriff within whose jurisdiction the action could
have been brought, where, in the opinion of the Court, the nature of
the action makes it appropriate to do so.
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If there are already related proceedings in a sheriff court, this
will clearly be a factor in the determining of whether a remit by the
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Court of Session would be appropriate. Case law is in fact building
up on the circumstances in which a remit or transfer should take
place. But this case law is not relevant to the subject of the
Conventions and Act and the remitting and transferring of actions.
Not surprisingly, the Conventions make no reference to the Scottish
rules concerning the remitting and transferring of actions. Nor do
any of their provisions refer to the subject in a "European", as
opposed to Scottish, context. But the powers of the courts of
Scotland and of the other law districts of the British Isles to remit
or transfer an action to another court in the same law district are
considered in the Schlosser Report. Schlosser states that
[t]he previous legal position in Ireland and the United Kingdom
remains essentially the same. Each court can transfer proceedings to
another court, if that court has equivalent jurisdiction and can
better deal with the matter.
One of his examples is that
a Sheriff Court in Scotland...may transfer proceedings to another
court of the same category or exceptionally to a court of another
category, if the location of the evidence or the circumstances for a
fair hearing should make such a course desirable in the interest of
the parties. 22®
So it would appear to be Schlosser's view that, as a general rule, in
the case of actions within the subject matter scope of the
Conventions, the Scottish courts are still free to make remits and
transfers in the circumstances provided for in the statutory
provisions set out at the beginning of this chapter. But if one reads
further it becomes apparent that Schlosser regards the general rule
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as having an exception. If the defender is domiciled in another
contracting state and the pursuer is making use of a rule of special
jurisdiction, it will only be in highly unusual circumstances that a
remit or transfer can be made. For the court's
discretionary powers should, of course, only be used in the spirit of
the 1968 Convention, if the latter has determined, not only
international but also local jurisdiction. 221
In the context of the art 5 special jurisdiction rules (which, of
course, determine local jurisdiction), Schlosser states that
a transfer to another court of the same State must be permitted, when
proper proceedings are not possible before the court which would
otherwise have jurisdiction.
But on the other hand a
transfer merely on account of the cost of the proceedings or in order
to facilitate the taking of evidence would be possible only with the
consent of the [pursuer], who had the choice of jurisdiction". 223
Schlosser referred earlier to transfers "to another court of the same
category or exceptionally to a court of another category". There
seems no reason to consider that in this quotation he is not
referring both to horizontal transfers between sheriff courts and to
vertical transfers between the Court of Session and a sheriff court.
The words "when proper proceedings are not possible" in the second
last quotation certainly provide some scope for argument, but it is
submitted that Schlosser's distinctions are reasonable. The first
point is that the remitting or transferring of an action is very
different from the upholding of a plea of forum non conveniens. For
one thing where an action is remitted or transferred the other court
concerned is in the same state - in fact within the same law
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district. Moreover there is certainty and simplicity. The pursuer
does not have to prepare fresh pleadings - quite possibly in a very
different style - and then ask the other court if proceedings can in
fact be brought in it. Of course in the highly unlikely event of a
court to which an action was transferred making a further transfer,
with the pursuer wondering when the merry-go-round would stop, the
European Court might very well feel itself entitled to step in.
And the second point is that a distinction can indeed be drawn
between suing in a domiciliary court and doing so in one in which the
action can be brought on account of one of the rules of special
jurisdiction. For of course art 2 only gives jurisdiction to the
courts of the state of the defender's domicile in general, leaving it
to the local law to allocate jurisdiction within the state. But art 5
provides that particular courts are to have jurisdiction; its policy
is clearly different.
The statutory provisions set out above are not specifically referred
to in the Act. But s 49 states:
Nothing in this Act shall prevent any court in the United Kingdom
from staying, sisting, striking out or dismissing any proceedings
before it, on the ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise, where
to do so is not inconsistent with the 1968 Convention".
There is clearly an argument that if a court is still permitted to
decline jurisdiction in favour of a foreign court on the basis of
forum non conveniens, it should not consider itself unable, in
appropriate circumstances, to take the less drastic step of remitting
or transferring an action. But on the other hand s 16(3)(b) of the
Act states that
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[i]n determining any question as to the meaning or effect of any
provision contained in Schedule 4
....the [Official Reports] may be considered and shall, so far as
relevant, be given such weight as is appropriate in the
circumstances.
Section 20(5)(b), concerning Sched 8, is in similar terms. Where
jurisdiction in Scotland is being based on art 2 of Sched 4, no
problem arises. For both the passage of the Schlosser Report quoted
above and s 49 of the Act imply that a remit or transfer may be made.
But there appears to the writer to be a strong case for saying that,
if jurisdiction is being based on a provision of art 5 of Sched 4,
for the sake of consistency with the Convention as interpreted by
Schlosser, a remit or transfer should not be made - unless, of
course, "proper proceedings are not possible" before the court
seised.
What if jurisdiction is being based purely on a provision of Sched 8?
Perhaps the defender is not domiciled in any EC or EFTA state. Or
perhaps the action concerns the interpretation of a will, and falls
outside the subject matter scope of the Conventions. In either case
the particular court or courts with jurisdiction will be determined
by Sched 8. In the case of the defender domiciled outside the EC /
EFTA bloc, one or more of the grounds of special jurisdiction in rule
2 may be relevant. In the case of the action concerning the will, the
defender may be domiciled in a particular sheriff court district,
with rule 1 being applicable.
It can of course be said that rule 1 of Sched 8, like art 5 of the
Conventions, determines the particular courts with jurisdiction. But
the Court of Session would clearly not hold that as a result if a
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court has jurisdiction on account of rule 1, a remit or transfer
cannot be made. For if it were to do so, it would in effect be
closing the door to remits and transfers generally. The legislature
cannot have intended this. And this would be a slavish application of
only one sentence in the Schlosser Report. For after all Schlosser
considered that where art 2, as opposed to art 5, of the Convention
is applicable, a remit or transfer can still be made. And in the art
2 context there must always be a local rule which determines the
particular court or courts with jurisdiction.
But what if the action is against an American domiciliary and
jurisdiction is being based on rule 2(3) of Sched 8? It could of
course be argued that transferring or remitting the action should not
be a course open to the court here any more than it would be if
jurisdiction was founded on art 5(3) of the Conventions or, arguably,
on art 5(3) of Sched 4. But, it is submitted, the Court of Session
would be highly unlikely to accept this argument. And in the present
writer's view it would not be at all necessary for it to do so. To
accept the argument would be significantly to restrict the
circumstances in which a remit or transfer can be made. Parliament
enacted the provisions set out at the beginning of this chapter as
provisions generally, if not invariably, available; it would be
difficult to describe them as generally available if they could not
be used in proceedings in which jurisdiction was based on any rule of
special jurisdiction. Section 20(5)(b) merely provides that the
Schlosser Report shall "be given such weight as is appropriate in the
circumstances"; it is submitted that it would not be at all
appropriate for it to be used to justify the courts' powers to remit
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and transfer actions being restricted in the context of Sched 8.
In concluding this chapter it should perhaps be said that the
Scottish courts' powers to remit and transfer actions do appear to
have been marginally restricted by the coming into force of the
Conventions. While the matter is not totally free from doubt, it is
probably only if particular courts have jurisdiction on account of a
provision of the Conventions or, possibly, of Sched 4 that the powers
have been restricted.
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I The courts' duty at the initial stages of an action: introduction
When the new schemes of jurisdiction came into force in Scotland on 1
I
January 1987, the Rules Councils considered it appropriate to create
new rules of court regulating the averments relating to the
jurisdiction of the court which should appear in summonses and
initial writs. It had previously been the practice for averments of
jurisdiction to be included in pleadings but, on account of both the
new rules of jurisdiction themselves and the new duty apparently
imposed on the courts in certain circumstances to consider ex proprio
motu the question of jurisdiction and the question of whether
adequate notice of the proceedings had been given to the defender, it
seemed desirable for Court of Session and sheriff court rules to set
out what averments should be made.
The new rules caused consternation among civil court practitioners,
and much frustration was expressed in Parliament House and in sheriff
court bar common rooms throughout Scotland. The first problem was in
obtaining a copy of the new rules; they had been enacted by Acts of
Z
Sederunt on 13 November 1986, but when they entered into force on 1
January 1987 very few copies were available. It was only when they
were published in the Scots Law Times in the course of January 1987
that their precise terms became widely known. The rules were
generally practitioners' first points of contact with the new schemes
of jurisdiction. For many they were in fact their first points of
contact with European Law in the wide sense. They were sometimes seen
as good examples of "people in Brussels" directly or indirectly
interfering in our legal system and in fact in our way of life.
There was a most unfortunate lack of understanding of exactly what
148
the new rules of court meant and precisely why they had been enacted.
As will by now be clear, simply reading through the Act does not
enable everything to fall into place in one's mind. Uncertainties
about the new sheriff court rules extended beyond solicitors to
sheriff clerks and sheriffs. The rules were being interpreted in
different ways in different sheriff courts. In order to obtain
warrants of citation, more averments on jurisdiction had to be
included in initial writs in some sheriff court districts than in
others. And the practice of a particular sheriff court might change
after the sheriff or sheriff clerk had learned more about, or
reflected on, the new rules of civil jurisdiction.
4-
The Maxwell Report had been published in 1980, two years before the
Act came into existence. In 1980 the whole matter seemed of little
more than academic interest. And Anton's book on the new schemes of
5
jurisdiction had of course been published in 1984, well before the
new rules of court were drafted. The Supplement by Anton and
&
Beaumont, including the new rules of court and a short commentary on
them, was published in the course of 1987. So at the beginning of
1987 there was no up-to-date Scottish commentary on the Act itself,
let alone on the rules of court. (Although the Act was not in force
between 1984 and 1987, there was a steady stream of case law on the
Convention in the original six contracting states; there was also a
7-
growing corpus of academic writing on the Convention and Act.)
Moreover no notes for the guidance of practitioners were published by
any official body to help smooth the introduction of the new rules.
But in 1987 the writer had published in the Scots Law Times four
articles in which he attempted to explain what he considered to be
149
8
important aspects of the new rules of civil jurisdiction. And
practitioners benefitted considerably from the publication at p 1 of
the News part of the 1987 Scots Law Times of Black's model styles.
to
These styles did not, however, meet with universal approval.
In the early part of 1987 the writer, along with Anton and Black,
addressed seminars in Edinburgh and Glasgow on the new rules of
ll
jurisdiction in Scotland. The questions put by the practitioners
attending the seminars were principally concerned with the averments
of jurisdiction which they should make in their initial writs and
summonses, and with the circumstances in which they would be entitled
to obtain decree in absence. Throughout the first half of 1987, in
fact, many practitioners contacted Black in order to obtain guidance
with regard to the new rules.
Those responsible for the rules of court in both the Court of Session
and the sheriff courts also appeared to be uncertain of precisely
what should be required, and amendments to the new rules were
12
introduced. The writer had two articles on the subject of the new
sheriff court rules published in the Journal of the Law Society of
Scotland. In them he argued the case for a fresh set of rules,
placing a heavier duty on practitioners than was by that time being
placed on them by the new rules as generally interpreted. He hoped
that at the very least his articles would go some way to explaining
why averments of jurisdiction are more important now than they were
before. He hoped to see some comment, positive or negative, on his
articles in the pages of the Journal . but unfortunately none
appeared. Whether this was because of satisfaction with the rules, a
continuing lack of understanding of them, general lethargy or some
150
other reason was not clear. The writer also wrote to the Junior
Counsel to the Lord President, setting out his views on the new Court
of Session Rules. A revision of the new Court of Session rules did
subsequently take place, but it was not fully in line with what he
had been suggesting.
In many ways the dust now appears to have settled. There is no longer
a widespread feeling among practitioners that the new rules of court
are particularly troublesome. It could be said that the rules have
ceased to be new. The present generation of trainee and newly-
qualified solicitors never knew the old pleading requirements. The
amount of reported case law on the rules has been very small, and
there now appears to be uniformity, or near uniformity, of practice
throughout the sheriff courts of Scotland. But, curiously, the rules
are materially different, and the practice is significantly
different, in the sheriff courts from what they are in the Court of
Session. No dispute concerning the interpretation of the new rules
appears to have been heard in the Court of Session, either at first
instance or on appeal from a decision of a sheriff. But because of
the differences in the rules and the practice, it certainly cannot be
assumed that, if a case does come before the Court of Session, the
present sheriff court approach will be approved by the superior
court, or that the whole subject will not be thought out afresh.
The writer's own views have not significantly changed from those
which he expressed in the published articles. He still considers that
the present rules, particularly as applied in practice, are not those
best suited to enabling the courts to fulfil the obligations now
imposed on them. It does not therefore seem inappropriate for him to
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set out his views here, and to suggest rules to replace those at
present in force. He will consider what the effect of the relevant
provisions of the Act should be on the sheriff court ordinary cause
rules, the sheriff court summary cause rules, the sheriff court small
claims rules, the Court of Session rules for proceedings begun by
summons and the Court of Session rules for petition procedure.
As the relevant principles are in each of the five contexts
identical, he will only set out the issues at length in the context
of the sheriff court ordinary cause rules. But as there is variation
in the present rules, and as the same particular forms of words
cannot be used in each of the five contexts, he will then turn to the
sheiiff court summary cause and small claims rules and to the two
sets of Court of Session rules. The courts' duty at the stage of
decree in absence being sought is of course related to their duty at
the initial stages of an action. Their duty when asked to grant
decree in absence will be considered at the end of this Part.
It would appear to be useful for present purposes to divide civil
actions, according to subject matter, into three categories: (i)
'4-
those within the scope of the Conventions, (ii) those outside the
scope of the Conventions but within the scope of the Scottish rules
IS
of jurisdiction in Sched 8 to the Act and (iii) those outside the
16
scope of both the Conventions and Sched 8. Included in (i) are all
actions within the subject matter scope of the Conventions, even if
in the particular case the Conventions do not to any extent determine
jurisdiction. It is worth bearing in mind that the vast majority of
actions within the subject matter scope of the Conventions will also
be within the scope of the Sched 8 jurisdiction rules. But the
152
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converse is not true. It should be noted that for the sake of brevity
an action involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties is referred to by the writer as an identical action.
153
The new sheriff court rules applicable to ordinary causes
lo
The new rules introduced on 1 January 1987 stated:
Rule 3
(2) The initial writ shall contain averments about any agreement
which the pursuer has reason to believe may exist prorogating
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause to another court.
(3) The initial writ shall contain averments about any proceedings
which the pursuer has reason to believe may be pending before another
court involving the same cause of action and between the same parties
as those named in the initial writ.
(4) An article of condescendence shall be included in the initial
writ stating-
(a) the domicile of the defender as determined in accordance with
sections 41 to 46 of, and article 52 of Schedule 1 to, the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982; and
(b) the ground of jurisdiction of the court.
At
In 1988 rule 3(4) (a) was effectively deleted. Rule 3(4) now simply
reads:
An article of condescendence shall be included in the initial writ
stating the ground of jurisdiction of the court.
Looking first at rules 3(2) and 3(3) together, two issues arise
concerning their interpretation. Firstly, do they extend to all civil
actions and, if not, what is their subject matter scope? Secondly, do
they require a pursuer, in appropriate circumstances, to make
negative averments, in other words to aver that he is unaware of the
existence of any relevant prorogation agreement or identical action?
So far as the first issue is concerned, the rules, considered on
their own, do appear to cover all types of civil actions. But they
are, in fact, generally interpreted as not being relevant in the
context of, for example, actions of divorce. The rules contain no
words indicating that their scope is restricted to certain categories
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of civil actions. And there is no ambiguous phrase which requires the
courts to consider different interpretations which could be given to
11
it. In his article in the Journal the writer referred to the recent
23
English case of Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton). and set out the words
of Lord Atkinson in Vacher & Sons v London Society of Compositors
IS
quoted by Lord Scarman in Stock:
If the language of a statute be plain, admitting of only one meaning,
the Legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it has
plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be
enforced though it should lead to absurd or mischievous results.
It is a trite point that different approaches to the interpretation
of legislation exist, making reference to its legal and social
contexts. But it is submitted that, on account of these dieta
approved by Lord Scarman, had rules 3(2) and 3(3) been statutory
provisions, there would have been a strong argument to the effect
that they should be regarded as applying to all types of civil
actions. Whether or not that was reasonable would have been
irrelevant. And for the reasons which will be given below, it should
be said, it is the view of the writer that it is quite pointless for
rules 3(2) and 3(3) to apply to certain types of civil proceedings,
particularly proceedings outside the subject matter scope of the Act
as a whole - category (iii) actions.
But the rules form part not of an Act of Parliament but of a piece of
delegated legislation, an Act of Sederunt published as a Statutory
Instrument. So far as the interpretation - in the broad sense - of
delegated legislation is concerned, the principal question which
arises is usually whether or not the particular provision is ultra
vi res. And the issue of ultra vi res can be raised in the context of
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an Act of Sederunt as well as in the context of a regulation made by
1C>
a Secretary of State and published as a Statutory Instrument. The Act
of Sederunt purporting to enact the rules was issued by the Lords of
Council and Session "under and by virtue of the powers conferred upon
them by section 32 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971, section
48 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 and of all other
powers enabling them in that behalf".
Section 48(1) enables the Court of Session to "make provision for
regulating the procedure to be followed in any court in connection
with any provision of this Act or the Conventions". The procedure,
including pleading, in any action outside the subject matter scope of
the Act cannot, it is submitted, be regarded as being "in connection
with" any provision of the Act or the Conventions, so an argument
that a rule concerning all types of proceedings, irrespective of
subject matter, was intra vires cannot be based on s 48. SectioQ 32
of the 1971 Act gives the Court of Session a general power to
"regulate and prescribe the procedure and practice to be followed in
any civil proceedings in the sheriff court". Whether that provision,
and the "other powers" referred to at the beginning of the Act of
Sederunt, enable the Court to make rules which are quite without
point is a question primarily of administrative law, outside the
scope of this thesis. Moreover, in view of the comparative ease with
which rules of court may be amended, a discussion of what the rules
ought to provide would appear to be much more useful than a
consideration of the validity of the present rules.
If the rules are indeed intra vires, do they extend to all types of
civil actions? This is a question of interpretation, in the narrower
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sense, of delegated legislation. There is an unfortunate scarcity of
authority on the interpretation of delegated legislation which has
28
been held to be, or is accepted as being, intra vires. In Hutchison v
21 "?o
Galloway Engineering Co, the Lord Justice-Clerk stated that
an Act of Sederunt is not subjected to the same rigid construction as
an Act of Parliament. But a Court can depart from the terms of an Act
of Sederunt only where special cause is shown.
The other judges concurred with these dicta. Admittedly the facts of
the case were very different from those of the actions which might
result in the point under consideration being judicially determined,
but it is submitted that there is much force in the argument that
Lord Scarman's approach to statutory interpretation should, at least
as a general rule, be extended to the interpretation of delegated
legislation. On account of what little authority there is, and for
the sake of consistency with the rule applicable in the context of
statutes themselves, rules 3(2) and 3(3), as presently framed, should
- even though the result may be somewhat undesirable - be interpreted
as applying to all types of civil actions.
If courts throughout Scotland can read words into straightforward
provisions of Acts of Sederunt, and effectively restrict the
application of their rules as far as they see fit, this may very well
lead to uncertainty and inconsistency, both of which are clearly
undesirable. Questions concerning the appropriateness of rules of
court should as a general rule be left to the Lords of Council and
Session in their legislative capacity, advised by the relevant Rules
Council. Only where the literal application of a plainly expressed
rule would lead to injustice in the case before it, should the Court
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as a judicial body, it is submitted, be prepared to give it a
contextual or purposive construction.
Three further points should be mentioned briefly here. Firstly, rule
3(1) contains a general rule relating to the form of writ in all
"ordinary causes". If it is to be used as a guide in the
interpretation of rules 3(2) and 3(3), something which may or may not
be justified, it must be remembered that in the sheriff court context
the term "ordinary cause" embraces all proceedings other than summary
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causes and summary applications. It includes, for example, actions of
divorce and for custody. Secondly, rule 3(5) makes special provision
with regard to actions of divorce and separation, but it cannot
easily be considered as replacing rules 3(2) and 3(3) in the context
of these types of actions. Read literally, the rules are not mutually
exclusive.
Thirdly, the question of the subject matter scope of the rules under
consideration has not explicitly been the subject of judicial
decision. This can be attributed largely to the general shrieval
attitude to negative averments, causing the practical effects of the
rules to be significantly less than they might have been; the
question of negative averments is considered below. But it is
implicit in the decision of Sheriff Principal Macleod in Burmy v
11
White, criticised by the writer below in the context of averments of
domicile, that the subject matter scope of rules 3(2) and 3(3) is
restricted. Though, curiously, although he accepts the argument that
the scope of the domicile rule should effectively be restricted, in
his obiter dicta he fails to appreciate that a similar argument can
be advanced with regard to rules 3(2) and 3(3).
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Turning to the second issue, that of whether negative averments are
required in appropriate circumstances, Black in a Scots Law Times
article, Sheriffs Principal O'Brien and Nicholson in consecutive Acts
3? 36
of Court and Sheriff Principal Taylor in a judgment have all
interpreted the rules as not requiring negative averments to be made.
3?
This is also the view of Macphail in his textbook. It is understood
that the practice throughout the Scottish sheriff courts, not just
those in Tayside, Central and Fife and in Lothian and Borders, is for
the issues of prorogation agreements and identical actions only to be
referred to in initial writs if a positive averment can be made - or,
of course, if the subject is being raised by the defender. But as
will be noted below, the practice in the Court of Session is
different.
Having considered the present rules, we can now turn to the question
of whether there should exist at all rules specifically requiring
averments about prorogation agreements and identical actions to be
made. Three principal issues arise here. Firstly, on account of the
Act, should a pursuer be required to make particular averments
concerning jurisdiction and certain other issues in his initial writ?
Secondly, if he should be required to do so, ought the rules to
require averments relating to prorogation agreements and identical
actions? And thirdly, if such averments ought to be required, how
should the rules of court be framed? In particular, should the scope
of rules 3(2) and 3(3) be restricted to certain types of actions? And
should they be amended so as specifically to require appropriate
averments, positive or negative, to be made in all actions where, on
account of their subject matter or for any other reason, the issues
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of prorogation agreements and identical actions are of relevance? We
shall consider the first question first. We shall then consider the
second and third questions together, first in the context of rule
3(2) and then in the context of rule 3(3).
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The court's duty to verify its .jurisdiction
At common law in England and Scotland the courts do not have a duty
in an action to consider their jurisdiction ex proprio motu■
38 3°\
Referring to Wal1's Trs v Drynan, the Maxwell Report states that
"normally it is not competent for the court to refuse of its own
motion to entertain a case on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction".
Article 19 and art 20 para one of the Conventions appear to impose on
courts of contracting states duties to consider their jurisdiction ex
proprio motu in certain circumstances. Article 20 para one is
particularly relevant in the present context, but as art 19 will be
referred to below it is appropriate to set out the terms of both
provisions.
Article 19 states:
Where a court of a Contracting State is seised of a claim which is
principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another
Contracting State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article
16, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.
Article 20 para one states:
Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued in a
court of another Contracting State and does not enter an appearance,
the court shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction
unless its jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of this
Convention.
In art 19 of Sched 4, "Contracting State" is replaced by "part of the
United Kingdom". In Sched 8, rule 7 states:
Where a court is seised of a claim which is principally concerned
with a matter over which another court has exclusive jurisdiction by
virtue of Rule 4, or where it is precluded from exercising
jurisdiction by Rule 4(3), it shall declare of its own motion that it
has no jurisdiction.
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In art 20 para one of Sched 4, "Contracting State" is replaced by
"part of the United Kingdom", and "Convention" by "Title". In Sched
8, rule 8, the equivalent provision, makes no reference to the
domicile of the defender and simply states:
Where in any case a court has no jurisdiction which is compatible
with this Act, and the defender does not enter an appearance, the
court shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.
Exactly what is the extent of the court's duty under art 20 para one
of the Conventions and Sched 4 and under rule 8 of Sched 8? Where it
appears ex facie of the initial writ that there is no jurisdiction -
for example where it is stated that the defender lives permanently in
France and there is no indication of a ground of special jurisdiction
being available - the court clearly cannot allow the action to
proceed and decree in absence to be granted. One can argue that
warrant to cite the defender should not, in fact, be granted. But, on
the other hand, if the action does proceed and the defender then
enters appearance without contesting jurisdiction, the court will, on
account of art 18 of the Conventions and Sched 4 and of rule 6 of
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Sched 8, have jurisdiction. The Maxwell Report states that
in view of Article 18 the clerk of court cannot refuse warrant to
serve an initiating writ on grounds of lack of jurisdiction unless it
is clear that another court has exclusive jurisdiction under Article
19.
It is submitted that there is much to be said for this point of view.
If the practice was for a clerk of court to refuse warrant on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, art 18 and rule 6 would be rendered
redundant - or at any rate they would only be applicable in the case
of actions which had "slipped through the net". To refuse to allow
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parties who are prepared to litigate in a particular court to do so
would appear to be contrary to the spirit of the Conventions. And it
certainly does not appear to have been seriously suggested that art
18 only has a "safety net" function. So, unless another court clearly
has exclusive jurisdiction in a particular action, the clerk of court
should grant warrant to serve the writ concerned. But of course in
the event of the Scottish court clearly lacking jurisdiction, there
is much to be said for the clerk of court drawing this to the
attention of the sheriff in the event of the defender failing to
enter an appearance during the period in which it is open to him to
do so.
But what if there is no averment suggesting a lack of jurisdiction?
And what is the position if the relevant averments in an initial writ
all suggest that the court does have jurisdiction? Can the court then
simply allow events to take their course? There have, unfortunately,
been no decisions of the European Court on the interpretation of art
20 para one of the Conventions. This is perhaps not altogether
surprising. The European Court can only be seised of a jurisdiction
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matter by an appeal court in a Brussels Convention contracting state.
It is highly unusual for proceedings to reach an appeal court if the
defender has not entered appearance. It is not likely to be in a
pursuer's interest to ask a national appeal court to make a reference
to the European Court, requesting it to clarify art 20 para one.
And on account of the terms of the provision, if it appears to a
court that it may not have jurisdiction, and the defender has not
entered appearance, it should almost certainly investigate the
question of jurisdiction for itself - or, if it is an appeal court,
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make a reference to Luxembourg concerning the interpretation of the
relevant rule of jurisdiction of the Convention. What it should not
do is focus on art 20 para one. If the European Court is called upon
to clarify the duty imposed on national courts by art 20 para one,
this is most likely to be in a case where the defender has "appeared"
after the granting of decree and is seeking either the recall or
reduction of the decree or the refusal, on account of art 27(2) of
the Conventions, of the pursuer's motion for enforcement of the
decree in another state. But even in these cases the court will be
more concerned with the rules of jurisdiction themselves or with the
4*
rule set out in art 27(2).
No real guidance can be obtained from any of the four decisions of
national courts of contracting states which refer to art 20 para one
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and which are to be found in the D Series Digest. The matter does not
appear to have been considered judicially in England and, as is noted
below, what little Scottish case law there is concerning the court's
duty to question its jurisdiction does not refer to art 20 para one
and can generally be regarded as unsatisfactory. The textbook writers
on the whole merely paraphrase the provision of the Conventions and
then refer to the passages on art 20 in the Jenard Report. In his
section "Scope of the Convention", Jenard's second subsection is
headed "The Binding Nature of the Convention". He states that "[t]he
courts must apply the rules of the Convention whether or not they are
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pleaded by the parties".
The example which Jenard goes on to give may lead the reader to
wonder if the court's duty only arises if and when the defender
enters an appearance. However if one returns to art 20 para one, one
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sees that one of the conditions for it being applicable is that the
defender has not entered an appearance. And of course art 18 makes it
clear that if an appearance is entered and jurisdiction is not
contested at all, the court concerned will as a general rule have
jurisdiction. Perhaps what Jenard is trying to show is that the duty
to consider the question of jurisdiction arises in any action where
the defender does not enter appearance and fully accept that the
court has jurisdiction. It is curious if on the one hand the
Conventions imply that the duty only arises where the defender does
not enter an appearance, and on the other hand Jenard implies that it
may arise even where an appearance is entered. It will only be in an
extremely small number of actions that, as in Jenard's example,
jurisdiction is disputed but, wrongly, no reference is made by the
defender to an applicable rule of the Conventions. But this
possibility will be considered again below.
Article 19, it should be said, appears to be applicable regardless of
4-6
whether or not appearance is entered. But art 19 concerns the grounds
of exclusive jurisdiction alone, and Jenard's example does not relate
to exclusive jurisdiction. Jenard comments that art 19
emphasises that the court must of its own motion declare that it has
no jurisdiction if it is seised of a matter in which the courts of
another Contracting State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of
Article 16. 4-T
Turning to art 20, which is central to the question of the court's
duty to verify its jurisdiction, Jenard begins his section on this
provision by stating that it "is one of the most important Articles
4-#
in the Convention . The thrust of what he goes on to state here is
that, where the Convention is applicable and the defender does not
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enter appearance, the court must play an active role in determining
whether or not it has jurisdiction. It cannot just sit back and make
assumptions. In view of the importance which he gives to this matter,
it seems useful to set out his dicta in full. He states that art 20
applies where the defendant does not enter an appearance; here the
court must of its own motion examine whether it has jurisdiction
under the Convention. If it finds no basis for jurisdiction, the
court must declare that it has no jurisdiction. It is obvious that
the court is under the same obligation even where there is no basis
for exclusive jurisdiction. Failure on the part of the defendant to
enter an appearance is not equivalent to a submission to the
jurisdiction. It is not sufficient for the court to accept the
submissions of the plaintiff as regards jurisdiction; the court must
itself ensure that the plaintiff proves that it has international
jurisdiction.
The object of this provision is to ensure that in cases of failure to
enter an appearance the court giving judgment does so only if it has
jurisdiction, and so to safeguard the defendant as fully as possible
in the original proceedings. The rule adopted is derived from Article
37(2) of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, by virtue of which the
court must of its own motion examine whether it has jurisdiction
where the defendant is a foreigner and does not enter an appearance.
Jenard says nothing here about any duty where an appearance is
entered; there is no reference to his words previously quoted. The
significance of this is unclear.
5O
In the Report on the other principal Convention, it is affirmed by
51
Jenard and Moller that Article 20
is a particularly important provision where the defendant fails to
enter an appearanee....A judge required to apply the Lugano
Convention must declare of his own motion that he has no jurisdiction
unless his jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of....that
Convention.
There are interesting, although not unambiguous, comments on art 20
5X 53
para one in the Schlosser Report and in Droz's principal work. Droz's
work appeared before Schlosser's, so we shall consider his comments
first. Because of the scarcity of authority on such an important
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matter, and the fact that his words carry greater weight than those
of most textbook writers, lengthy quotation does not seem out of
S*
place. Droz states that
[1]'obiigation de se declarer d'office incompetents implique done que
les juges des Etats membres de la Communaute devront, dans l'avenir,
verifier systematiquement leur competence chaque fois qu'ils
constateront que le defendeur ne comparait pas et que 1'assignation
vise une personne domiciliee dans un autre Etat contractant. Pour
mener & bien cette recherche, ils devront disposer d'un pouvoir
d'investigation qui leur permette de verifier les allegations du
demandeur concernant la competence.
Article 20 para one, he states, is inspired by art 39(2) [sic] of the
SS
Italian Code of Civil Procedure, which requires judges to look into
the question of jurisdiction where the defender is a foreigner. The
provision will, he asserts, require French judges to do more than
they are required to do by art 171 of their Code of Civil Procedure.
When it comes into force, as a general rule - in other words not only
in actions concerning real rights - French judges will have to regard
questions of jurisdiction as being questions to which they should
address themselves ex proprio motu.
In his paragraph quoted above, Droz states in effect that, on account
of art 20 para one, the question of jurisdiction should be
investigated where it seems from the pleadings that the person who is
being sued and who has not appeared is domiciled in another
contracting state. After all, art 20 para one refers to "a defendant
domiciled in one Contracting State.... sued in.... another". But he
goes on to make the very important point that
on peut penser que la verification d'office de la competence pourrait
et meme devrait intervenir bien que le demandeur aliegue que le
defendeur est domicilie sur le territoire du tribunal saisi. S'il en
est reellement ainsi, 1'article 20 ne s'applique pas mais encore
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faut-il qu'on en soit sQr.
In other words, the court should consider the question of
jurisdiction even where it is stated or averred that the defender is
domiciled in the state of the court seised. The statement or averment
may not be correct. Those advancing the argument that by simply
reading the pursuer's averments on jurisdiction the court may not be
fulfilling the duty imposed on it by art 20 para one will find
support in Droz's last statement quoted above and in his statement
that
[ i ] 1 semble que le juge saisi puisse exiger du demandeur des
explications compl6mentaires lorsque 1'assignation laisse planer
quelques doutes sur la r6alit6 d'un domicile dans le pays du
tribunal.^8
It should be said that he concludes this section by admitting that
[djans bien des cas cependant 1'allegation du demandeur aura toutes
les apparences de la v6rit6, et le d£fendeur n'aura pratiquement pas
d'autres moyens que de comparaltre pour _d6cliner la competence en
contestant les affirmations du demandeur.^1
Article 20 para one, in other words, is designed to give protection
to defenders. But there will be occasions when it is not successful.
So precisely what steps should a Scottish court now take in the
fulfilment of its duty to "examine whether it has jurisdiction", or
in the words of the French text to "verifier son competence"? There
is a wish on the part of many individuals to have the traditional
Scottish practice changed as little as possible. The relevant
passages in the Schlosser Report have been used to support the
argument that the courts need not question their jurisdiction in
actions where there is no reason to believe that jurisdiction does
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not exist. But these passages are, in the words of the Maxwell
(SO
Report, "far from clear". They do not appear to be well thought-out,
and a coherent argument is certainly not well expressed in them.
61
Schlosser begins by stating that
[u]nder Articles 19 and 20 of the 1968 Convention the provisions
concerning "direct jurisdiction" are to be observed by the court of
its own motion: in some cases, i.e. where exclusive jurisdiction
exists, irrespective of whether the defendant takes any steps; in
other cases only where the defendant challenges the jurisdiction.
What he says in the context of exclusive jurisdiction is correct,
although of course it does not tell us anything about the particular
steps which a court must take in the observance of the rules of
jurisdiction. The French version of the Schlosser Report, it should
be said, simply uses the words "le juge doit respecter d'office les
regies relatives & la competence directe". Schlosser's dicta here
which refer to art 19 are nevertheless in line with those of Jenard
a
and other writers.
But so far as the "other cases" are concerned, the dicta are quite
simply wrong. The duty imposed by art 20 para one arises where the
defender does not enter an appearance and challenge the jurisdiction.
And the statement that the jurisdiction provisions are to be observed
ex proprio motu where jurisdiction is challenged is somewhat strange.
Jenard and Droz refer to the situation where a defender enters
appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the court by reference to
rules outside the Convention, and the court proceeds to apply the
rules of the Convention. But because of the words "does not enter
appearance" in art 20 para one, such a consideration by the court
cannot be based on art 20. And if Schlosser had had this situation in
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mind, presumably he would have made this clear. The French language
version of the passage, it should be said, is no better expressed:
....le juge doit respecter d'office les regies relatives h la
"competence directe", soit....soit seulement lorsque le d6fendeur
conteste la competence du juge.
This initial sentence certainly does not encourage the reader to
attach great weight to the passages in the Schlosser Report under
consideration.
"It does not necessarily follow from Articles 19 and 20 of the 1968
Clf.
Convention , states Schlosser
that the courts must, of their own motion, investigate the facts
relevant to deciding the question of jurisdiction, that they must for
example inquire where the defendant is domiciled. The only essential
factor is that uncontested assertions by the parties should not bind
the court.
It is, at least initially, difficult to see how these words can be
reconciled with the dicta of Jenard and Droz quoted above. And to the
present writer, the simple form of words "shall declare of its own
motion" which is to be found in art 20 para one appears in effect to
be imposing an obligation on courts to look into the matter of
jurisdiction in actions where no appearance has been entered. If
there is no jurisdiction, the court must declare this. It must
address itself to the matter before it can make the declaration. If
Schlosser is saying that the court cannot look behind the averments
made by the pursuer, then it is submitted that he is wrong.
CS
Schlosser continues:
....the following rule is reconcilable with the 1968 Convention: a
court may assume jurisdiction only if it is completely satisfied of
all the facts on which such jurisdiction is based; if it is not so
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satisfied it can and must request the parties to provide the
necessary evidence, in default of which the action will be dismissed
as inadmissible....Whether a court is itself obliged to investigate
the facts relevant to jurisdiction, or whether it can, or must, place
the burden of proof in this respect on the party interested in the
jurisdiction of the court concerned, is determined solely by national
law. Indeed some of the legal systems of the original Member States,
for example Germany, do not require the court itself to undertake
factual investigations in a case of exclusive jurisdiction, even
though lack of such jurisdiction has to be considered by the court of
its own motion.
Just what does all this mean? In the Maxwell Report it is stated that
Schlosser
appears to suggest that the court is not obliged always to
investigate the facts on which jurisdiction is based. If from the
pursuer's pleadings it appears there is no real doubt as to
jurisdiction, the court can proceed. If it appears there is doubt,
the court must request the parties to provide the necessary
evidence.... National law will determine whether the court itself will
investigate the facts or whether it will place the burden of proof on
the pursuer.
In referring to these passages of the Schlosser and Maxwell Reports,
6?
Anton and Beaumont state that
[i]t seems 1 ikely....that, unless averments of the pursuer, if
substantiated, would not allow the court to assume jurisdiction or
unless the court is put on its guard in the circumstances of the
case, the court may accept as true the averments of the pursuer as to
the grounds of jurisdiction. It will frequently have no alternative.
Returning to Schlosser's words, "the party interested in the
jurisdiction of the court concerned" does not seem a particularly
useful form of words. Presumably, as the Maxwell Committee believed,
he means the pursuer, but as he has referred earlier in the sentence
to the court requesting the "parties" to provide evidence, one cannot
be absolutely sure. Of course contrary to what Schlosser appears to
believe, the art 20 para one duty only arises where the defender does
not enter an appearance. He cannot very easily be requested to
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provide evidence!
While Schlosser's language does indeed provide much scope for
argument, it is submitted with all due respect to the Maxwell
Committee and to Anton and Beaumont that the correct interpretation
of the passage quoted is not that the court can proceed if there is
nothing in the pursuer's pleadings which gives it a real doubt as to
jurisdiction. And it is nonsense to say that the court will
frequently have no alternative to accepting the pursuer's averments
as true. It could of course request some comments on these averments
by the pursuer's solicitor at the bar of the court. Or it could seek
affidavits, signed by the pursuer and a witness, on the issues
referred to in the averments. Or it could even order a parole proof.
It would generally be accepted that one of these steps would be
appropriate in the event of the averments of the pursuer casting
doubt on the jurisdiction of the court. But what is the court's duty
where the averments are clear and unambiguous, where it appears ex
facie of the initial writ that there is jurisdiction? Here the
present writer's interpretation of Schlosser's words is as follows.
Before it can hold that it has jurisdiction in an undefended action -
any undefended action within the scope of the Conventions - a
Scottish court must satisfy itself that the pursuer's pleadings
correctly outline the factual situation; it must be "completely
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satisfied of all the facts". If the pursuer has not provided it with
the necessary evidence, it must ask him to do so; "it can and must
request the parties [ie the pursuer] to provide the necessary
evidence". If he fails to provide evidence which satisfies the court,




Schiosser is not saying that clear and unambiguous averments are
acceptable. A court cannot be "completely satisfied of all the facts"
merely through reading averments; that is why, for example, in
certain consistorial causes an undefended proof on the merits is
required in the event of the defender failing to enter an appearance.
In a consistorial cause the court concerns itself with the interests
of any children and of society as a whole; in an undefended action
within the scope of the Conventions, it is being required to concern
itself with the interests of the absent defender and, arguably, of
society. This interpretation of Schlosser's words is of course in
line with the approach of Jenard and Droz and, it is submitted, with
a straightforward interpretation of art 20 para one. Moreover it can
be supported by reference to the second part of Schlosser's passage
quoted above (the part beginning "Whether") and to the French
language version of the Schiosser Report.
It is submitted that the meaning of the second part of the passage
quoted above is this. In certain legal systems a court will verify
particular points by investigating matters for itself ("rechercher
lui-meme les faits" in the French version); it will examine witnesses
itself and it will send out its officers to collect the required
evidence. In other legal systems, by contrast, the court will require
the pursuer to lead what it considers to be sufficient evidence on
each crucial matter ("imposer a la partie....de produire les
justifications nbcessaires"); until he does so, the point is not
considered verified and the action cannot proceed. The Brussels
Convention does not affect the approach traditionally taken in any
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legal system to the verifying of points which arise. There must be
verification of jurisdiction in undefended actions, but as far as the
European Court is concerned it may be carried out either by means of
an investigation by officers of the local court or by means of the
examining of evidence led by the pursuer.
The method of verification, he is stating, will vary from state to
state; but at the same time, he is implying, the thoroughness of the
verification will not. The Convention, after all, is not designed to
harmonise civil procedure throughout the contracting states; but as
the European Court has made clear the interpretation of its
provisions should be the same throughout the contracting states. So
long as the two courts both have a sufficiently thorough approach to
their task, it is perfectly satisfactory for a Continental court to
declare its jurisdiction or lack of it on the basis of the enquiries
which it has itself made; it is equally acceptable for a Scottish
court to do so on the basis of its assessment of the pursuer's
evidence.
Turning to the French version of the Schlosser Report, the text of
the first part of the passage quoted above is:
....le syst6me expose ci-apres est compatible avec la convention:
bien que le juge ne puisse se declarer competent que s'il est
pleinement convaincu de 1'existence de tous les elements de fait qui
justifient sa competence, il pourra ou devra demander aux parties,
tant qu'il n'a pas acquis cette conviction, de lui fournir les
preuves requises. A defaut, la demande devra etre d6clar6e
irrecevable. ^I
It is suggested that a good translation of the words from the colon
to the end of the sentence would be as follows:
although the court may only hold that it has jurisdiction if it is
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fully satisfied that there exist all the elements which are inherent
in its jurisdiction, insofar as it is not satisfied on this matter it
may or must ask the parties to provide it with the necessary
evidence.
In other words, if the court has not ascertained for itself that it
has jurisdiction, it may ask the parties to provide the evidence. In
his view, it is submitted, it could be fully satisfied without
calling on the parties to provide evidence only if it had
investigated matters for itself, not if it had merely read one or two
sentences. This is implied by the use of "bien que" ("although") if
by nothing else. The use of this expression in the context implies
that in his opinion the basic rule is that the court should
investigate matters for itself, but nevertheless it is perfectly
acceptable for the parties to be asked to provide appropriate
evidence. As a Continental lawyer, it could be said, Schlosser was
thinking in terms of an investigation by the court itself as being
the norm, and the leading of appropriate evidence as being an
acceptable variation. (There is of course no word corresponding to
"bien que" in the official English language version of the Schlosser
Report.)
A further point is that the existence of the semicolon after "based"
in the English language version may encouage the belief that the
court can be satisfied without evidence being led, without it being
given any more than bare averments. For the word "evidence" only
forms part of the phrase following the semicolon. But in the French
version there is a comma rather than a semicolon, and the whole
sentence "hangs together" much more than the English language one
does. So the writer's interpretation of the sentence, that something
more than a simple assertion by the pursuer is always required, might
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very well be accepted more readily by the average French reader. And
of course the French language version of a European Community paper
could be said to be generally regarded as primus inter pares.
This interpretation of what Schlosser describes as a rule
"reconcilable with the 1968 Convention" enables a reasonable
interpretation to be given to his earlier statement that the courts
need not, of their own motion, "investigate the facts relevant to
deciding the question of jurisdiction". If "investigate" is
interpreted as "have examined by officers of the court acting
independently from the pursuer", then the statement is not
irreconciTable with the dicta of Jenard and Droz.
After his strange initial statement on the effects of arts 19 and 20
}2
quoted above, Schlosser states that a court must
of its own motion consider whether there exists an agreement on
jurisdiction which excludes the court's jurisdiction and which is
valid in accordance with Article 17.
What he is in effect saying, it is submitted, is that the question of
the existence of a valid prorogation agreement should be considered
by the court in the light of either an investigation which it and its
officers have themselves carried out or the providing of evidence or
making of submissions by or on behalf of the pursuer. If the
existence of a valid prorogation agreement is relevant to
jurisdiction, then it would appear to be the case that it should
indeed be examined in one of these ways. For, as Schlosser goes on to
state, in the case of an undefended action a court can only allow the
proceedings to continue if it is "completely satisfied of all the
facts on which.... jurisdiction is based".
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As has been made clear, the present writer interprets these words as
meaning, in the Scottish context, that mere averments are
insufficient. But even if he is wrong and averments are sufficient,
it would appear to be Schlosser's view that these averments must
cover all the factors which are inherent in the jurisdiction of the
court. If the lack of a prorogation agreement in favour of another
court, and the lack of an identical action in another court, are
factors inherent in the jurisdiction of the court, then it would seem
that they should be covered by the averments. This matter will be
considered in detail later in this chapter.
It should finally be mentioned that Schlosser refers to the impact of
arts 19 and 20 in the United Kingdom. He states:
An obligation to observe the rules of jurisdiction of its own motion
is by no means an unusual duty for a court in the original Member
States. However, the United Kingdom delegation pointed out that such
a provision would mean a fundamental change for its courts. Hitherto
United Kingdom courts had been able to reach a decision only on the
basis of submissions of fact or law made by the parties. Without
infringing this principle, no possibility existed of examining their
jurisdiction of their own motion.
Precisely what should be made of this passage? Does it cast doubt on
the present writer's interpretation of the other passages? It is
conceded that it is somewhat opaque. Exactly what the United Kingdom
delegation stated, and what Schlosser understood English law and
Scots law to be, are not clear. It was correct to say that if English
and Scottish courts had to observe their rules of jurisdiction ex
proprio motu, this would mean a fundamental change. So far as the
third and fourth sentences of the passage are concerned, all that
they may mean is that at common law disputes concerning jurisdiction
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were approached in the same way as disputes concerning the merits of
an action. The courts would come to their decision on the basis of
the evidence led; in principle they would not ask questions about
issues not raised by the parties. But in order to do their duty in
terms of the Convention, they could not confine their attention to
the evidence concerning the matters which the parties had chosen to
refer to within the four corners of the written pleadings.
But of course as a general rule the duty to verify jurisdiction
imposed by the Conventions only arises where the defender does not
enter an appearance. Here, as elsewhere, it is not clear if Schlosser
fully appreciates this point. And it is in the context of undefended
actions that the effect of art 20 para one does appear to be highly
significant, requiring a fundamental change in procedure. At common
law the courts could simply accept the pursuer's uncontested
averments of jurisdiction; in terms of the Convention they cannot do
so. The present writer suspects that this was in fact the point which
the United Kingdom delegation was trying to make. But this is not
clear, and further speculation about this particular passage in the
Schlosser Report would seem to be of little value.
The present writer has from time to time been asked what the approach
of Continental courts is to the matter of the verification of
jurisdiction. Do they require lengthy statements relating to
jurisdiction in all documents instituting court proceedings? Do
judges as a matter of course have investigations carried out by
assistants or by clerks of court? No systematic study of the relevant
rules and practices in the various states appears as yet to have been
carried out. The writer's impression is that the requirements vary
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significantly from state to state. There is considerable variation
not only in what a pursuer is required to state but also in the
extent of the obligation which is considered to be imposed on the
courts by arts 19 and 20. But of course a failure to examine
jurisdiction ex proprio motu in Scottish courts could not be
justified on the grounds that there is a similar failure in the
courts of certain other legal systems in the EC.
In considering what averments relating to the jurisdiction of the
court a pursuer ought to be required to make, it should not be
forgotten that in Continental legal systems in both civil and
criminal proceedings the court - in other words a judge - plays a
much more active role than it / he does in proceedings in the legal
systems of the British Isles. Their systems, it is sometimes said,
are inquisitorial; ours are adversarial. While the differences may at
times be exaggerated, and matters are oversimplified, differences
undoubtedly exist and are of relevance in the context of the courts'
duty to verify jurisdiction. As the French judicial system as a whole
is significantly different from the English judicial system as a
whole, what is appropriate in a particular context in French law may
not be appropriate in the same context in English law.
A Continental examining magistrate, sitting at a desk discussing a
case with the lawyer who has instituted it, is in a much better
position than a Scottish sheriff to resolve the questions of
jurisdiction. The Continental magistrate has far less need of written
statements; if he is in any doubt he can much more easily ask the
lawyer the necessary questions face to face. It may be because of the
much closer involvement in civil proceedings of Continental judges
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that in the Schlosser Report it was stated that "further
clarification" of art 20 was not necessary. On the other hand this
statement may as much as anything be the result of the fact that, for
the reasons given above, references relating to art 20 para one are
not likely regularly to be made to the European Court, and none have
so far been made.
To sum up, it appears to the writer that the implication of the
paragraphs of the Jenard Report quoted above is that averments by the
pursuer on the various matters relevant to jurisdiction may not
always be sufficient. In at least certain actions where the defender
fails to enter an appearance, it may be appropriate for the court to
hear submissions by the pursuer's solicitor or counsel in chambers,
for affidavits on the question of jurisdiction to be lodged or even
for a parole proof on jurisdiction to take place. In other words, a
somewhat onerous duty is imposed on national courts by art 20 para
one. Precisely how onerous this duty is, and at exactly what stage it
must be fulfilled, are, it must be admitted, matters which are not
clear. But the duty exists and, for the reasons which will be given
below, the fact that the presence of averments on jurisdiction in the
initial writ may not by itself enable the court to fulfil its duty
certainly does not mean that the averments should not be required to
be made.
The passages taken from Droz's work, and the passages of the
Schlosser Report as interpreted by the present writer, support these
assertions. So too, it is submitted, does a straightforward reading
of art 20 itself. Moreover, further support is obtained by referring
to the Preamble to the Convention and to Title III. The Preamble
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contains the words:
The High Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community,
Anxious to strengthen in the Community the legal protection of
persons therein established
It would seem to be perfectly in keeping with this statement for
courts to be required actively to verify their jurisdiction in any
action in which the defender does not appear. In that way persons
established in the Community have their legal protection
strengthened; they are less likely to find that judgments have been
obtained against them in courts which did not in fact have the
necessary jurisdiction. And Title III sets out a straightforward
scheme for the recognition and enforcement in one contracting state
of a judgment given in another. As a general rule if a court in one
state is asked to enforce a judgment given in another state, it
cannot examine the jurisdiction of the court which gave the judgment.
It therefore seems important for courts fully to examine their own
jurisdiction before giving judgment.
To conclude this section, in all category (i) actions in which the
Conventions are applicable, and the defender does not enter an
appearance, the court has at least to some extent a duty to
investigate the question of jurisdiction. If the court establishes
that the defender in an action is not domiciled in another
contracting state, it is no longer under a duty to take any steps to
comply with art 20 para one of the Conventions. But if it does not
establish this, then it must look into the whole question of its
jurisdiction over the defender. As was noted in Part I, there may be
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a category of local or internal actions to which the Conventions as a
whole do not apply. But because of the doubts surrounding this
matter, and because, as Droz implies, statements that the defender is
domiciled in the territory of the court and the action is purely a
"local" one may not be correct, at present the proper course, it is
submitted, is for it to be assumed that there are no types of
category (i) actions where art 20 para one of the Conventions can be
treated as irrelevant. And, finally, as was noted above, Jenard and
Droz imply that, where a defender appears and contests jurisdiction
without making any reference to the Conventions, the court has a duty
to consider whether it has jurisdiction in terms of the Conventions.
As has been seen, art 20 para one is applicable in the case of
defenders domiciled in other contracting states. What is the position
with regard to category (i) actions when it is made clear beyond any
reasonable doubt that the defender who has not appeared is domiciled
in the United Kingdom, and so art 20 para one of the Conventions
imposes no (further) obligation on the court? And what is the
position with regard to category (ii) actions? The art 20 para one in
Sched 4 was referred to above, and rule 8 in Sched 8 was set out.
What we are concerned with here is whether the Scottish courts should
interpret the expression "shall declare of its own motion" in art 20
para one of Sched 4 and in rule 8 of Sched 8 in the same way as it is
interpreted by Jenard and Droz in the context of the Conventions. The
courts are not bound to do so. The effect of ss 16(3)(a) and 20(5)(a)
of the Act is that where a provision of the Conventions is to be
found in identical terms in Scheds 4 and 8, in interpreting the
provision in the Sched 4 or 8 context any decisions of the European
9-8
Court are only of persuasive value. And ss 16(3) (b) and 20(5)(b)
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state that, in such a situation, the Jenard and other Reports
may be considered and shall, so far as relevant, be given such weight
as is appropriate in the circumstances.
There is of course considerable merit in an expression being given
the same interpretation in Scheds 4 and 8 as in the Conventions, and
it is submitted that it should at present be assumed by both the
judiciary and the drafters of the Rules of Court that the same
onerous duty to investigate the question of jurisdiction arises, in
the event of the defender failing to enter appearance, in all
category (i) and category (ii) actions.
It should be said that in the brief report of Hestair Management
Services v GHH Transport Services it is stated that "the court [ie
the sheriff principal hearing the defender's appeal against the
refusal of his reponing note] was satisfied, on ex parte statements,
examination of documents, and admissions, that the requirements of
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sched. 8, para 8, were
met". But if, as would appear to have been the case, it was only
Sheriff Principal Taylor who considered the question of jurisdiction,
the requirements of rule 8 were not met by the court of first
8o
instance. And in Northamber v Benson. where the court brought up the
question of jurisdiction ex proprio motu when decree in absence was
sought, the sheriff's note does not refer to any of the provisions
which we have been considering; reference is only made to one of the
rules of court considered at the end of this Part. The reports of
these Scottish cases are of very little value in the interpretation
of art 20 para one of the Conventions and Sched 4 and of rule 8 of
Sched 8.
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So far as category (i) actions are concerned, Sched 4 applies to most
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types of actions within the subject matter scope of the Conventions.
It will be interpreted by English and Northern Ireland judges as well
as by Scottish judges. It would be most unfortunate if its provisions
were to be interpreted in different ways in different United Kingdom
law districts, and it is submitted that, in view of the lack of
authority on this matter in England, the Scottish courts should do
what they can to bring about, throughout the United Kingdom, a common
approach to the interpretation of the Sched 4 provision which is in
line with what appears to be regarded as the correct interpretation
of art 20 para one of the Conventions.
But should a pursuer be required to make averments in his initial
writ relating to all the matters which affect the jurisdiction of the
court? Or, as the court's duty under art 20 para one of the
Conventions and Sched 4 and under Rule 8 of Sched 8 only arises where
the defender does not enter an appearance, would it not be sufficient
for the pursuer to be required to put the court in the picture at the
stage of lodging a minute for decree? As the court cannot be sure at
the initial stages if the defender is going to enter appearance or
not, it cannot then be under a duty imposed by art 20 para one; the
duty cannot arise before a hearing at which the defender could be
represented has taken place or the period laid down for lodging
defences has ended.
There is nothing in the Conventions themselves or in the Jenard
Report to suggest that the court's duty to consider the question of
jurisdiction only arises when decree in absence is being sought. It
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is appreciated that in the majority of undefended actions the
defender would not be prejudiced by the court only considering the
question when a minute for decree is lodged. But it is submitted
that, until the European Court has had the opportunity to clarify the
point, the drafters of the Rules of Court should assume that the
court's duty arises at a much earlier stage than that of the pursuer
seeking decree in absence. It certainly seems doubtful to the present
writer if, in an action as yet undefended, a court should, other than
in a situation in which urgency is required and art 24 of the
Conventions and Sched 4 is of relevance, make an interim award
without first considering the question of jurisdiction.
Moreover, it would appear to be both wrong in principle and
unsatisfactory in practice for a pursuer to be required to make
averments relating to certain matters concerning jurisdiction in the
initial writ, but only at a later stage to be required to make
statements relating to certain other jurisdiction matters. Let us
take the case of an action in Edinburgh sheriff court against a
defender domiciled in Glasgow and concerning a contractual obligation
which ought to have been performed in Edinburgh. Concentrating for
the sake of the discussion on Sched 8, if Edinburgh sheriff court
does have jurisdiction then, as will be seen below, it will be partly
because the conditions in rule 2(2) are satisfied, and partly because
there is no prorogation agreement in terms of rule 5 in favour of
another court. If the court must consider the question of
jurisdiction, and the pursuer should (following the traditional
practice) make averments relating to rule 2(2), should he not also
make averments relating to rule 5?
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There is clearly much to be said for all of a pursuer's statements on
the matter of jurisdiction appearing in one item of process. And if a
pursuer makes, in his minute for decree, a point relating to
jurisdiction which he did not make in his initial writ, ought the
defender not, in some way, to be made aware of this point? And if
affidavits on, inter alia, the existence or non-existence of a
prorogation agreement are required, would it not be wrong for these
to be accepted in the event of the initial writ containing no
averment relating to this matter? Certainly the initial writ could be
amended, with this amendment being intimated to the defender, but it
would have been much simpler - and cheaper - for an appropriate
averment to have been included in the initial writ from the outset.
It is worth mentioning that more than fifty per cent of sheriff court
actions appear to be undefended. So in the majority of actions which
a practitioner brings, and in the majority of actions coming before a
court, the court is likely to be required by art 20 para one and / or
rule 8 to consider the matter of jurisdiction. As a result, in view
of the various passages quoted above, it does not seem unreasonable
to the writer for the practitioner to be required to make averments
in each of his initial writs concerning each of the various factors
which are inherent in the question of jurisdiction. In the Maxwell
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Report it is stated that
Article 20 is subject to two limitations:
a The defender must be domiciled in another Contracting State....
b Article 20 only applies where the defender does not enter
appearance....
It is thus in only a very small minority of cases that Article 20
will be relevant.
This, it is submitted, is somewhat misleading. For it seems that in
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most actions the defender does not enter appearance. And a court can
only hold that art 20 is irrelevant if it is satisfied that the
defender is not in fact domiciled in another contracting state. And
of course it must not be forgotten that the Maxwell Report was
prepared before provisions parallel to art 20 para one were enacted
for the intra United Kingdom and Scottish contexts too.
As has been noted, it seems from the dicta of Jenard and Droz that
where a defender contests the jurisdiction of the court without
reference to the Conventions, the court has a duty to consider its
duty in terms of the Conventions. Again, the court will be in a much
better position to do this if, right from the beginning of the
proceedings, it has been provided with averments concerning the
factors inherent in its jurisdiction - a starting point for its
verification of its jurisdiction.
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Prorogation agreements and ordinary causes
It seems appropriate first briefly to consider certain aspects of the
provisions of the Conventions which are concerned with prorogation
agreements. These provisions are to be found in arts 12, 12A, 15 and
17. Articles 12 and 12A relate to actions regarding contracts of
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insurance and art 15 relates to actions regarding consumer contracts.
Article 17 is concerned with prorogation agreements more generally.
The articles are all somewhat lengthy and it is not possible to set
them out here. Various problems of interpretation exist, particularly
relating to art 17. Anton believes that this article has "a deceptive
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air of simplicity" and is "in reality a complex provision". The
article has now been the subject of several decisions of the European
8T-
Court.
It would seem to be the effect of art 16 itself and the reference to
art 16 in art 17 para three that there cannot be a valid prorogation
agreement in favour of courts in the contracting states if the
subject matter of the action falls within the scope of one of the art
16 exclusive jurisdiction provisions. It might have been suggested
that there can be a prorogation agreement covering actions within the
scope of art 16 if it is one giving jurisdiction to certain chosen
courts as well as to the courts of the locus - in other words, not an
agreement expressly or implicitly taking away jurisdiction, the type
of agreement against the existence of which courts must be on their
guard. But in the light of the decision of the European Court in
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Rosier v Rottwinkel, such an agreement would not appear to be valid
in terms of the Conventions.
It is not clear from art 17 para one if a prorogation agreement in
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favour of a court of a non-contracting state will have the effect of
excluding the jurisdiction of the courts of the contracting states.
On this, as on many other points concerning art 17, the Jenard Report
SI
does not significantly assist us. But the one thing which is clear is
that, if an action falls within the scope of the Conventions, there
may, at any rate if it is a non-exclusive jurisdiction action, be a
prorogation agreement which will have the effect of excluding the
jurisdiction of all courts within the contracting states other than
that or those agreed upon.
In Sched 4 to the Act, the terms of art 17 are similar to those of
the Conventions. But the changes which have been made seem to go
beyond the minimum which would have been required to adapt art 17 to
intra-United Kingdom jurisdiction. The word "exclusive" does not
feature in art 17 para one of Sched 4, and it would appear to be the
case that, where the prorogation provisions of Sched 4 but not of the
Conventions are applicable, the jurisdiction of the court or courts
agreed upon will simply be concurrent with that of the court or
courts having jurisdiction by virtue of the other provisions of the
<jo
Schedule. So, if this interpretation is correct, in proceedings where
the defender is domiciled in England, and there is a prorogation
agreement in favour of the Court of Session, the English High Court
will be able to exercise jurisdiction, at least if it is the court
first seised of the dispute. Of course this assertion is based on the
assumption that in "intra-United Kingdom" actions the Conventions are
irrelevant. And, as was noted in Part I, this assumption, although
Hi
widespread, may not be correct.
In Sched 8, rule 5 is concerned with prorogation agreements. Rule
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5(1) states:
If the parties have agreed that a court is to have jurisdiction to
settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in
connection with a particular legal relationship, that court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction.
It may be that the effect of rule 5(5) is that, where jurisdiction is
4
being determined by the provisions of Sched 8, there cannot be a
valid prorogation agreement in an action which, by reason of its
subject matter, falls within the scope of one of the exclusive
jurisdiction provisions in rule 4. But on the other hand there is an
argument that a prorogation agreement giving jurisdiction to courts
other than, and in addition to, those of the locus would be valid.
Such an agreement would not, however, be of the type against the
existence of which courts should be on their guard.
It will be noted that in rule 5(1) the reference is simply to "a
court"; it is not to "a court in Scotland", "a court in the United
Kingdom" or "a court in the Contracting States to the Conventions".
It is not clear if the prorogation of the jurisdiction of a court in
Uruguay could have the effect of excluding the jurisdiction which the
Scottish courts would otherwise have in terms of the Act. An argument
that it would, at least as a general rule, have this effect can be
based on rule 5(1) of Sched 8 and / or s 22(2) of the Act. Rule 5(1)
has already been set out; s 22(2) states:
Nothing in Schedule 8 affects the operation of any enactment or rule
of law under which a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction
because of the prorogation by parties of the jurisdiction of another
court.
Whether or not rule 5(1) has any application in the case of an
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agreement to prorogate the jurisdiction of a court outside the
contracting states, s 22(2) would appear to preserve the pre-existing
law in this area which is briefly considered below. But in view of
11
the precedence which the Conventions take over Sched 8, if the
Scottish courts have jurisdiction in an action in terms of the
general rules of the Conventions (perhaps supplemented by Sched 4),
and if it is the case that, in terms of the Conventions, a
prorogation agreement in favour of a court of a non-contracting state
does not exclude the jurisdiction of the courts of the contracting
states, rule 5 and s 22(2) almost certainly cannot have the effect of
by themselves preventing the action going ahead in the Scottish
courts on account of the purported prorogation of the jurisdiction of
%
the Uruguay court.
As is implied in the preceding paragraph, rule 5(1), like art 17 para
one of the Conventions, speaks of "exclusive jurisdiction". But in
view of the priority of Sched 4 over Sched 8, if Sched 4, but not the
Conventions, is also relevant in an action, it may well be that rule
5 cannot exclude the jurisdiction of Scottish courts not agreed upon
by the parties. So if the situation is the converse of that outlined
above, and there is a prorogation agreement in favour of the English
High Court, but the defender is domiciled in Scotland, the Court of
Session as well as the English High Court would appear to have
jurisdiction.
These remarks are designed primarily to show that in certain
circumstances a prorogation agreement will have the effect of
excluding the jurisdiction of courts not agreed upon; in other
circumstances it will not have this effect. In some situations the
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precise effect of the prorogation agreement is clear; in many others,
on account of a lack of judicial or other authoritative dicta, it is
not. It is submitted that at present it is not possible with
certainty to list all the sets of circumstances in which a
prorogation agreement will have the effect of excluding the
jurisdiction of all Scottish courts not agreed upon. So the best
course for those concerned with the drafting of rules of court is to
assume that with regard to all types of category (i) and category
(ii) actions - even exclusive jurisdiction ones - there may be a
prorogation agreement in favour of one or more courts which has the
effect of excluding the jurisdiction of all other courts. It should
be left to the judge in the particular case to decide what the
precise effect of any prorogation agreement is.
Is it therefore the case that a pursuer in a category (i) or category
(ii) action should be required to make averments in his initial writ
about the existence or non-existence of a prorogation agreement? It
is submitted that the correct answer to this question is Yes. For the
question of whether or not a valid prorogation agreement in favour of
another court exists is one which, it has been argued, should be
regarded as potentially relevant to jurisdiction in all category (i)
and category (ii) actions. And in view of the onerous duty which the
court may very well have to investigate the question of jurisdiction
in all category (i) and category (ii) actions in which the defender
does not enter appearance, it is the view of the writer that it is
appropriate for a pursuer to be asked to assist the court in any such
action by making it aware of anything which might be a relevant
prorogation agreement.
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Even if, as now seems likely, it is the case that, in an exclusive
jurisdiction action, a prorogation agreement cannot prevent any of
the courts of the relevant locus from exercising jurisdiction, there
is a strong argument that such actions should not be excluded from
the scope of any rule of court concerning averments relating to
prorogation agreements. For, in addition to the uncertainties
surrounding art 17 of the Conventions and rule 5 of Sched 8, the
wording of at least some of the provisions of art 16 and rule 4
leaves room for doubt as to the full range of actions to which they
apply. Of art 16(1), Anton states that "its domain of application
remains unclear". The European Court has already been called upon
IT
three times to clarify its scope. Anton also points out problems
concerning the interpretation of art 16(2). A judge who is in
possession of all the facts which may be relevant to jurisdiction is
clearly in the best position to ascertain whether or not the court
does in fact have jurisdiction. Moreover as will be seen in the next
chapter, there may be a duty on the court to consider whether there
is an identical action taking place elsewhere, and to decline
jurisdiction if there is such an action. And the subject matter of an
identical action might fall within the scope of art 16. And if a
pursuer is required to make an averment concerning the possibility of
a prorogation agreement, the court is, it is submitted, more likely
to become aware of the real possibility of an identical action
elsewhere.
It is sometimes suggested that prorogation, or rather the lack of it,
is a secondary or subsidiary matter, and does not merit as much
attention as do, for example, the rules of special jurisdiction in
art 5 and rule 2. But it is submitted that a distinction between
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primary and secondary matters cannot be drawn. Either a court has
jurisdiction or it hasn't. And it is quite clear that if there is a
valid prorogation agreement, within the contracting states courts not
agreed upon do not have jurisdiction. Like art 16, art 17 para one
uses the words "exclusive jurisdiction". The lack of jurisdiction in
terms of the Convention on the part of the Scottish courts to
entertain an action relating to the ownership of land in Berlin is
not in doubt; nor should there be any doubt about their lack of
jurisdiction to entertain an action relating to a matter which has
been the subject of a prorogation agreement in favour of the Berlin
courts.
It may be pointed out that art 19 contains a special rule relating to
the courts' duty to declare their lack of jurisdiction in "art 16"
actions wrongly brought before them. The explanation for this
provision not referring to art 17 as well as to art 16 is that art 20
para one is perfectly adequate in the art 17 context. Unlike art 20
para one, art 19 does not cease to operate when the defender enters
appearance. For it would not be appropriate for parties to be allowed
to litigate in Scotland about the ownership of land in Berlin. As
Jenard puts it, "the exclusive jurisdictions [in art 16] are
conceived to be matters of public policy". But there would be no
justification in preventing them litigating in Scotland just because
they had previously agreed to litigate only in Berlin.
In case further authority on the "negative" effect of a prorogation
agreement is required, two short passages in Droz's commentary will
too
be quoted. The first is this:
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L'article 17 a....pour effet de dormer au tribunal 61u une competence
exclusive. II en r6sulte nScessairement que tout autre tribunal que
le tribunal ou les tribunaux 61us est incompetent. [Droz's emphasis]
Of course, "etre competent" should be translated as "to have
10/
jurisdiction". The second passage is even more to the point. It forms
part of the section on art 20 para one and states that if a party to
a prorogation agreement in favour of the court in Brussels is
domiciled in a contracting state, and in an attempt to obtain a
decree against him
le demandeur saisisse le tribunal de Paris, en violation de la
prorogation de for en faveur du tribunal de Bruxelles, le juge
frangais devra se declarer d'office incompetent en cas de d6faut.
It is interesting to note that, in justifying the "negative" aspect
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of art 17 para one, Jenard states that it
is essential to avoid different courts from [si_c] being properly
seised of the matter and giving conflicting or at least differing
judgments.
But, some practitioners may still ask, must the defender be required
to aver, if this is the case, that he is unaware of the existence of
anything which may be a prorogation agreement? It can be argued that,
on account of the wording of the present rule, if there is no
averment concerning the existence of a prorogation agreement, the
court can assume that there is no such agreement or, at any rate,
that the pursuer knows of no such agreement. This would appear to be
the view of Sheriff Principal Taylor. St Michael Financial Services v
10 S
Michie was a summary cause, but he would no doubt have made it clear
if he felt that the approach in ordinary causes should be any
different from that in summary causes. He undoubtedly considered that
the equivalent summary cause rule (as he interpreted it) was
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adequate; a rule requiring negative averments to be made in
appropriate cases would "simply [add] unnecessarily to the
IOif
formalities of the writ".
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Then in Central Farmers v Watson Sheriff Principal Taylor in effect
held that, even at the stage of granting decree in absence, a sheriff
could deduce from the lack of either an averment on the question of
prorogation or any other "grounds for suspecting" that there might
have been prorogation in favour of another court, that no relevant
prorogation agreement did in fact exist. In his words, "[i]f....the
court has no reason to suppose... .that jurisdiction may have been
excluded by prorogation. .. .there is nothing to trigger paragraph 8,
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and it is the sheriff's duty to grant decree in absence".
Sheriff Principal Taylor's approach is in line with that of the
IOT
Maxwell Report. The Report states that
[o]ne of the points which the court will have to consider.. . . i s
whether another court has been prorogated by an agreement valid in
accordance with Article 17 We think that the most which can be
done is to require the pursuer, by rules of court, where he has
reason to believe that there is or may be such an agreement, to say
so in the initiating writ.
But it is nevertheless the writer's view that, on account of the
somewhat onerous duty imposed on the court by art 20 para one of the
Conventions, and quite possibly also by art 20 para one of Sched 4
and by rule 8 of Sched 8, it is perfectly reasonable for the pursuer
in a category (i) or category (ii) action to be required by the rules
of court to assist the court by setting out, in the initial writ,
whether or not there exists, to the best of his knowledge, anything
which may constitute a prorogation agreement.
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The present writer has already argued the case for the statements on
prorogation to form part of the initial writ rather than be
introduced at a later stage, and he believes that, in the event of
the defender failing to enter appearance, a negative averment is of
significant assistance to the court in the fulfilling of its duty to
consider the question of jurisdiction. Of course some practitioners
may as a matter of course, without giving adequate attention to the
matter, aver that no relevant prorogation agreement exists. But it is
submitted that if he is required to make an averment, positive or
negative, the average practitioner is much more likely to address his
mind to the question of prorogation and as a result be of real
assistance to the court in the fulfilling of its duty to verify
jurisdiction in the event of the defender failing to enter
appearance. And it is clearly good practice for a practitioner,
before raising an action, to look into all the elements of
jurisdiction. When he ascertains that there is no relevant
prorogation agreement, stating this from the outset in the initial
writ is surely preferable to simply making a written note which may
get lost in the file or elsewhere.
Moreover, as the lack of a prorogation agreement in favour of another
court, like the defender's domicile being in the territory of the
court, or the accident having taken place in the territory of the
court, is one of the elements inherent in the court's jurisdiction,
it would be illogical for it not to be the subject of an averment. Of
course it can be argued that if the lack of a prorogation agreement
is one of the elements inherent in jurisdiction, averring this matter
is required by the present rule 3(4) and a special rule is
197
unnecessary. The best answer to this point is probably that unless
there is an Inner House decision on the question of averring the lack
of a prorogation agreement, it is only by means of a further rule of
court that the correct approach can be introduced and maintained
throughout the sheriff courts of Scotland.
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Black has stated in public that, in his schrieval capacity, he would
not be prepared - or at any rate he would be reluctant - to grant
decree in absence in an action in which there had been neither an
averment in the initial writ nor a submission on the pursuer's behalf
relating to the question of prorogation. He has also given advice to
practitioners that wherever possible they should make, in their
initial writs, a positive or negative averment concerning
prorogation. A reported decision by him would of course be in
conflict with those of Sheriff Principal Taylor. But it would be
giving judicial approval to an approach along the same lines as that
favoured by the present writer, and it might well have the effect of
encouraging the Rules Council once again to look into the whole
matter of averments of jurisdiction.
Before concluding this section on prorogation agreements with a new
draft rule of court, something should for completeness be said about
category (iii) actions. In this context the new requirement -
assuming it exists - of a prorogation agreement averment seems
inappropriate. For category (iii) actions are outside the subject
matter scope of the Act as a whole and so the rules of prorogation
relating to them cannot have been affected by the Act. And in any
event it does not appear to have been held that at common law the
mere fact of prorogating the jurisdiction of one court had the effect
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IOS
of excluding the jurisdiction of all other courts.
no
It is submitted that Elderslie Steamship Co v Burrel1 & Son, cited by
hi
Duncan & Dykes, did not in fact decide this point. It is preferable
to regard the decision in that case as concerning forum non
conveniens on account of an action having previously been
legitimately raised elsewhere. And at common law an agreement by the
parties to exclude a court's jurisdiction would probably be competent
but the pursuer was not required as a matter of course to aver the
existence or non-existence of such an agreement. It was left to the
defender to raise the issue. But even if the writer's interpretation
of Elderslie Steamship Co is wrong, insofar as category (iii) actions
are concerned there would not appear to be any good reason for rule
3(2) to replace the traditional practice of leaving the question of
prorogation (of another court) to be raised by the defender.
Finally, it is suggested that it would be appropriate for rule 3(2)
to read:
In any cause which, by reason of its subject matter, falls within the
scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano Convention,
and/or the rules of jurisdiction in Schedule 8 to the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, whether or not jurisdiction is
II2
determined by the provisions of either Convention and/or Schedule 8,
the initial writ shall contain an averment about whether or not there
may be in existence, as far as the pursuer is aware, any agreement
prorogating jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause to
another court.
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5 Identical actions and ordinary causes
The provisions of the Conventions which are concerned with identical
actions are those of arts 21 and 23. The wording of art 21 of the
first version of the Brussels Convention was amended by the 1989
Accession Convention. The wording in the new version of the Brussels
Convention, and that in the Lugano Convention, is as follows:
Art 21
Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the
same parties are brought in the courts of different Contracting
States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own
motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of
the court first seised is established.
Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any
court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in
favour of that court.
Art 23
Where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several
courts, any court other than the court first seised shall decline
jurisdiction in favour of that court.
There are no equivalent provisions in Sched 4 or Sched 8. It is of
course on account of the words "shall decline jurisdiction" in both
art 21 para two and art 23 that it can be argued that, for the
purposes of the rules of court, identical actions should in effect be
equated with prorogation agreements. And, it should be noted, art 21
para one provides that in certain circumstances a court "shall of its
own motion stay its proceedings"; here too courts are being given a
requirement, not a discretion.
It is worth mentioning that art 22, which is concerned with actions
which are related to each other without being identical, does not
contain the words "shall decline jurisdiction". Instead, it merely
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provides that in certain circumstances where there are related
actions, a court other than the court first seised "may....stay its
proceedings" or "may....decline jurisdiction". The court is being
given a discretion to stay the proceedings or decline jurisdiction,
and has no duty to act ex proprio motu and establish whether or not
there is a related action. So there is clearly no need for a pursuer
to be required to make averments relating to the possibility of the
existence of a related action; it can quite safely be left to the
defender to raise this matter. And, it should be said, no rule
contained in the Act itself or elsewhere imposes on Scottish courts
the duty to investigate ex proprio motu the possibility of a related
action taking place elsewhere.
The argument that identical actions can for present purposes be
equated with prorogation agreements is commonly made. If a positive
or negative averment must be made in each initial writ relating to
one of these matters, it is said, such averments must be made in
relation to both. If positive averments alone are required on one
matter, only positive averments are required on both. Article 20 para
one of the Conventions imposes a duty on courts with regard to
jurisdiction, the argument goes, and the lack of a previously brought
identical action in a court of another contracting state, just like
the lack of a prorogation agreement in favour of another court, is a
factor essential to the court where the action has been brought
having jurisdiction. If, in the event of a defender not entering
appearance, affidavits or oral evidence are required in relation to
one matter, they are required in relation to both.
It is submitted that if one result of the existence of a previously
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brought identical action in a court of another contracting state is
that a Scottish court does not - cannot - have jurisdiction, then
this argument is correct. On account of the interpretation of art 20
para one of the Conventions which he has set out above, and his
application of this provision with regard to prorogation agreements,
the present writer would argue that, in the case of category (i)
actions, each pursuer should be required to make a positive or
negative averment about identical actions as well as about
prorogation agreements. The first question to be considered is
therefore: Does the existence of a previously brought action in one
of the contracting states, at any rate where the jurisdiction of the
court seised has been established, have the effect of preventing the
courts of all the other contracting states from having jurisdiction
in an action with the same subject matter and between the same
parties? Loosely speaking, can the effect of art 21 be equated with
that of art 16 or art 17?
There have not been any decisions of the European Court on this
point, and it does not yet appear to have been discussed in a
Scottish or English court. It seems appropriate to begin by
considering the relevant words of the Conventions themselves. Can a
distinction be made? Article 16 provides that certain courts "shall
have exclusive jurisdiction", and in art 17 we read that a particular
court or courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction". But of course in
art 21 the form of words used is different: "shall decline
jurisdiction". It is appreciated that an international Convention
cannot be interpreted in the same way as a British statute, and
differences between particular forms of words may be of less
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significance, but it does nevertheless seem that it might not be
unreasonable to make a distinction in this area between arts 16 and
17 on the one hand and art 21 on the other.
If an action concerned the ownership of land in France, or there was
a prorogation agreement in favour of a French court, on account of
art 16 or art 17 a Scottish court would not have jurisdiction; if
II6-
there already was an identical action in France, on account of art 21
it would be required to decline jurisdiction. Is the distinction here
more superficial than real? It may not be. As stated above, in art
22, concerning related actions, the words "may decline jurisdiction"
are used. In this context, in "declining jurisdiction" the court is
clearly simply declining to entertain an action although it does have
jurisdiction. It is interesting to look at other language versions of
the Conventions.
In the French version - and of course European Community agreements
such as the Brussels Convention are drafted in French - the words
"sont seuls compdtents" are used in arts 16 and 17, but in art 21 we
read "se dessaisit". So a difference can clearly be seen here; art 21
does not use the word "competent" or "incompdtent". "[D]essaisir"
would usually be translated as "to remove", and "se dessaisir" as "to
decline". And in art 22 it is stated in the French version that the
second court seised "peut....se dessaisir" - "may. ...dec 1ine
jurisdiction" in the English version. What those who drafted the
Conventions were wanting to say in the art 21 context may very well
have been that the second court seised should "decline to hear the
case" / "decline to entertain the action". But this form of words was
perhaps considered to be too cumbersome, and as a result "decline
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jurisdiction" was used instead in the English version.
The approach of the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese versions of the
Conventions is similar to that of the French version. At first sight
the German version appears to be of value to those who argue that
there is no real distinction between not having jurisdiction and
declining jurisdiction. It has the words "ausschlieBlich zustandig"
in arts 16 and 17, and "erklart sich....fur unzustandig" in art 21.
But it is submitted that the use of these German forms of words
cannot in fact assist those who argue that, where art 21 is
applicable, the court lacks jurisdiction. For "unzustandig", perhaps
curiously, appears to be used loosely, or in different contexts, in
German. In art 22 we read in the German version that the court
"kann....fur unzustandig erklaren". So the question can be described
as one of "Zustandigkeit" where it clearly is whether the court
should exercise the jurisdiction which it undoubtedly has.
Of course the practical effect of a court declaring that it has no
jurisdiction will generally be the same as that of a court declaring
that, although it has jurisdiction, it cannot allow the action before
it to proceed. But the steps which the court must take to verify its
jurisdiction before making one declaration may be different from
those which it must take before making the other. If, on account of
art 21, a court seised second does not - cannot - have jurisdiction,
in view of art 20 para one (as interpreted by Jenard and Droz) where
the defender does not enter appearance a court must go to some
lengths to determine whether or not there is a previously brought
identical action elsewhere. But if, on account of art 21, a court
seised second which does have jurisdiction in terms of the general
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rules simply cannot exercise that jurisdiction, the question then
arises of whether art 21 imposes a duty to investigate at some length
the matter of identical actions, a duty similar to the art 20 para
one duty to investigate the matters, including prorogation, which
relate to jurisdiction.
IIS
Much assistance is derived from the Jenard Report. It makes the point
that
[b]y virtue of Article 21, the courts of a Contracting State must
decline jurisdiction, if necessary of their own motion, where
proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties are already pending in a court of another State.
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It then goes on to state that
[a] court will not always have to examine of its own motion whether
the same proceedings are pending in the courts of another country,
but only when the circumstances are such as to lead the court to
believe that this may be the case.
Ilf
In the context of art 20 para one, Jenard stated simply that "the
court must itself ensure that the plaintiff proves that it has
international jurisdiction". But he is undoubtedly implying that in
the art 21 context the court's duty to verify matters, if it exists
at all, is not nearly as onerous. Of course the art 21 duty, unlike
the art 20 para one duty, exists whether or not the defender has
entered appearance. It can safely be assumed from the context that,
in his statement that a court will not always have to examine whether
there is an identical action elsewhere, Jenard is not referring
purely to situations where the defender has entered appearance. There
is also of course an implication in Jenard's comments that art 21
para two is concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction rather than
with jurisdiction itself. For he is saying in effect that the onerous
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art 20 para one duty does not involve the issue of identical actions
- which on account of its terms it would have done if art 21 para two
had been concerned with jurisdiction itself.
It should perhaps be stated that for present purposes the amendments
made to the original version of art 21 by the 1 989 Accession
Convention are immaterial; the expression "sha11....dec 1ine
jurisdiction" was used in the first version of the Convention. So the
comments of Jenard - and Droz - cannot be regarded as out of date.
In his passages on art 20 para one, Droz makes no reference to art
21. And it is clear from both the layout of his book and his comments
on art 21 that he does not consider the question of the existence of
an identical action to be a question of jurisdiction, bringing art 20
para one into play. Nor does he consider the court's duty under art
21 to be as onerous as that imposed by art 20 para one. In the part
II8
of his book devoted specifically to civil jurisdiction, the first
section is concerned with the rules of jurisdiction themselves, and
the second section with the "mise en jeu des rdgles de competence".
The provisions of arts 16 and 17, and the effects of the "negative"
rule in art 4, are all considered in the first section, but the
discussion of art 21 is in the second section. In discussing art 21,
IIS
he states that
[1]e juge qui, au cours de la procedure, apprend que le tribunal d'un
autre Etat contractant est ddj& saisi de 1'affaire pourra done h tout
moment se dessaisir meme si les parties ne le sollicitent
point....Meme s'il n'est plus temps pour une partie de soulever
1'exception, il est fort probable que le juge, mis au courant de
1'existence d'une instance poursuivie a 1'etranger, n'h6sitera pas h
se dessaisir si les conditions de 1'exception sont reunies.
On account of the obligation imposed by art 21, in the second line of
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the quotation "devra" might have been a more appropriate word than
"pourra". But what is clear is that he, like Jenard, regards art 21
para two as being concerned with the declining to hear cases rather
than with the lacking of jurisdiction. And he seems to be thinking in
terms of courts, in one way or another without investigation on their
part, becoming aware of the existence of identical actions. Moreover,
on account of his earlier comments on art 20 para one, we can assume
that, had he regarded the duty imposed by art 21 para two as
requiring courts to investigate matters for themselves, he would have
made this clear.
In art 21 attention usually focuses on para two, but it should be
made clear that Jenard and Droz very much appear to be rejecting the
notion that courts should investigate matters for themselves so as to
satisfy the provisions of either para two or para one. If a Scottish
judge becomes aware of the existence of a previously brought
identical action in another contracting state, with the question of
the jurisdiction of the foreign court about to be considered by the
foreign judge, he should sist the Scottish action. But if he is not
aware of the existence of the foreign action, and so does not sist
the proceedings in Scotland, he is not failing to carry out his duty.
His duty, in other words, only arises when he becomes aware of the
existence of the identical action.
IZO
The justification which Jenard gives for art 21 is this:
As there may be several concurrent international jurisdictions, and
the courts of different States may properly be seised of a matter
(see in particular Articles 2 and 5), it appeared to be necessary to
regulate the question of 1 is pendens [T]his will facilitate the




la Convention ne veut pas mettre les Etats membres dans la p6nible
situation d'avoir h reconnaitre et ex6cuter des jugements
contradictoires, ou simplement non identiques, 6manant de plusieurs
autres Etats contractants.
In the writer's opinion this is a perfectly adequate explanation for
having a rule requiring courts to refuse ex proprio motu to entertain
an action if an identical action has been brought in another
contracting state. It will be remembered that an explanation along
these lines was given for the jurisdiction conferred by a prorogation
agreement being exclusive. One might ask whether a good case can be
made for requiring judges actively to guard against contradictory
judgments being given in actions one of which has resulted from a
prorogation agreement, but not for requiring them actively to guard
against such judgments in actions which have both been brought in
courts with jurisdiction in terms of the general rules of the
Conventions.
It is submitted that a case can, in fact, be made for the identical
action rule to impose on the courts a more onerous duty of
investigation than that imposed on them by the rule in art 20 para
one laying down the general duty to verify jurisdiction. A defender
can appear and argue "no jurisdiction". And in terms of art 20 paras
two and three, if he does not appear the court must, loosely
speaking, check that he has had a proper opportunity to appear and
defend the action. But for the reasons given by Jenard and Droz,
whether or not the defender appears, and whether or not he raises the
matter, the court should not let the proceedings continue if it is
aware of identical proceedings which have previously been brought
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elsewhere. However, on account of the wording and interpretation in
this context of art 21 paras one and two on the one hand, and that of
arts 17 and 20 para one on the other, there seems little doubt that
the duty imposed on courts by art 21 is not as onerous as that
imposed by art 20 para one.
It is worth pointing out that art 21 is only concerned with the
situation where the previously brought identical action is in a court
of another contracting state. It is not concerned with an identical
action in the state of the forum or with identical actions in a
contracting state and in a non-contracting state. If the identical
action is in another Scottish court, an English court or an American
court, the appropriate course for a Scottish court to take is
determined by Scots law - modified, of course, by any of the general
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rules of the Conventions or Sched 4 which are of relevance. It should
also be noted that for the purposes of art 21 the domicile of the
defender and the grounds of jurisdiction of the courts concerned are
immaterial. If an action is being brought against an American, and
jurisdiction in the Scottish court and in the court of the other
contracting state is being based on rules of exorbitant jurisdiction,
the Scottish action cannot go ahead any more than it could have done
if the action had been against a German and jurisdiction was based on
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art 5(1) of the Conventions.
A further point worth emphasising is that, as is clear from sentences
in Droz s book quoted above, the court s duty under art 21 exists
whether or not the defender has entered appearance; it exists in
other words until decree is granted. As a general rule art 18
provides a court with jurisdiction if the defender appears. But it
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does not take away the duty of the court to decline its jurisdiction
if it becomes aware at a late stage in the proceedings of a
previously brought identical action in a court of another contracting
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state.
At the beginning of this chapter the writer set out the terms of art
23. It simply refers to "actions", not to "actions involving the same
cause of action and between the same parties". But on account of its
terms it, like art 21, must be concerned with identical actions. For
present purposes the difference between art 23 and art 21 is that art
23 is limited in scope to actions where there is exclusive
jurisdiction. Article 21, on the other hand, is general in its
application, though of course it can be argued that it is by
implication inapplicable in the context of exclusive jurisdiction.
The need for art 23 is not particularly clear. Like art 21 it uses
the expression "shall decline jurisdiction". So in the view of the
writer it can safely be assumed that it does not impose on courts a
duty to investigate matters greater than that imposed by art 21. But
it was probably felt that if a court claimed exclusive jurisdiction
in an action, it would be most reluctant to decline to hear the
action on account of another court having been seised first. So art
23 was inserted to "reinforce" art 21 in the context of exclusive
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jurisdiction. Article 23 does not state explicitly that it is only
concerned with actions in different contracting states, but as the
Conventions are not, at least as a general rule, concerned with
jurisdiction outside the contracting states, or with problems of
jurisdiction internal to any one state, it is probably only of




In what circumstances could a "conflict" to be determined by means of
art 23 arise? The example most often given is of a situation where,
on account of differing national rules relating to the seat of
companies, the courts of two states have jurisdiction in terms of art
I2S>
16(2). Secondly, it is conceivable that an action might fall within
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two of the art 16 categories. Kaye gives the example of an action to
have declared void as ultra vi res a transfer of land from a company
to its directors; it could be argued that both art 16(1) and art
16(2) are relevant here.
Thirdly, the approach of art 16 is, of course, to give exclusive
jurisdiction to the courts of a contracting state as a whole; it is
left to the national law to determine which courts within the state
should have jurisdiction. It is not clear whether art 23 would be of
relevance in the context of a duplicity of actions within one state;
the Conventions are, as stated above, at least as a general rule,
concerned with intra-Community, rather than with purely internal,
questions of jurisdiction. Finally here, in terms of art 17 the
jurisdiction of more than one court may be prorogated; on account of
the words "exclusive jurisdiction" in art 17, in this context art 23
might have a role to play. If an agreement to prorogate the courts of
two contracting states was valid, and an action was brought in one,
art 23 would probably be applicable in the event of an action then
being brought in the other. The number of occasions on which art 23
will be invoked is undoubtedly extremely small, but the precise
extent of its scope is far from clear.
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Having considered the effects of arts 21 and 23, it is now
appropriate to return to the question of whether a rule of court
should require pursuers to make averments relating to the possibility
of identical actions and, if so, what the precise scope of the rule
should be. Considering the writer's three categories of actions in
the order (iii), (ii), (i), it can first of all be said that any rule
should not extend to category (iii) actions. These actions are
outside the scope of the Act as a whole and the common law approach
to identical actions, involving the pleas of forum non conveniens and
ISO
lis alibi pendens, cannot have been affected by the Act.
So far as category (ii) actions are concerned, they too should be
outside the scope of any new rule. For Sched 8 does not contain an
equivalent of arts 21 and 23. As a result, in the context of actions
outside the subject matter scope of the Conventions, the common law
rules are still applicable. A court need not investigate for itself
the possibility of an identical action; it can leave it to the
defender to plead forum non conveniens or lis alibi pendens. Section
49 of the Act, it must be remembered, makes it clear that these pleas
are still available in the category (ii) context; s 22(1) contains a
similar provision relating to the plea of forum non conveniens alone.
Turning to category (i) actions, is it the case that, on account of
the wording of arts 21 and 23 and its interpretation by Jenard and
Droz, the courts can in practice leave it to defenders to raise the
matter of a previously brought identical action in a court of another
contracting state? It is submitted that there is a strong argument
that the correct answer is Yes, and that as a result the rules of
court need not refer to identical actions. But it is the view of the
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present writer that, on balance, a rule concerning identical actions
is appropriate. And, for the reasons given above in the context of
averments relating to prorogation agreements, the rule should require
an averment, positive or negative, to be made in each initial writ.
The writer must justify his now effectively equating identical
actions with prorogation agreements. But there is no need for there
to be repeated here his case for the necessary statements to be
included in the initial writ rather than simply in the minute for
decree, and for the rule of court to require negative as well as
positive averments. If identical actions can for present purposes be
equated with prorogation agreements, what was said in the context of
prorogation agreements is valid here too.
It is accepted that it is almost certainly the case that identical
actions are concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction rather than
with jurisdiction itself, and that art 20 para one is of no relevance
in this context. But in terms of art 21 the court has at least in
principle a duty, not a mere discretion, to decline to entertain
proceedings if an identical action has previously been brought in
another contracting state. The best authority we have at present,
13I
that of the Jenard Report, does indeed suggest that there need not be
a requirement for an averment on the subject of identical actions to
form part of each initial writ. But the importance of conflicting
judgments not being given in courts of different contracting states
is clear, and it is conceivable that the European Court would give a
ruling at variance with the dicta of Jenard on the courts' duty of
investigation in the art 21 context. On account of the importance of
the matter of identical actions, it does not seem to be expecting too
much of those representing pursuers to require them to include, in
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each of their initial writs, an averment on the subject.
Jenard, it must be remembered, was writing when the contracting
states were all Continental states with an inquisitorial system of
civil procedure. As referred to above, in these states the judge is
much more closely involved in the proceedings than he is in an action
in the British Isles; he is therefore much more likely to become
aware of the existence of an identical action elsewhere without a
formal investigation of the matter. Had Jenard been writing in the
context of the United Kingdom's accession to the Convention, his
comments on the extent of the court's duty under art 21 might, it can
be argued, have been somewhat different. The point is not referred to
in the Jenard and Moller Report on the Lugano Convention. But this
Report is primarily concerned with the features of the Lugano
Convention which are not reflections of the Brussels Convention as
amended in 1978, and with the European Court case law on the Brussels
Convention. It is not a further commentary on the Conventions as a
whole.
The rule of court ought not, it is submitted, to require the
pursuer's averment merely to concern identical actions which have
already been brought. It is indeed the case that it is only if an
identical action is already taking place that the Scottish
proceedings cannot go ahead. But as it may not be easy for the
pursuer to establish precisely what stage matters have reached in
another contracting state, and the question of exactly what is meant
iu
by the bringing of proceedings is not always free from difficulty,
the averment should make reference to proceedings which the pursuer
understands might be begun elsewhere. The court can then take
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appropriate steps to establish whether or not an identical action was
as a matter of law previously raised elsewhere.
One question remains in this chapter. Should the rule of court relate
to identical actions in any other court, or only to those in courts
of other contracting states? Article 21 is purely concerned with
courts in other contracting states, but as is mentioned above the
scope of art 23 may not be restricted in this way. Because art 23 is
limited to exclusive jurisdiction actions, and because a situation in
which art 23 is relevant will be very rare, there is a temptation to
suggest that it should be ignored and that the rule should simply
concern identical actions in other contracting states. But if the
existence of an identical action i_n any other court is regarded as
potentially relevant in any category (i) action, this will actually
enable a shorter averment to be made by the pursuer in the vast
majority of actions. Averring that there are no identical actions
elsewhere is simpler than averring that there are no identical
actions in any other Brussels Convention or Lugano Convention
contracting state. And informing the court of an identical action
which it considers to be irrelevant is preferable to not informing it
of one which is relevant.
To conclude, it is suggested that the present rule 3(3) be amended to
read:
In any cause which, by reason of its subject matter, falls within the
scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano Convention,
whether or not jurisdiction is determined by the provisions of either
Convention, the initial writ shall contain an averment about whether
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or not there may be, as far as the pursuer is aware, at the date of
the bringing of the action or thereafter, pending before another
court a cause involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties as those named in the initial writ.
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6 The domicile of the defender, the giving of adequate notice to the
defender and rules of court
There was set out in Chapter 2 of this Part the Sheriff Court
Ordinary Cause Rules, rule 3(4) (a), which existed from 1 January 1987
till 30 November 1988. It is generally considered that, as a result
of the deletion of this rule, the domicile of the defender in terms
of the Conventions and Act need now only be averred where the
jurisdiction of the court is being based on the defender being
domiciled in the sheriffdom. This chapter will consider the question
of whether a rule ought to exist requiring an averment of the
defender's domicile to be made in all civil actions, or at any rate
in a larger category than that of those where jurisdiction is being
based on the defender being domiciled in the sheriffdom.
It is appropriate briefly to consider the old rule 3(4)(a). The only
13^
reported case on the rule is Burmy v White, referred to above. In
this case the Sheriff Principal of Glasgow and Strathkelvin held
that, notwithstanding the terms of rule 3(4) (a), in an action for
payment of rent and an order for ejection it was unnecessary for the
defender's domicile to be averred. If the property concerned was in
the sheriffdom, the court had exclusive jurisdiction on account of
134-
Sched 8 rule 4(1)(a) of the Act. Sheriff Principal Macleod held that
"one must...regard [rule 3(4)(a)] as applicable only to actions in
which...the domicile of the defender is a matter relevant to the
action".
It is indeed pointless for the defender's domicile in terms of the
Conventions and Act to be required to be averred where it is of no
relevance to either the jurisdiction of the court or the progress of
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the action. But it is the view of the present writer that the rule
may very well, however unfortunately, have required such an averment
to be made in all civil actions. There were no words in the rule
which indicated that all civil actions were not included in its
scope, and it had no ambiguity requiring the court to consider how it
ought to be interpreted. The writer's comments on the scope of
13S
application of the prorogation averment and identical action rules,
and the dieta of Lord Atkinson quoted by Lord Scarman in Stock v
13C
Frank Jones (Tipton), appear to be relevant in the context of the old
rule 3(4)(a) too. There is no need for them to be repeated here, and
as the rule has now been deleted the matter is of limited importance.
There are of course numerous types of actions which are outside the
scope of the Act as a whole - category (iii) actions. The domicile of
the defender in terms of the Conventions and Act cannot affect the
jurisdiction of the court or the progress of the action if the
subject matter does not concern a civil or commercial matter in terms
of art 1 of the Conventions and does not fall within the scope of
Sched 8 to the Act. If any kind of domicile is relevant in such an
action, it is domicile at common law. It is therefore quite pointless
for a rule of court to require the defender's domicile in terms of
the Conventions and Act to be averred in a category (iii) action.
Nor does there appear to be any justification for requiring the
defender's domicile in terms of the Conventions and Act to be averred
in every action which by reason of its subject matter falls outside
the scope of the Conventions but inside the scope of the Sched 8
rules - category (ii) actions. The kind of domicile which may be
relevant to jurisdiction in such actions is indeed domicile in terms
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of the Conventions and Act. But in such actions the defender's
domicile is only of relevance if it is the ground of jurisdiction of
the court. And if it is the ground of jurisdiction it must of course
be averred in order to comply with the requirement which has been
Ill-
retained in Ordinary Cause Rules, rule 3(4).
It should be said that in contrast to the Conventions, which very
loosely speaking have one set of rules of jurisdiction for persons
domiciled in the contracting states and another set for those
domiciled outside them, as a general rule Sched 8 does not
discriminate between persons domiciled in Scotland, persons domiciled
elsewhere in the United Kingdom, persons domiciled elsewhere in the
contracting states and persons domiciled outside the contracting
states. And rule 8 of Sched 8, which is based on art 20 para one of
the Conventions, makes no reference to domicile. No rule of Sched 8
is based on art 20 paras two and three of the Conventions. So if an
action concerns the interpretation of a will, the defender's domicile
will only be of relevance if jurisdiction is being based on his being
domiciled in the territory of the court.
In Sched 8, rule 2(8) states that
....a person may....be sued-
where he is not domiciled in the United Kingdom, in the courts for
any place where-
(a) any moveable property belonging to him has been arrested; or
(b) any immoveable property in which he has any beneficial interest
is situated.
If jurisdiction is being based on either limb of this rule, it is
clearly appropriate for there to be an averment relating to the
domicile of the defender as well as an averment concerning the
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location of the property in question. And, as a defender may be
domiciled in more than one place, an averment that, for example, the
defender is domiciled in Nicaragua is insufficient; it must be
averred that he is not domiciled in the United Kingdom. It seems
unnecessary to have a rule of court specifically concerning the
averring of the domicile of the defender in category (ii) actions
where jurisdiction is based on rule 2(8). Averring domicile in such
actions is, it can easily be argued, required in any event by the
present rule 3(4). And, perhaps more importantly, the number of
actions where use is made of rule 2(8) is rather small; any failure
to make the appropriate averments can result in a shrieval decision.
The remaining question then is: Should the pursuer be required to
aver the defender's domicile in terms of the Conventions and Act in
all actions which fall within the subject matter scope of the
Conventions - category (i) actions? In other words, should a pursuer
be required to aver the defender's domicile where he is basing
jurisdiction on something other than the defender's domicile in the
territory of the court? (The present rule 3(4) requires him to do so
where jurisdiction is being based on the defender's domicile in the
territory of the court.) If the answer is Yes, must each domicile be
averred in the event of the defender having more than one? And, if
there is more than one defender, must the domicile(s) of each of them
be averred? It was unfortunate that the drafters of rule 3(4)(a) took
no account of the possibilities of multiple domiciles and multiple
defenders.
The discussion here focuses on art 20 of the Conventions. It is
appropriate first to consider para one, and then to consider paras
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two and three. In view of its importance it is useful to set out para
one again:
Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued in a
court of another Contracting State and does not enter an appearance,
the court shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction
unless its jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of this
Convention.
As stated in Chapter 3 of this Part, in art 20 para one of Sched 4
"Contracting State" is replaced by "part of the United Kingdom", and
"Convention" by "Title". And then of course no reference to the
domicile of the defender is made in the equivalent provision of Sched
I3S
8.
In Chapter 3 the writer considered the duty imposed on the Scottish
courts by these provisions. He stated that the implication of certain
sentences in the Jenard Report is that, where an action falls within
the subject matter scope of the Conventions and the defender fails to
enter an appearance, the court has a somewhat onerous duty. It must
investigate for itself at least certain matters relating to
jurisdiction. If the defender is domiciled in another contracting
state, it must ascertain whether it has jurisdiction in terms of the
Convention. If the defender is domiciled in another United Kingdom
law district, on account of art 20 para one of Sched 4 the court may
very well have a similar duty to investigate the whole matter of
jurisdiction.
The court is clearly in a much better position to fulfil its duty if,
with regard to all the various factors relevant to jurisdiction, it
has been put in the picture by the pursuer as much as possible right
at the beginning of the action. The arguments put forward by the
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writer for statements about prorogation agreements being required to
be made in the initial writ rather than in a subsequent minute for
decree appear to him to be at least as valid in the context of
statements about the defender's domicile. In the Maxwell Report it is
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recommended that
[i]t should be presumed in practice, where the defender's address
stated in the initiating writ is in Scotland, that the defender is
domiciled here and that accordingly there is jurisdiction.
But an individual might very well have an address in Scotland without
being domiciled there in terms of s 41 of the Act, and on account of
the importance of the ascertaining of the defender's domicile the
present writer does not consider the Maxwell Report's recommendation
to be at all satisfactory.
As was stated above, it is not at present clear if rule 8 of Sched 8
imposes on courts a duty as onerous as that imposed by art 20 para
one of the Conventions. There is of course much merit in assuming
that it does. If it does not, then the value of an averment in the
initial writ concerning the defender's domicile is clear. If it is
averred that the defender is domiciled in another contracting state,
then the court should investigate for itself the various factors
inherent in jurisdiction. But if on the other hand it is averred that
the defender is domiciled in Scotland, and the court as a result of
the appropriate enquiries is satisfied that this is indeed the case,
it has no duty to investigate ex proprio motu the other factors
inherent in jurisdiction.
But even if rule 8 of Sched 8 does impose on the Scottish courts the
same duty to consider the question of jurisdiction in actions where
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the defender is domiciled in Scotland or Sri Lanka as they have in
actions where the defender is domiciled in another contracting state,
a court may very well require to be made aware of the defender's
domicile in order to carry out the duty imposed on it. It is
appropriate here to consider the relevance of the defender's domicile
in the context of what are probably the four principal sets of
grounds of jurisdiction, other than the domicile of the defender in
the state / territory of the court, which are to be found in the
Conventions and Act.
Firstly, so far as the exclusive jurisdiction grounds are concerned,
it may be argued that in actions where jurisdiction is based on
Conventions art 16 / Sched 8 rule 4 it is only the whereabouts of the
subject matter of the proceedings, and not also those of the
defender, which are relevant for the purposes of jurisdiction. As all
the court needs to do is check that the relevant locus is within its
territory, it was often said, such actions should be excluded from
the scope of rule 3(4)(a). This was of course the view of the Sheriff
\Lro
Principal in Burmy v White.
But despite the more than seventeen years of operation of the
Brussels Convention in the six original contracting states, doubt
still exists about the precise extent of the art 16 categories. This
matter was referred to above in the prorogation agreement averment
context. There is likely to be a not insignificant number of actions
where it is not immediately clear whether or not jurisdiction is
determined by art 16 / rule 4. It would therefore seem to be in the
courts' interest for exclusive jurisdiction actions not to be
excluded from the scope of a rule requiring the pursuer in a category
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(i) action to make averments relating to the domicile of the
defender.
Secondly, the definition of consumer contract to be found in the
Conventions is different from that in Sched 4, and both definitions
are different from that in Sched 8. And each of the three sets of
provisions has slightly different rules for determining where a
consumer contract action can be brought. So if an action concerns
what may be a consumer contract, in order to establish whether or not
it has jurisdiction it is very important for the court to know which
one or more of the three schemes of jurisdiction are applicable. The
IU
consumer contract jurisdiction rules are a potential minefield, and
attempts to define their scope in the abstract are all frought with
danger. But if a sheriff is told that the defender is domiciled in
another contracting state, he will begin his verification of
jurisdiction by focusing on the rules of the Conventions. And if he
is told that the defender's only domicile is in Scotland, and there
is no suggestion of the dispute having a non-Scottish dimension, he
can focus straight away on the consumer contract rules of the Act
itself.
Thirdly, with regard to the special jurisdiction rules, a comparison
of the three schemes' rules concerning jurisdiction in delict is
useful. Article 5 of the Conventions begins: "A person domiciled in a
Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued:". Part
(3) continues: "in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict,
in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred". In art
5 of Sched 4 the opening words are: "A person domiciled in a part of
the United Kingdom may, in another part of the United Kingdom, be
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sued:". In Sched 8, rule 2(3) simply states that as a general rule a
person may be sued "in matters relating to delict or quasi-delict, in
the courts for the place where the harmful even occurred".
The effect of this is, for example, that if someone domiciled in
Dundee is being sued in Edinburgh sheriff court on the basis of the
locus of the delict in question being in Edinburgh, jurisdiction is
being founded on Sched 8 rule 2(3) alone. But if the defender is
domiciled in Dortmund - without also being domiciled somewhere in the
United Kingdom - and the locus is in Edinburgh, jurisdiction is being
founded on art 5(3) of the Conventions and, arguably, rule 2(3) of
Sched 8 too. If a dispute arises concerning the interpretation of
rule 2(3), the court must simply have "regard...to any relevant
decision of [the European Court] as to the meaning or effect of [art
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5(3)]". But if, on account of the defender's domicile, art 5(3) may
itself be applicable, the court can be regarded as having its hands
tied. For s 3(1) of the Act states:
Any question as to the meaning or effect of any provision of the
Conventions shall...be determined in accordance with the principles
laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court.
So in a category (i) action, which scheme's rule of special
jurisdiction may be applicable, or very loosely speaking how the
possibly applicable rule of special jurisdiction should be
interpreted, will depend on the domicile of the defender. Moreover,
if the defender in an action in a United Kingdom court has his only
domicile in Dortmund a question concerning the interpretation of art
5(3) can be referred to the European Court; if he is domiciled in
'44
Dundee it almost certainly can not.
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In an action resulting from a road accident, a problem of
interpretation of art 5(3) or rule 2(3) may seem highly unlikely.
But, in a world with an increasing number of "international" product
liability disputes and defamation actions resulting from the
publication of newspapers and magazines with transnational
circulation, the delict locus jurisdiction rule may become the source
of a not insignificant amount of litigation. A rule of court cannot
impose a requirement purely in the case of actions where jurisdiction
is doubtful and, at least in the vast majority of cases, making an
averment relating to the domicile of the defender will not be a
difficult task for the pursuer's solicitor. It is submitted that
providing the court with information on this matter will, in an
increasing number of cases, go some way to enabling it to fulfil the
duty imposed on it by art 20 para one of the Conventions.
Finally, in a category (i) action the rules in heavy type in Sched 8
cannot provide the basis of jurisdiction if the defender is domiciled
in another contracting state (in certain cases, where the defender is
domiciled in any law district of the contracting states other than
Scotland) without also being domiciled in the United Kingdom (in
certain cases, without also being domiciled in Scotland). If
averments have been made about his domicile, the court will, in the
event of the defender failing to enter an appearance, be in a much
better position to check that the relevant rule in heavy type can be
founded on and that there is jurisdiction.
Paragraphs two and three of art 20 of the Conventions provide an
additional argument for a pursuer to be required to make the court
aware, to the best of his knowledge, right from the beginning of the
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action, of the defender's domicile. They state:
The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown that
the defendant has been able to receive the document instituting the
proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable
him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been
taken to this end.
The provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall be replaced by those
of Article 15 of the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, if the document instituting the proceedings or
notice thereof had to be transmitted abroad in accordance with that
Convention.
In Sched 4, art 20 contains a para two identical to that of the
Conventions, but it has no para three. There are no equivalent
provisions in Sched 8.
In the French text of art 20 para two, the words "ce defendeur" are
used where "the defendant" appears in the English text and, as a
result, it is generally believed that, in view of the wording of para
one, para two is only applicable in the case of an action brought
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against a defender who is domiciled in another contracting state.
Presumably a corresponding interpretation can be given to para two of
art 20 in Sched 4: the duty to stay the proceedings can only arise
where the defender is being sued in a United Kingdom law district
other than the one where he is domiciled.
The effect of art 20 para two of the Conventions and Sched 4 is then
that, as a general rule, if an action falls within the subject matter
scope of the Conventions and Sched 4, and the defender is domiciled
in another United Kingdom law district or in another contracting
state, even if the court does have jurisdiction, it must
nevertheless, in the event of the defender failing to enter an
appearance, sist the proceedings until he has been given what is
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considered a proper opportunity to defend the action. The court's
duty almost certainly arises prior to any minute for decree being
lodged.
The practical effect of the duty is probably that, unless the measure
sought is "provisional or protective", an interim application cannot
be made to the court unless the defender has appeared or the
provisions of art 20 para two have been complied with. And no period
of time can run to the prejudice of a defender until he appears or
there has been compliance with the provisions. The Scottish courts
have no such duty in the case of actions against defenders domiciled
I&
in Scotland or outside the contracting states, and so a court can
only fulfil its art 20 para two duty if it has been made aware of the
domicile of the defender in the action before it. And it is clearly
much more satisfactory for the court to be informed of the domicile
of the defender right at the beginning of the action, rather than
only when the pursuer seeks an interim award or decree in absence.
Article 20 para two of the Brussels Convention was regarded by both
14-8 I4T
Jenard and Droz as a transitional provision. The effect of art 20
para three would appear to be that, when a defender domiciled in one
contracting state is sued in another but does not enter an
appearance, if the "document instituting the proceedings or notice
thereof" had been sent abroad in accordance with the 1 965 Hague
Convention referred to in para three, the question of whether or not
the case can proceed to judgment is to be determined by art 15 of the
Hague Convention rather than by art 20 para two of the Brussels
Convention.
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Only one of the other EC states 1s not a party to the Hague
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Convention, and three of the six EFTA states are parties to it. So 1n
the majority of actions where it is applying one of the provisions, a
Scottish court is likely to be applying Hague Convention art 15
rather than Brussels Convention art 20 para two. But there will be a
not insignificant number of cases where Brussels Convention art 20
para two is still applicable. For example, a defender may be
domiciled in, and served with the appropriate document in, an EC or
EFTA state which is not a party to the Hague Convention. And a
defender domiciled in an EC or EFTA state which is a party to the
Convention may be served with the document in the state of the court
where the proceedings are to take place - in this case the United
Kingdom.
The rules of citation / service are of course quite separate from the
ISZ
rules of jurisdiction. An individual whose sole domicile is in
another contracting state may have service effected on him while he
is in Scotland if, for example, one of the art 5 rules of special
jurisdiction gives Scottish courts jurisdiction. And a legal person
only domiciled in another contracting state may well find itself
being served with the appropriate document at its branch in Scotland
if jurisdiction is being based on art 5(5).
So it is far from true that Brussels Convention art 20 para two has
been, or is about to be, effectively replaced by, Hague Convention
art 15. Of course, had this statement - which is not infrequently
made - been correct, then knowledge of the defender's domicile would
not have been required for the purposes of compliance with Brussels
Convention art 20 paras two and three. For Hague Convention art 15
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makes no reference to the domicile of the defender, and the Ordinary
15?
Cause Rules make it clear that, if service is to take place in a
state which is a party to the Hague Convention, there must,
irrespective of the defender's domicile, be compliance with the rules
of the Convention - in particular with art 15.
A further point of relevance is that, as stated above, the art 20 in
Sched 4 has no para three. If a defender domiciled in one United
Kingdom law district is being sued in another, service abroad will at
least as a general rule not be necessary. If the defender is an
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individual, he can be cited at his residence in the United Kingdom.
And if the defender is a legal person, it can be cited at a
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registered office or place of business in the United Kingdom. It was
presumably for this reason that reference to the Hague Convention was
thought not to be necessary in Sched 4. So if a defender domiciled in
England and Wales, or in Northern Ireland, fails to enter an
appearance in a Scottish court, it is apparently always the "art 20
para two" test which is to be applied. And it is only if the court
has been informed of the domicile of the defender that it can know
that Sched 4, art 20 para two is applicable.
To be in a better position to fulfil the duty imposed on it by para
two of art 20 of the Conventions and Sched 4, as well as that imposed
by para one, a Scottish court should therefore, in any action within
the subject matter scope of the Conventions, be made aware, 1n the
initial writ, of the domicile of the defender, as far as this is
known to the pursuer. And the duty imposed by art 20 para two, it
should be noted, exists in exclusive jurisdiction actions just as
much as in non-exclusive jurisdiction ones. Contrary to what is
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implied by Anton and Beaumont, the rule of court requiring an
averment concerning the domicile of the defender was not imposing "an
unnecessary requirement where the action is founded on Art. 16 of the
1968 Convention".
But what if there is more than one defender? And what if the defender
/ a defender has more than one domicile? With regard to the question
concerning actions with two or more defenders, it is undoubtedly true
that, at least as a general rule, if the court has jurisdiction over
one defender on account of his / its domicile in its territory it
will have jurisdiction over both or all of them. Article 6(1) of the
Conventions provides that
[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued:
where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the
place where any one of them is domiciled.
There is a corresponding rule in art 6(1) of Sched 4, and in Sched 8
rule 2(15)(a) provides simply that as a general rule
a person may....be sued
where he is one of a number of defenders, in the courts for the place
where any one of them is domiciled.
But it would be most unsatisfactory if a pursuer averring that one
defender was domiciled in the territory of the court was not required
to make averments relating to the domicile of the other defender(s).
If averments are made concerning the domicile of each defender, then,
on account of the importance of domicile in the schemes of
jurisdiction, in the event of jurisdiction over the first defender
being in doubt the court is in a better position to consider its
jurisdiction over the other defender(s).
231
A further argument for averments concerning the domicile of each
defender being required concerns art 20 para two. This provision is
of course designed to give an element of protection to defenders
being sued in a contracting state where they are not domiciled. Where
more than one defender is being sued outside the state of his
domicile, the element of protection should clearly be given to each
one. And it can only be given to any one if the court is made aware
of his being domiciled in another contracting state.
But, turning to the other question, to require a pursuer to make
averments concerning each of a defender's domiciles would be
impractical. Fortunately, on account of the wording of the various
rules of jurisdiction of the Conventions it is also unnecessary. If a
defender is domiciled in the United Kingdom, as a general rule art 2
gives the United Kingdom courts jurisdiction; whether the defender is
also domiciled in another contracting state is of no consequence. And
if a defender is domiciled elsewhere in the contracting states but
not in the United Kingdom (and United Kingdom courts have
jurisdiction on account of a rule of special jurisdiction) it makes
no difference whether he is domiciled in one place or in one hundred
in the other contracting states.
Paragraphs one and two of art 20 of the Conventions are both
concerned with the situation where a defender domiciled in one
contracting state is being sued in another contracting state where he
is not domiciled. It is generally accepted that art 20 has not been
included in the Conventions in order to give protection to a defender
who is domiciled in two contracting states and is being sued in one
of them. So if a defender in an action in a Scottish court is
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domiciled in the United Kingdom, art 20 cannot be applicable.
The wording of the rules of jurisdiction in Sched 4 also makes the
ascertaining of each of a defender's domiciles unnecessary. The whole
approach of these rules is of course based on that of the rules of
jurisdiction of the Conventions. And in Sched 4, art 20 1s concerned
with the situation where a defender who is domiciled in one United
Kingdom law district is being sued in another where he is not
domiciled. It 1s not applicable where an individual domiciled in both
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England and Scotland is being sued in a Scottish court.
In other words, if the defender in an action in a Scottish court is
domiciled in Scotland, whether or not he is also domiciled elsewhere
in the contracting states is of no significance. And if the defender
is not domiciled in Scotland, but is domiciled in England and Wales,
or in Northern Ireland, any domicile of his in another contracting
state is irrelevant.
It is worth mentioning that, 1n any event, neither the Conventions
nor the Act provides any mechanism for determining whether a natural
person domiciled in the state of the forum is also domiciled in
another contracting state. Article 52 para two begins: "If a party is
not domiciled in the state whose courts are seised of the matter..."
In concluding, the writer would suggest that Ordinary Cause Rules,
rule 3(4) be amended to read:
(a)(i) In any cause which, by reason of its subject matter, falls
within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, whether or not jurisdiction is determined by the
provisions of either Convention, the initial writ shall, in the event
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of one or more defenders being domiciled in Scotland, contain
appropriate averments to this effect; 1n the event of one or more
defenders being domiciled in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland
but not in Scotland, the initial writ shall contain appropriate
averments to this effect; in the event of one or more defenders being
domiciled in a state to which one of the said Conventions applies,
but not in the United Kingdom, the initial writ shall contain
appropriate averments to this effect; in the event of one or more
defenders not being domiciled in any of the States to which either of
the said Conventions applies, the initial writ shall contain
ISR
appropriate averments to this effect.
(ii) For the purposes of part (i), "domiciled" shall be construed as
"domiciled in terms of sections 41 to 46 of the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgments Act 1982 and articles 52 and 53 of the said
ISO
Conventions".
(b) The initial writ shall contain appropriate averments of the
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ground of jurisdiction of the court.
The rule 3(4)(a) which is being suggested is longer and more
complicated than both the suggested rules 3(2) and 3(3) and the
domicile averment rule which existed from 1 January 1987 to 30
November 1988. Some comments on the rule and its particular wording
are therefore appropriate. Firstly, it may be argued that if in any
action the jurisdiction of the court depended even in part on where
the defender was or was not domiciled, averments relating to domicile
would be required by rule 3(4)(b) and, as a result, rule 3(4)(a)
would be unnecessary. But a point similar to that which was made in
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the context of averments relating to prorogation agreements can
easily be made here. It is that if the pursuer's solicitor were asked
what he regarded as the ground of jurisdiction of the court, he would
in all probability simply state something such as "the accident
having taken place in the sheriff court district" or "the disputed
property being in the sheriff court district". He would not say: "the
property being in the sheriff court district and the defender not
being domiciled anywhere in the contracting states". Without a
provision such as that in rule 3(4)(a), solicitors would only make
averments relating to the domicile of the defender if jurisdiction
was being based on this domicile being in the sheriff court district.
Moreover on account of the existence of art 20 para two of the
Conventions and Sched 4, the court should be made aware of the
defender's domicile. And these provisions do not strictly speaking
concern jurisdiction. So if 1n a particular action the defender's
domicile was not in fact relevant to the jurisdiction of the court,
the pursuer's solicitor could fully comply with rule 3(4)(b) without
referring to that domicile, but the court would not be in a good
position to fulfil the duty imposed on it by art 20 para two of the
Conventions and Sched 4.
Secondly, the words "whether or not jurisdiction is determined by the
provisions of the Conventions" are included. This is because actions
which are purely internal to one contracting state may be outside the
scope of the Conventions as a whole. But in all actions the pursuer's
solicitor should be required to make appropriate averments relating
to the domicile of the defender. For one thing it 1s not clear if
purely internal actions are excluded from the scope of the
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Conventions. But even 1f they are, if the court is unaware of the
domicile of the defender, it cannot be sure that the action before it
is an internal one and therefore outside the scope of the Conventions
as a whole.
Thirdly, there is a reference to "appropriate averments". The
solicitor is not told what the appropriate averments are in the case
of, for example, a company with numerous domiciles in England and
Wales but none in Scotland. But rules of court are concerned
primarily with procedure, not with the details of pleadings. And it
would not be possible for those drafting the rules of court in a few
lines to take account of all the situations which may arise. Some
matters must be left to the good sense of practitioners. If problems
occur in practice, case law, Acts of Court and sheriff clerks'
policies can provide guidance as to what is appropriate. A provision
relating to a particular point could even be Inserted into the rules
of court.
In the case of the company domiciled in England - which might, for
example, be sued in Glasgow sheriff court because the place of
performance of the contractual obligation in question was in Glasgow
- it should normally be appropriate simply to aver that it was
incorporated under English law, that it has its registered office in
[a particular place] and that it has numerous places of business in
England and Wales. If it was incorporated under English law and has
its registered office in England, it is domiciled in England and
Wales. It is only if there is some doubt about this matter that the
places of business might become significant; averments about their
location and about the business carried out in them could, if
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necessary, be introduced at a later stage.
Fourthly, on account of the wording of each of the rules of
jurisdiction in the Conventions and in Scheds 4 and 8, for the
purposes of the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts domiciles can, as
implied above, be divided into (a) those in Scotland, (b) those in
another United Kingdom law district, (c) those in another contracting
state and (d) those outside the contracting states. If an individual
or a business has a category (a) domicile, any category (b), (c) or
(d) domicile is irrelevant. If he / it has a category (b) domicile
(but no category (a) domicile), any category (c) or (d) domicile is
irrelevant. And if he / it has a category (c) domicile (but no
category (a) or (b) domicile), any category (d) domicile is
irrelevant. That is why the latter part of the draft rule 3(4)(a)(i)
is expressed as it is. This "order of priority" of domiciles can be
illustrated by one or two examples.
Let us first take the case of an individual who is domiciled in
France and in the United Kingdom. It is wished to bring against him
in the United Kingdom an action concerning a tort, the harmful event
of which occurred in the United Kingdom. Is art 5 of the Conventions
relevant? It provides, of course, that
[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another
Contracting State, be sued in matters relating to tort, delict or
quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event
occurred.
It is generally considered that the rules of special jurisdiction are
not applicable where the defender is domiciled in the contracting
state where the locus is situated as well as in another contracting
IGif
state. The rules of special jurisdiction are designed to enable
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defenders to be sued 1n certain circumstances 1n particular courts of
contracting states where they are not domiciled. Allocating
jurisdiction to particular courts 1n states where they are domiciled
is not one of their functions; that is a matter which can adequately
be left to the local law. So in the action against the individual
domiciled in France and the United Kingdom, in a United Kingdom court
jurisdiction could not be based on art 5(3) of the Conventions.
Loosely speaking, the United Kingdom domicile has priority over the
French one.
Let us now take an example involving a rule of "exorbitant"
jurisdiction available in the United Kingdom. It is in fact in the
context of "exorbitant" jurisdiction that the practitioner may feel
that domiciles outside the United Kingdom are always of relevance. It
is indeed often said that if a defender is domiciled in another
contracting state, the rules of special jurisdiction - exorbitant
jurisdiction - in heavy type in Schedule 8 cannot provide
jurisdiction in an action against him. But if the defender is
domiciled in the United Kingdom as well as in the other contracting
state, his domicile in the other contracting state is actually
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immaterial. In Schedule 8, rule 2(9) is probably in practice one of
the more often used rules of "exorbitant" jurisdiction, and use can
be made of it to illustrate this point.
If someone who would generally be regarded as a Frenchman has a
holiday home in Inverness, and spends several weeks there every year,
he may well be domiciled in the United Kingdom and in Scotland 1n
terms of s 41 of the Act. If as a matter of law - Scots law - he is
resident in Inverness, and the nature and circumstances of his
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residence Indicate that he has a substantial connection with the
United Kingdom and with Scotland in particular, the tests in s 41(2)
and (3) will have been satisfied. So art 2 of the Conventions allows
him to be sued in the United Kingdom courts, and Sched 4, art 2
allows him to be sued in the Scottish courts. As a result, if it is
wished to bring an action against him 1n Glasgow sheriff court,
concerning the ownership of moveable property in Glasgow,
jurisdiction can be based on the "exorbitant" provision in rule 2(9)
of Sched 8. The fact that what would be regarded as his principal
residence is in Paris is quite irrelevant. Once again the United
Kingdom domicile has priority.
It is true, it should be said, that art 3 of the Conventions states:
Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of
another Contracting State only by virtue of....this Title.
In particular the following provisions shall not be applicable as
against them:
- in the United Kingdom: the rules which enable jurisdiction to be
founded on: .... (b) the presence within the United Kingdom of
property belonging to the defendant.
But at the beginning of art 3 what "another Contracting State" means
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is: "a Contracting State where they are not domiciled". The writer is
aware that the question of the applicability of the rules of
"exorbitant" jurisdiction has caused some uncertainty among
practitioners. But for those who have published material on the
Conventions it is a trite point that a state is perfectly free to
allocate jurisdiction in whatever way it chooses over those against
whom proceedings can be brought in it by virtue of art 2 of the
239
Conventions. In allocating jurisdiction to particular courts, there
is nothing to prevent 1t using connecting factors which are not used
in the Conventions. It could if it so wished use as its general
connecting factor residence rather than domicile, and it can use
grounds of "exorbitant" jurisdiction specifically prohibited by art 3
para two in the case of persons not domiciled in it but domiciled in
another contracting state.
In connection with the "order of priority" of domiciles it should
also be mentioned that in art 20 para one of the Conventions the
opening words "Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State
is sued in a court of another Contracting State" should be read as
"Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued in a
court of a Contracting State in which he is not domiciled". For the
provision is designed to protect defenders who are being sued in a
contracting state where they are not domiciled. A corresponding
interpretation can be given to the opening words of art 20 para one
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in Sched 4.
It was stated above that in para two of art 20 in the Conventions the
words "Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued
in a court of another Contracting State and does not enter an
appearance" should be considered as coming before what appears in the
text. The words which should be read into the provision are in fact:
"Where a defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued 1n a
court of a Contracting State in which he is not domiciled and does
not enter an appearance". For once again it is the protection of
persons not domiciled in the contracting state where they are being
sued which is intended. In Schedule 4, art 20 para two should be
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considered as beginning in a similar way. So, to sum up here, for the
purposes of Section 7 of Title II of the Conventions, as well as for
the purposes of the rules of jurisdiction themselves, it is
appropriate for the averments in the initial writ concerning the
defender's domicile only to relate to the domicile which is, loosely
speaking, closest to the court in which the action is being brought.
The suggested rule 3(4)(a)(i) concludes by stating that, if this is
the case, it should be averred by a pursuer in his initial writ that
the defender is not domiciled in any of the contracting states. An
individual may, of course, be domiciled in both a contracting state
and a non-contracting state, so it is important for a negative
averment to be made in the event of the defender not having a
(To
domicile within the contracting states. On account of the relevance
of the defender's domicile in a category (i) action to both the
jurisdiction of the court and the progress of the action, the court
should not be expected to consider a lack of any averment about the
defender having or not having a domicile within the contracting
states as signifying that the pursuer is not aware of there being any
domicile there. Requiring a pursuer to make a negative averment does
not seem unreasonable. On account of its duty set out in art 20 of
the Conventions, the court cannot simply assume that such a negative
averment is correct. But it nevertheless is of some value.
As any domicile in a non-contracting state is of no significance in
the application of Title II of the Conventions, it can be argued that
an averment that a defender is domiciled in a particular non-
contracting state would be irrelevant. But it is submitted that it
would be good practice for a pursuer's solicitor to aver that the
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defender's only domicile was in Pakistan or Peru or wherever it
happened to be. This would provide the court with a good starting-
point for the enquiry which it might have to make into the question
of whether the defender was in fact domiciled 1n a part of the
contracting states other than Scotland.
Finally, the reference in rule 3(4)(a)(ii) is to "articles 52 and
53". Because of the difference 1n wording between arts 52 and 53 of
the Conventions, reference to art 53 may strictly speaking be
unnecessary, and in fact the rule of court which existed from 1
January 1987 to 30 November 1988 made no reference to art 53. In
determining the domicile of an individual, art 52 provides that
foreign rules of law may be relevant; s 41 of the Act refers to art
52. But in determining the domicile of a legal person, s 42 is alone
applicable - unless it directs the court to another system of law.
For art 53 provides that in this context it 1s the lex fori which is
to be applied. However an absence of reference to art 53 in the rule
of court could lead to puzzlement.
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7 The averring of .jurisdiction m a whole
As stated near the beginning of this Part, prior to 1 January 1987 it
was the practice for an averment relating to the jurisdiction of the
in
court to be Included 1n each initial writ. If jurisdiction was based
on the defender's residence in the sheriff court district, and his
address in the sheriff court district appeared in the Instance, the
averment might very well simply state: "The parties are as designed
in the instance." Many solicitors may have been far from certain as
to the justification for beginning the condescendence in almost all
of their initial writs with this averment; they inserted these words
simply because they had been taught to do so and their fellow civil
court practitioners were doing the same.
But the explanation is that at common law an initial writ should set
out the facts which, if proved, enable the court to grant the decree
sought. A defender was - and of course is - entitled to base his case
that the court should not grant decree against him on arguments
relating to the substance of the claim and / or to the jurisdiction
of the court. The pursuer's case concerns both matters, so both
matters have been required to be referred to in the condescendence.
Some practitioners, it should be said, considered that, for there to
be compliance with the common law rule, the first averment should
actually state the defender's residence, and not simply refer the
reader to the instance. But they were in a minority and the matter
was never resolved by the Court of Session.
The common law justification for averments relating to the
jurisdiction of the court being included in each initial writ still
holds good, and there is now the additional argument that the a court
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1s in a much better position to fulfil the duty imposed on it by art
20 of the Conventions, and arguably also by art 20 of Sched 4 and
rule 8 of Sched 8, if it is aware of the pursuer's grounds for
believing that it has jurisdiction. So, it is submitted, it is very
difficult to dispute the desirability of a rule of court setting out
the pursuer's duty in category (1) actions to make appropriate
averments relating to jurisdiction. Schedule 8 applies to category
(ii) actions too, and the common law rule relating to the role of
initial writs extends to category (11 i) actions. So, it is submitted,
the application of a rule of court concerning averments of
jurisdiction should not be restricted to particular types of actions.
The form of words used in the present rule 3(4) seems reasonable. As
a result, at the end of the last section of this chapter the writer
suggested that the present rule 3(4) be retained and renumbered rule
3(4)(b).
As in the case of the suggested rule 3(4)(a), it would not be
appropriate for the rule of court to go into detail about what should
be averred. There is however a general view, with which the writer
certainly agrees, that on account of the duty imposed on the courts
by the Act, averments of jurisdiction should now be lengthier than
they were prior to the Act's coming into force. If, for example,
jurisdiction in an action is being based primarily on rule 2(2) of
Sched 8, an averment along the following lines - which is no more
than an adaptation of the words of the rule itself - would be of very
limited value to the court and could therefore with much
justification be held to be insufficient - using the appropriate
terminology, to be lacking in specification:
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The action relates to a contract and this court is a court for the
place of performance of the obligation in question.
It does not seem unreasonable for the pursuer to be expected, in the
averment relating to jurisdiction, briefly to inform the court of the
type of contract concerned, the nature of the obligation in question
and the place of performance. In the event of the defender failing to
enter appearance, the court could then much more easily set about its
task of verifying its jurisdiction. Of course the subsequent articles
of the condescendence ought to contain averments relating to the type
of contract, the nature of the obligation and the place of
performance. But there is a danger that the relevant points will be
lost in verbiage there; it is in the interests of all concerned for
them to be summarised in the first article of condescendence.
Even if it were held to be good pleading to refer in the
condescendence to the instance, it would no longer be appropriate, in
the event of the defender living 1n the sheriff court district,
simply to aver: "The parties are as designed in the instance." For
one thing, the defender's address given in the instance may be
considered as being - at any rate in the pursuer's submission - his
residence, but an individual is not domiciled at a place merely
because he is resident there. It is clear from the words "nature and
circumstances of his residence" in s 41 of the Act that domicile
requires something more than residence.
And of course, for the reasons which the writer has set out above, he
considers that there should be included in each initial writ
averments concerning the possibilities of there being a relevant
prorogation agreement or an identical action elsewhere, and also
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concerning the defender's domicile. (The averments concerning these
matters are averments relating to jurisdiction; the averments of
domicile are also averments relating to the court's duty under art 20
para two of the Conventions and Sched 4.) But for the avoidance of
doubt 1t should be said that if in an action the jurisdiction of the
court is based on the defender being domiciled in the sheriff court
district, one set of averments would satisfy the requirements of both
3(4)(a) and 3(4)(b) in the writer's suggested rules.
It is the writer's view that, in the case of an action in Aberdeen
sheriff court, the following averment would be adequate (for the
purposes of both rule 3(4)(a) and rule 3(4)(b)) at the initial
stages:
The defender is resident in Bieldside. He has been resident there
during the three months immediately prior to the bringing of this
action. He is domiciled there. This court accordingly has
jurisdiction.
If the pursuer proves that the defender has been resident for the
last three months in Bieldside, and there is no appearance by the
defender, the court must presume that the defender is domiciled in
the sheriff court district. For s 41(4) states that an individual is
domiciled in a particular place in the United Kingdom if he is
domiciled in the part of the United Kingdom in which the place is
situated and he is resident in the place. In this example the
defender is resident in Bieldside, which is in the sheriff court
district. One effect of s 41(3) is that an individual is domiciled in
Scotland if he is resident in Scotland and the nature and
circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial
connection with Scotland.
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The defender is resident in Scotland. With regard to the nature and
circumstances of his residence, s 41(6) is of relevance. It provides
that if an Individual has been resident for the last three months in
a United Kingdom law district, it is to be presumed that the nature
and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial
connection with that law district. In the case of the defender, the
presumption can be made with regard to Scotland. So, returning to s
41(3), it is to be presumed that the defender is domiciled in
Scotland. And on account of s 41(4) it is to be presumed that he is
domiciled in the sheriff court district.
Of course if the defender enters an appearance and argues that he is
not domiciled in the sheriff court district, the pursuer must then
expand on his initial averments. But it is submitted that, at the
initial stages and as long as the jurisdiction of the court is not
being contested by the defender, on account of his having made these
simple averments the pursuer is complying with the common law rule
that his case must be set out in the initial writ. He is also
providing the court with an adequate starting point for any enquiry
concerning its jurisdiction which the Act may require it to make. So
far as the court's verifying its jurisdiction is concerned, these
averments would provide a basis for the making of submissions by the
pursuer's solicitor at the bar, or for the lodging of affidavits
signed by the pursuer and a witness. They give the defender adequate
notice of the pursuer's case that he has been resident in the sheriff
court district during the relevant three month period.
The writer understands that his approach to averring domicile in the
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sheriff court district is in fact that adopted in almost all of the
sheriff courts. But in one or two sheriff courts a pursuer will only
be granted warrant for service if he avers that the nature and
circumstances of the defender's residence in Scotland indicate that
he has a substantial connection with Scotland. It is respectfully
submitted that the approach taken in these courts is wrong.
As was implied above, at common law the purpose of written pleadings
is to set out the facts which, if proved, entitle the party concerned
to decree in the terms specified. If it is admitted by the defender
that there has been three months' residence on his part in the
sheriff court district, or if he does not appear and contest the
matter, or if after proof his three months' residence is held proved
without any relevant case of his also being proved, the court must
treat the defender as being domiciled in its territory. Unless and
until the defender enters an appearance and argues that the nature
and circumstances of his residence do not indicate that he has a
substantial connection with Scotland, there is no need for the
pursuer to prove anything more than three months' residence on the
defender's part. So initially his written case need not - indeed
probably should not - concern anything more than the fact that there
has been three months' residence by the defender in the sheriff court
district. If the defender makes averments relating to the nature and
circumstances of his residence, the pursuer will of course have an
opportunity to adjust or amend his own pleadings.
When a pursuer makes averments concerning the jurisdiction of the
court, he is of course now doing so not only to comply with the
common law rule relating to the setting out of his case, but also to
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give the court Information which will be of assistance to it in the
fulfilling of the duty imposed on it by the Act. But the existence of
this new duty to verify jurisdiction, like the common law duty, does
not require the making of an averment specifically referring to the
nature and circumstances of the residence concerned. For, as
explained above, if there is held to have been three months'
residence in the sheriff court district, on account of s 41(6) it is
in effect presumed that the defender is domiciled in the sheriff
court district. And there is no practical difference between a
defender simply being held to be domiciled in a particular place and
his being presumed to be domiciled there. In each case the court must
proceed on the basis that he is domiciled there.
So, for example, if a defender who has not entered an appearance is
undoubtedly domiciled in Italy in terms of Italian law, and by virtue
of s 41(6) is presumed to be domiciled in Scotland, in considering
its jurisdiction over him the Scottish court can disregard the
Italian domicile. By establishing that there has been three months'
residence in its district - and that there is no valid prorogation
agreement or identical action elsewhere - the court will have
fulfillied the duty imposed on it by art 20 para one of the
Conventions.
It is to be hoped that, for the sake of both consistency of approach
throughout Scotland and a correct application of the law, the sheriff
principal within whose sheriffdom the courts concerned are situated,
or the Court of Session, will have and take the opportunity to hold
that, at least at the initial stages of an action, an averment
relating to three months' residence by the defender in the sheriff
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court district (coupled of course with averments concerning the
issues of prorogation agreements and identical actions) 1s perfectly
adequate.
If the defender is not an individual but a limited company, a similar
problem cannot arise; s 42 makes no provision for any presumption. In
the case of an action in Dundee sheriff court against an English
company with a place of business in Dundee, there would be compliance
with the suggested sheriff court rules 3(4)(a) and 3(4)(b) if an
averment were to read:
The defenders are a company incorporated under the Companies Acts.
Their registered office is in London. They have a place of business
in Dundee. They are domiciled in Dundee. This court accordingly has
jurisdiction.
In s 42, the effect of subsections (3), (4) and (5) is that, if a
company "was incorporated.... under the law of a part of the United
Kingdom and has its registered office....in the United Kingdom", it
has a seat - and therefore domicile - in every place in the United
Kingdom where it has a place of business. At the Initial stages, it
is submitted, it is unnecessary to make averments relating to the
nature of the business at the place of business in the sheriff court
district; such averments can if appropriate be added at the
adjustment stage. There is of course no need to make averments
relating to any other places of business, and therefore any other
domiciles, which the company might have elsewhere in Scotland or in
England. If the company is domiciled in the sheriff court district,
such domiciles cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court. The point
has already been made that the domicile which is of significance is
IT-A.
the one which is, loosely speaking, closest to the court.
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If the company is in due course held not to be domiciled in the
sheriff court district, it will not be prejudiced by its domiciles
elsewhere not having been mentioned in the pursuer's averments. For
if the pursuer wishes to attempt to continue the action with
jurisdiction based on a different ground - such as a Sched 4 ground
of special jurisdiction - he must then have appropriate averments
relating to both the domicile of the company (rule 3(4)(a)) and the
jurisdiction of the court (rule 3(4)(b)) inserted into the
condescendence.
This chapter is concerned primarily with rules of court, not with
written pleadings. It would therefore not be appropriate for there to
be set out and discussed here averments of jurisdiction suitable in
other circumstances. As stated at the beginning of this Part, such
averments are to be found in an article by Black in the Scots Law
Times.
251
8 Sheriff court summary causes and smal1 claims: specific comments
(a-) Summary causes
\K
The relevant provisions introduced by Act of Sederunt on 1 January
1987 were as follows:
Rule 2
(2) The statement of claim shall contain averments about any
agreement which the pursuer has reason to believe may exist
prorogating jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause to
another court.
(3) The statement of claim shall contain averments about any
proceedings which the pursuer has reason to believe may be pending
before another court involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties as those named in the initial writ.
(4) The statement of claim shall specify-
(a) the domicile of the defender as determined in accordance with
sections 41 to 46 of, and article 52 of Schedule 1 to, the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982; and
(b) the ground of jurisdiction of the court.
IT*
In 1988 the whole of rule 2(4) was deleted. So the rules of court now
contain no obligation on pursuers in summary causes to make averments
concerning either the domicile of the defender or the jurisdiction of
the court in general. And, as is to be expected in view of the
approach to averments of jurisdiction in ordinary causes, rules 2(2)
and 2(3) are interpreted as not requiring negative averments to be
made. The wording of rules 2(2) and 2(3), it should be said, follows
as far as possible that of the equivalent ordinary cause rules. But
rule 2(3) should refer to "the summons" rather than to "the initial
writ".
The writer understands that it is in fact the practice for solicitors
commencing summary cause proceedings in many if not all of the
sheriff courts to begin the statement of claim in each summary cause
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summons with averments concerning the jurisdiction of the court. But,
as in ordinary actions, averments concerning the domicile of the
defender are only included if jurisdiction is being based on the
defender's domicile being in the sheriff court district. He has been
told by the sheriff clerk depute responsible for summary causes in
Edinburgh sheriff court that this is the practice in Edinburgh
sheriff court and that the present practice is generally regarded by
those concerned as satisfactory.
Summary causes are defined by s 35 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland)
IT6
Act 1971 as amended, and as a general rule the sum at stake in a
summary cause is not high. Section 35(1)(a) as amended provides that
actions for payment of money not exceeding £1,500 constitute summary
causes. However actions ad factum praestandum where a sum in excess
of £1,500 is not claimed in addition to, or as an alternative to, the
m
delivery or implement are also summary causes. Actions ad factum
praestandum usually include a monetary claim, but an action ad factum
praestandum without such a claim will in principle proceed as a
summary cause even though what the court is being asked to order the
defender to do would be of considerable significance. However,
provision exists for such summary causes to be transferred to the
lao
roll of ordinary causes.
Is there any justification for the summary cause rules' requirements
relating to averments of jurisdiction being any different from the
requirements in the ordinary cause rules? In the writer's opinion
there is not. The courts have the same duty to verify their
jurisdiction, and in certain circumstances to sist the proceedings,
in summary causes as they have in ordinary causes. Even if the sum
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effectively at stake in summary causes was always under £1,500, this
would not justify the court paying less attention to the factors
relating to jurisdiction in summary causes than in ordinary causes.
If it is not told about its jurisdiction 1n the pursuer's original
pleadings, the court is in no better a position in summary causes
than it would be in ordinary causes to consider whether an action
should be sisted or dismissed in terms of a provision of art 20 of
the Conventions or Sched 4 or rule 8 of Sched 8. It cannot be argued
that party litigants would not understand rules of court along the
lines of the Ordinary Cause Rules, rule 3(4) suggested by the writer.
For one thing, such rules would not be more difficult to understand
than the present Summary Cause Rules, rule 2(2) and (3). And many of
the other Summary Cause Rules are far from easy for the layman to
understand. It is therefore submitted that rule 3 of the Summary
Cause Rules ought to contain rules which, as far as possible, follow
the wording of the provisions which the writer considers should form
rule 4 of the Ordinary Cause Rules.
(b) Small claims
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Small claims are, strictly speaking, a type of summary cause, but on
account of the separate set of rules applying to them they are
usually considered on their own. Section 35(2) of the Sheriff Courts
(Scotland) Act 1971 made provision for the introduction of the small
18?
claims procedure, and art 2 of the Small Claims (Scotland) Order 1988
provides that as a general rule actions for payment of money not
exceeding £750, and actions ad factum praestandum with an alternative




The relevant part of the Small Claim Rules (which have been in force
since 30 November 1988) is as follows:
Rule 3
(4) The pursuer shall give a statement of his claim in the summons to
give the defender fair notice of the claim; and the statement shall
include-
(c) a reference to any agreement which the pursuer has reason to
believe may exist giving jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
small claim to another court;
(d) a reference to any proceedings which the pursuer has reason to
believe may be pending before another court involving the same cause
of action and between the same parties as those named in the summons.
There is no rule requiring either the domicile of the defender or the
f3<f-
jurisdiction of the court to be stated. In British Gas v Pariing it
was held by the Sheriff Principal of Glasgow and Strathkelvin that,
at the stage of warrant for service being sought, the small claims
rules
leave it....to the sheriff clerk or sheriff to apply their awareness
of grounds of jurisdiction. Details relevant to this matter may be
gleaned from the statement of claim, and may also be gleaned from
other parts of the summons.... For instance, if, as in this case, the
defender is designed as residing at an address within the
jurisdiction that, in my opinion, suggests, prima facie, that the
defender is domiciled within the jurisdiction.
In view of the lack of reference to questions of jurisdiction in the
Small Claims Rules, this decision is to be welcomed. The Sheriff
Principal referred to the "perplexing provisions of the Civil
186
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982", and would appear to be aware
that in category (i) and category (ii) actions the Act imposes on the
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Scottish courts a duty to look Into matters relating to jurisdiction.
But the writer is unaware of whether the matter of jurisdiction in
small claims is approached in the other sheriffdoms in the same way
as it is approached in Glasgow and Strathkelvln.
It is appreciated that it is hoped that in very many actions
proceeding as small claims pursuers themselves will be able to
present their case to the court 1n writing and then, if necessary,
orally. A large number of complex rules relating to pleading would
not be conducive to litigation carried out by the parties themselves.
But it is submitted that if reference were to be made in the Small
Claims Rules to the various issues relating to jurisdiction, and the
approach to the whole matter were very different from that of those
who drew up the present rule 3(4)(c) and (d), then the sheriff clerk
or the court would reach the correct conclusion with regard to
jurisdiction more often and more quickly than at present.
It would reach the correct conclusion more often if only because the
matters of prorogation agreements and identical actions would be
brought to the attention of all pursuers, and not effectively hidden
away in the rules of court as at present. And it would do so more
quickly because the pursuer would be putting down in writing points
relating to jurisdiction. Of course these statements could not simply
be accepted by the court any more than averments on jurisdiction in
initial writs in ordinary causes may be. But a court has as much of a
duty to verify its jurisdiction in the case of a small claim as it
has in the case of an ordinary action, and what is being suggested
would provide the court in a small claim with a useful starting point
for its enquiry into its jurisdiction.
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What the writer suggests is this. Small claims are begun by the
completion of a form; the completed form serves as the summons.
Appendix 1 to the Small Claims Rules sets out the various forms; the
pursuer will obtain a printed copy of the appropriate form at his
local sheriff court, fill in the blanks and send it to the court
where he wishes to bring the action. On page one he must insert
details of the parties; on page two he must complete the section
which begins: "The details of the claim are". There could be included
in the printed form, perhaps most appropriately between the details
of the parties and those of the claim, questions relating to
jurisdiction. The questions would be simple and perfectly
comprehensible to any layman capable of filling in the form as a
whole, but at the same time the answers to the questions would be of
significant value to the court.
The new part of the form which the writer has in mind is as follows:
If the defender is an individual, you should complete sections A, B
and D below. If it is a business or another type of body, you should
complete sections Aj. C and D^_
Section A
1 Have you ever agreed with the defender, or may someone acting on
your behalf ever have agreed with him / her, that a claim such as
this one should be made in a particular court?
yes / no / don't know
Note: If you answer "yes" or "don't know", you should give details
below.
257
2 Is there, or might there be, taking place in another court another
case between you and the defender concerning the same claim as this
one?
yes / no / don't know
Note: If you answer "yes" or "don't know", you should give details
below.
Section B
3 Is the defender resident in the sheriff court district? (The
sheriff clerk can tell you what towns and villages are in the sheriff
court district.)
yes / no / don't know
4 (If the answer to 3 is "yes".) Has the defender been resident in
the sheriff court district during the last three months?
yes / no / don't know
5 (If the answer to 3 is "no".) Where is the defender resident?
You should insert here the name(s) of the town(s) / country/ies where
he is resident.
6 (If you answered "yes" to 3, and "no" or "don't know" to 4.) What
links does the defender have with the sheriff court district?
Section C
7 Is the defender a British limited company with a place of business
in the sheriff court district? (The sheriff clerk can tell you what
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towns and villages are in the sheriff court district.)
yes / no / don't know
8 (If the answer to 7 is "no" or "don't know".) As far as you are
aware, what type of body is the defender; what links does it have
with the sheriff court district?
Section D
9 Apart from any links which the defender may have, what links does
the claim have with the sheriff court district?
Some comments on this series of questions would seem to be called
for. In Section A, there may not logically be any justification for
allowing the would-be pursuer to answer "don't know". But in practice
it may well be that by including a "don't know" possibility the court
is more likely to ascertain the truth. "Don't know" responses, and
any comments relating to them, can be followed up by the sheriff
clerk or the sheriff. It should be clear from the chapters on the
ordinary cause rules why the matters referred to in the various
questions may be of relevance. The central personal connecting factor
in the new rules of jurisdiction is of course domicile, but in a
series of questions designed for laymen use of the word "domicile"
did not seem advisable. In Section B the writer concentrated on
"residence" instead. And in Section C references to "incorporation",
to "registered offices" and to "central management and control" would
not have been appropriate.
So far as Section D is concerned, it is appreciated that if in any
action jurisdiction can be, and is, based on the defender being
259
domiciled in the sheriff court district, the other links which the
claim may have with the sheriff court district will not affect the
court's jurisdiction. But attempting to explain grounds of
jurisdiction to the would-be pursuer would clearly not be
appropriate, and his providing an answer to the question in Section D
should not be difficult. Another point worth making is that the
official forms only provide for the claim to be made against one
defender. As a result in the above questions no account has been
taken of the possibility of there being more than one defender.
In concluding it should be emphasised that the writer fully
appreciates that the questions do not specifically cover all the
points relating to jurisdiction which may be of relevance. Had the
series of questions done so, it would of course have been not only
significantly longer but also, to use Sheriff Principal Macleod's
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description of the provisions of the Act, "perplexing". The writer
has taken account of the nature of most small claims, and in
particular the fact that they are generally brought against defenders
domiciled in the sheriff court district. He has tried to produce a
set of questions which strike a balance, which provide answers of
significant value to the court without intimidating the would-be
pursuer.
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S Court of Session proceedings: specific comments
Depending on their subject matter, proceedings are begun in the Court
of Session by means of either a summons or a petition. In 1986 those
responsible for revising the Rules of Court appreciated the
desirability of the Rules taking account of the provisions of the
Convention and Act and requiring particular averments to be made in
summonses. As a result Rule of Court 70(1)(c) was introduced on 1
I88
January 1987. It provided:
A condescendence shall include averments stating -
(i) the domicile of the defender (to be determined in accordance with
sections 41 to 46 of, and articles 52 and 53 of Schedule 1 to, that
Act) ;
(1i) the ground of jurisdiction of the court, unless jurisdiction
would arise only if the defender prorogated the jurisdiction of the
court (without contesting jurisdiction);
(iii) where appropriate, whether there is reason to believe that
there exists an agreement prorogating the jurisdiction of a court in
a particular country; and
(iv) whether proceedings involving the same cause of action are in
subsistence between the parties in England, Wales, Northern Ireland
or another Contracting State.
IS1
The rule was then amended with effect from 3 August 1987. Part (i)
was deleted, the remaining parts were renumbered and part (iv) was
amended to read:
(iii) whether proceedings involving the same cause of action are in
subsistence between the parties in a country to which the Convention
in Schedule 1 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
applies, unless the court has exclusive jurisdiction.
There has been no further amendment of the rule. No equivalent rule
applying to proceedings begun by petition was introduced on 1 January
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1987. But on 3 August 1987 rule 191 (aa) was introduced into the
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Rules of Court. It provides:
The narrative of the petition shall include a paragraph stating -
(i) the ground of jurisdiction of the court, unless jurisdiction
would arise only if the respondent prorogated the jurisdiction of the
court (without contesting jurisdiction);
(ii) where appropriate, whether there is reason to believe that there
exists an agreement prorogating the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular country; and
(iii) whether proceedings involving the same cause or matter are in
subsistence between the parties in a country to which the Convention
in Schedule 1 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
applies, unless the court has exclusive jurisdiction.
There has been no amendment of this rule. The first point which
should be made is that there is no less justification for having such
rules in the context of petitions than for having them in the context
of summonses. The three schemes of jurisdiction in the Act - the
Convention, Schedule 4 and Schedule 8 - all apply in principle to all
proceedings within their subject matter scope, regardless of whether
the document instituting the proceedings is called a summonses, a
petition or an initial writ. It is true that the terminology used in
the English language version of the Convention and in Schedules 4 and
8 is associated by the Scottish reader with summonses and initial
writs rather than with petitions. But the Convention is undoubtedly
applicable to all types of proceedings.
Certain legal systems have categories of proceedings similar to that
of proceedings begun by petition in Scotland. In Germany, for
example, there is Freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit. But it is not the
purpose of the Convention to regulate civil jurisdiction only where
the proceedings are in a particular form. That would be inappropriate
if only because the various systems categorise proceedings in
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different ways. Certain proceedings begun by petition in Scotland
would not fall within the Freiwi11ige Gerichtsbarkeit in Germany, and
vice versa. It should be said that art 25, which begins Title III on
Recognition and Enforcement, states that "'judgment' means any
judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State,
whatever the judgment may be called " An interlocutor in which the
prayer of a petition is granted is therefore a judgment for the
purposes of the rules of recognition and enforcement, and Title II is
concerned with jurisdiction in proceedings the judgment at the end of
which could be enforced in terms of Title III.
A further point which can be made here is that many sets of
proceedings begun by petition in the Court of Session fall outside
the subject matter scope of one or more of the schemes of
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jurisdiction in the Act. In the family law area, art 1 of the
Conventions excludes from their subject matter scope i nte r alia
proceedings for custody and proceedings relating to succession.
Custody, it should be said, is not specifically referred to in art 1.
But it is there provided that the Conventions "shall not apply to the
status or legal capacity of natural persons", and the European Court
would, if called upon, hold that custody matters come within this
category. In Scots law, custody is not a question of status, but of
course the European Court would give the expression a "Community"
interpretation. It would be significantly influenced by the way in
which custody is generally classified in the Continental contracting
states.
Article 57 of each Convention, it should be said, provides that
[t]his Convention shall not affect any conventions to which the
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Contracting States are or will be parties and which, in relation to
particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or
enforcement of judgments.
One effect of this is that if the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
m
Aspects of International Child Abduction enables particular
proceedings to be brought in the Court of Session, even if the
subject matter of the proceedings falls within the scope of the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, jurisdiction is determined by the
Hague Convention rather than by the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
The other convention given the force of law by the Child Abduction
and Custody Act 1985, the 1980 Council of Europe Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of
Children and on the Restoration of Custody of Children, is as its
name suggests concerned with recognition and enforcement rather than
with jurisdiction. Again, where recognition or enforcement is sought
in terms of this convention, its provisions, rather than those of the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, will be applicable.
So far as proceedings relating to succession are concerned, "wills
and succession" are specifically mentioned in art 1 of the
Conventions. But it should also be said that trusts fall within the
subject matter scope of the Conventions. After all, art 5(6) contains
a rule of special jurisdiction applicable in the case of certain
actions concerning trusts. There is clearly scope for argument here
as to whether petitions relating to certain trusts, on account of the
trust's close connection with the disposal of an individual's
property on his death, fall within the "succession" category in art
1.
In the commercial area, art 1 excludes from the subject matter scope
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of the Conventions "bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-
up of Insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial
arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings". Many petitions
in the Court of Session concern company matters, but this form of
words does not make it at all clear precisely which fall within the
subject matter scope of the Conventions. Just what are analogous
proceedings? And the Scottish practitioner cannot always be totally
sure if his petition concerns a judicial arrangement or a
composition. The European Court would interpret these words in the
light of what it saw as the policy of the Brussels Convention, and
H?
the general approach of the legal systems of the contracting states.
Most of these legal systems are of course very different from the
Scottish one. The reference to insolvent companies does suggest that
in principle proceedings relating to the winding-up of solvent
companies are within the scope of the Convention, but of course the
proceedings which the petitioner wishes to bring may come within the
category of "judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous
proceedings". If he turns to the Scottish textbook on the Convention
and Act, he is not likely to find an answer to his question.
Schedule 4 to the Act does not apply to any proceedings the subject
matter of which falls outside the scope of the Conventions. And s 17
provides that it
shall not apply to proceedings of any description listed in Schedule
5 or to proceedings in Scotland under any enactment which confers
jurisdiction on a Scottish court in respect of a specific subject-
matter on specific grounds.
Schedule 5 lists inter alia proceedings under the Companies Acts and
proceedings in which, by virtue of art 57 of the Brussels and Lugano
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Conventions, jurisdiction is regulated by a special convention rather
than by the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. Jurisdiction in many
family law actions, and in many commercial proceedings, is regulated
by special statutory provisions within the United Kingdom. Many
petitions in the Court of Session will therefore be excluded from the
scope of Schedule 4 by virtue of Schedule 5 and / or the reference to
proceedings in Scotland in s 17 itself.
So far as Schedule 8 is concerned, its scope is not restricted to
proceedings within the subject matter scope of the Conventions and,
for example, actions concerning wills and succession are as a general
rule subject to Schedule 8. But s 21 provides that Schedule 8 does
not affect
(a) the operation of any enactment which confers jurisdiction on a
Scottish court in respect of a specific subject-matter on specific
grounds;
(b) without prejudice to the foregoing generality, the jurisdiction
of any court in respect of any matter mentioned in Schedule 9.
As a result many proceedings begun by petition in the Court of
Session are not subject to Schedule 8. The thirteenth item listed in
Schedule 9 is this: "Proceedings which are not in substance
proceedings in which a decree against any person is sought." This
item has no counterpart in Schedule 5, and precisely which types of
proceedings fall into this category is unclear. In connection with
this matter Anton states that
the Scottish courts have jurisdiction, especially in petition
procedure, in proceedings where there is not necessarily a
contradictor and where it would be inappropriate, if not
impracticable, to apply the ordinary rules of jurisdiction in
patrimonial matters.
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That does not, of course, answer all of the questions which may be
asked here. But the question of the circumstances in which a
respondent is not a contradictor is outside the scope of this thesis.
So indeed are all the questions which can be raised concerning the
precise meaning of the provisions excluding types of proceedings from
the scope of a scheme of jurisdiction. In a consideration of the most
appropriate rules of court relating to averments of jurisdiction in
petitions, the two useful points which can be made in the light of
the foregoing paragraphs are these: (1) Jurisdiction in certain types
of proceedings which are begun by petition may not be subject to any,
or may only be subject to one or two, of the schemes of jurisdiction
in the 1982 Act; the Conventions alone, or Schedule 8 alone, might,
for example, be applicable. (2) Precisely how certain of the
exclusions set out in art 1 of the Conventions and in Scheds 5 and 9
of the Act should be interpreted is something of a mystery.
It would not be appropriate for the rules of court to set out what
averments should be made in the case of each type of petition which
may be presented to the Court of Session. This would take up an
excessive amount of space and would cover many types of petition
which are rarely presented. Moreover it would in effect require
unsatisfactory predictions on the part of the Court of Session Rules
Council as to how particular provisions of the Brussels Convention
would be interpreted by the European Court, and how various words and
phrases in Scheds 5 and 9 would be interpreted by the Court of
Session. But there should certainly be borne in mind by those
drafting any fresh rules of court the writer's two points and in
addition the possible bewilderment of practitioners in this area in
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general and the possibility of the person drafting a particular
petition wrongly believing either that the Act as a whole is for one
reason or another inapplicable to petitions or that his particular
petition falls outside the scope of the Act as a whole. This matter
will be referred to again below.
So far as the forms of words of the rules set out at the beginning of
this chapter are concerned, various criticisms can be made. On
account of the similarities between the two sets of rules, it is
appropriate for them to be considered together. With regard to the
old part (i) of the rule for actions begun by summons, at least three
points can be made. Firstly, its scope, like that of the equivalent
sheriff court rules, appeared to extend to all civil actions. But as
in the case of the sheriff court rules, there was no other need for
it to apply to category (ii) actions, far less category (iii) ones.
Secondly, the rule referred to "the domicile" and "the defender". But
a defender may have more than one domicile, and an action may have
more than one defender. And thirdly, reference was made to "that
Act". But neither 70(1)(a) nor 70(1)(b) referred to any statute and
it seemed to be left to the practitioner to work out from the context
that the Act in question was the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
1982.
Turning to the new part (i) of the rule for actions begun by summons,
and part (i) of the rule for proceedings begun by petition, it is
submitted that the words "unless jurisdiction would arise only if the
respondent prorogated the jurisdiction of the court (without
contesting jurisdiction)" are inappropriate. If the court would not
otherwise have jurisdiction, but it is hoped that the defender will
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appear and not contest jurisdiction - thereby giving the court
jurisdiction - this should be required to be stated in the
condescendence. Otherwise the court will not know if the pursuer had
considered the question of jurisdiction and, if he had, why he
believed that he could bring the action in the Court of Session. A
further point here is that, in the context of an action where there
has not been a jurisdiction agreement in terms of art 17 of the
Conventions and / or Sched 4, and / or rule 5 of Sched 8, "to
prorogate the jurisdiction" means "to appear and not contest
l%
jurisdiction". As a result the words "(without contesting
jurisdiction)" are superfluous.
So far as the next part of each of the rules is concerned, the
thinking behind the words "where appropriate" is unclear. Perhaps it
was thought that an averment, positive or negative, would be
appropriate in all category (i) and category (ii) actions. Perhaps it
was thought that an averment would be appropriate in the case of
actions concerning commercial contracts. Or perhaps those drafting
the new Rules of Court had other thoughts about when an averment
would be appropriate. Nor are the words "a court in a particular
country" particularly helpful. The reader might wonder whether these
words signify something more than the shorter and simpler expression
"another court" would do.
The final part of the rule does not begin - has never begun - with
the words "where appropriate". The rule would therefore appear to be
applicable irrespective of whether the action, on account of its
subject matter, falls within category (i), category (ii) or category
(iii). But it is quite fatuous for an averment concerning identical
269
I In¬
actions to be required in category (iii) actions. Whether the
provision need be interpreted to this effect is a question along the
same lines as that which arose in connection with the parallel
sheriff court rules; the points made there in relation to the
interpretation of delegated legislation need not be repeated here. In
the original version of the provision applicable in the context of
actions begun by summons, reference was made to "another Contracting
State". But what the states in mind would be contracting to was not
explained.
The present version of this part of the rule is more satisfactory,
specifically mentioning Sched 1 to the Act. But as was explained
above in the context of the sheriff court rules, on account of the
lack of an art 21 in Sched 4, or an equivalent provision in Sched 8,
it is not essential for the court to be made aware of an identical
action elsewhere in the United Kingdom. So if it is only identical
actions in certain courts which the pursuer or petitioner is to be
required to mention, it should be those in courts of other
contracting states. But of course, as in the sheriff court context,
what is simplest is for there to be a short averment that there are
no identical actions in any other court.
The last part of the rule now concludes with the words "unless the
court has exclusive jurisdiction". It is submitted that these words
ought not to be there. As was considered above, there is more than
one reason why two or more courts might have exclusive jurisdiction
in a particular action. It is just as important for the court to be
made aware of any identical action elsewhere in the exclusive
jurisdiction context as it is in, for example, the special
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jurisdiction context.
Three further points concerning the present rules are these. Firstly,
it is curious that the rules appear to require in each summons and
petition an averment about the possibility of identical proceedings
elsewhere. But an averment about the possibility of a prorogation
agreement should only be made "where appropriate". This is curious
because in the context of prorogation agreements, but not in that of
identical actions, the Jenard Report makes it clear that the court
has a duty - in the event of an action being undefended - to
m
investigate matters for itself. In considering appropriate rules of
court for sheriff court ordinary causes, it was only after some
hesitation that the writer considered that pursuers should be
required to make an averment about identical actions as well as about
prorogation agreements.
The next point is that the writer's understanding is that in practice
counsel generally, in drafting summonses which will begin Court of
Session proceedings, include averments, positive or negative,
concerning the possibility of there being an identical action
elsewhere or a relevant prorogation agreement. So not only are the
sheriff court and the Court of Session rules on these matters
different; the practice in the Court of Session is also different
from that in the sheriff courts. It is submitted that there is no
justification for these differences.
Finally, in late 1987 - in other words after the original Rule of
Court 70(1)(c)(i) was deleted - the present writer wrote to the
junior counsel to the Lord President, setting out the arguments for a
pursuer or petitioner in proceedings within the subject matter scope
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of the Conventions to be required to aver the defender's domicile in
the summons or petition. But he failed to convince those responsible
that the provision which had been deleted should be restored. It
appears to be the view of the Rules Council that if, when he is
seeking decree in absence, a pursuer informs the court of what he
considers the defender's domicile to be, the court is being given as
much assistance as it need be given in the carrying out of the duty
imposed on it by the Act.
Having considered the present rules, it is now appropriate to suggest
fresh rules. It is submitted that, so far as proceedings begun by
summons are concerned, the substance of the rules ought to be the
same as in the context of ordinary causes in the sheriff courts.
There is no need to repeat here the arguments for the phraseology
favoured by the writer. Retaining where possible the format and
wording of the present rules, it is suggested that the new rules
should read as follows:
(i) A condescendence shall include averments stating the ground of
jurisdiction of the court.
(ii) (a) In any cause which, by reason of its subject matter, falls
within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, whether or not jurisdiction is determined by the
provisions of either Convention, the condescendence shall, in the
event of one or more defenders being domiciled in Scotland, include
averments to this effect; in the event of one or more defenders being
domiciled in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland but not in
Scotland, the condescendence shall include averments to this effect;
272
in the event of one or more defenders being domiciled in a state to
which one or both of the said Conventions applies, but not in the
United Kingdom, the condescendence shall include averments to this
effect; in the event of one or more defenders not being domiciled in
any of the states to which either of the said Conventions applies,
the condescendence shall include averments to this effect.
(ii) (b) For the purposes of part (a), domicile shall be determined
in accordance with sections 41 to 46 of, and articles 52 and 53 of
Schedule 1 to, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.
(iii) In any cause which, by reason of its subject matter, falls
within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, whether or not jurisdiction is determined by the
provisions of either Convention, the condescendence shall include an
averment about whether or not there may be, as far as the pursuer is
aware, at the date of the bringing of the action or thereafter,
pending before another court a cause involving the same cause of
action and between the same parties.
(iv) In any cause which, by reason of its subject matter, falls
within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, and / or the rules of jurisdiction in Schedule 8 to the
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, whether or not
jurisdiction is determined by the provisions of either Convention and
/ or Schedule 8, the condescendence shall include an averment about
whether or not there may be in existence, as far as the pursuer is
aware, any agreement prorogating jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the cause to another court.
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Turning to the question of appropriate rules in the context of
petition procedure, 1t will be recalled that there is a significant
number of types of petitions which on account of their subject matter
fall within the scope of only one or two of the Act's three schemes
of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be determined in part by statutory
rules specifically concerned with the subject matter of the petition.
Precisely which types of petitions are within the scope of which
schemes of jurisdiction is far from clear, and the average
practitioner may be somewhat confused. He may, in fact, not
appreciate all the difficulties. Of course certain types of actions
begun by summons do not fall within the scope of all three schemes of
jurisdiction, and here too matters are not always clear cut. But the
number of types of petitions outside the scope of at least one
scheme, and the number of problems of classification in the petition
procedure context, are considerably larger.
It can be argued that the practitioner's additional difficulties
should not be taken into account in the preparation of the rules of
court; he should simply be expected to make the appropriate averments
in the light of the correct categorization of the proceedings. But it
is submitted that this approach would be somewhat naive, particularly
as one of the purposes of the rules is to enable the court to have
before it material of use to it in the carrying out of its new duty.
In a significant number of cases the practitioner's categorization
would probably be wrong. Another approach would be for the rules of
court to provide that in the narrative of al1 petitions there should
be statements concerning the possibility of a relevant prorogation
agreement and / or an identical action elsewhere and also the
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dom1 ci 1 e(s) of the respondent(s) in terms of the Act. But as there
are certain types of proceedings clearly outside the scope of the Act
as a whole, this approach would be far from satisfactory.
It is submitted that in the circumstances the most appropriate course
would be for it to be provided that in the narrative of each petition
it should be stated which of the three schemes of jurisdiction in the
Act includes / include in its / their subject matter scope the
subject matter of the proceedings. Such a rule would in principle
require the practitioner drafting the petition to consider the
applicability of each of the schemes of jurisdiction. It would also
have the effect of the court having before it material of significant
value to it in the carrying out of its duty in the event of the
respondent failing to appear. For both these reasons it would
increase the likelihood of the court coming to the correct decision
with regard to jurisdiction. Of course the petitioner's statements
could not simply be accepted by the court, but they would provide it
with a good starting point.
The rule which the writer has in mind would no doubt initially be
intensely disliked by practitioners. But it would not be expecting an
unreasonable amount of work on their part. For it is a trite point
that a practitioner ought always to consider the question of
jurisdiction before bringing proceedings, and one cannot fully
explain the jurisdiction of the court in particular proceedings
without reference to all three of the schemes of jurisdiction in the
Act. Because of the priority of the Conventions, it would clearly be
insufficient to consider the subject matter scope of Schedule 8
alone. And because the Conventions generally leave it to domestic
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rules of jurisdiction to determine the particular courts with
jurisdiction, it would not be sufficient to consider the subject
matter scope of the Conventions alone. Styles would be gathered
together by practitioners, and textbooks and stylebooks would in time
give guidance on this matter. So the rule would not be the bane of
practitioners' careers.
Two further points are these. It should be made clear in the rule
that the paragraph on jurisdiction should make reference to all three
schemes even if the person drafting the petition considers that one
of the schemes is inapplicable for some reason. Consideration should,
for example, be given to the subject matter scope of the Conventions
even if it is considered that because of the purely Scottish nature
of the proceedings the Conventions are irrelevant. It should also be
made clear by the rule that, in addition to the statements on the
three schemes of jurisdiction, the paragraph should contain
statements applying the relevant rules of jurisdiction - in other
words, linking the proceedings with the court.
Finally, so that the court 1s given real assistance in its task, a
statement concerning a particular scheme of jurisdiction should not,
for example, simply state: "The proceedings fall outside the subject
matter scope of Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments
Act 1982." An acceptable form of words would be: "The proceedings are
for regulating the custody of a child and therefore, on account of s
21 of, and para 2 of Schedule 2 to, the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982, fall outside the scope of Schedule 8 to the said
Act." But it is perhaps unnecessary for this point specifically to be
made in the rules of court.
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Following as far as possible the wording of the rules applicable to
proceedings begun by summons, it is suggested that the new rules
applicable in the context of petition proceedings should read as
follows.
(i) The narrative of the petition shall contain a paragraph stating
the ground of jurisdiction of the court; without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing, and whether or not in the circumstances
of the proceedings jurisdiction is determined in whole or in part by
the provisions of (a), (b) or (c), there shall be included in the
said paragraph statements about whether or not the subject matter of
the proceedings falls within the scope of (a) the 1968 Brussels
Convention and 1988 Lugano Convention, (b) Schedule 4 to the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 and (c) Schedule 8 to the said
Act.
(ii) (a) In any proceedings which, by reason of their subject matter,
fall within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, whether or not jurisdiction is determined by the
provisions of either Convention, the narrative of the petition shall,
in the event of one or more respondents being domiciled in Scotland,
include statements to this effect; in the event of one or more
respondents being domiciled in England and Wales or in Northern
Ireland, but not in Scotland, the narrative of the petition shall
include statements to this effect; in the event of one or more
respondents being domiciled in a state to which one or both of the
said Conventions applies, but not in the United Kingdom, the
narrative of the petition shall include statements to this effect; in
the event of one or more respondents not being domiciled in any of
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the states to which either of the said Conventions applies, the
narrative of the petition shall include statements to this effect.
(ii) (b) For the purposes of part (a), domicile shall be determined
in accordance with sections 41 to 46 of, and articles 52 and 53 of
Schedule 1 to, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.
(iii) In any proceedings which, by reason of their subject matter,
fall within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, whether or not jurisdiction is determined by the
provisions of either Convention, it shall be stated in the narrative
of the petition whether or not there may be, as far as the petitioner
is aware, at the date of the presenting of the petition or
thereafter, pending before another court proceedings involving the
same matter and between the same parties.
(iv) In any proceedings which, by reason of their subject matter,
fall within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, and / or the rules of jurisdiction in Schedule 8 to the
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, whether or not
jurisdiction is determined by the provisions of either Convention and
/ or Schedule 8, it shall be stated in the narrative of the petition
whether or not there may be in existence, as far as the petitioner is
aware, any agreement prorogating jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the proceedings to another court.
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10 fhe granting of decrees in absence: introduction
lev
It has already been stated that it is not clear precisely when in any
proceedings the new duties imposed on the courts arise. It may well
be that they arise before decree in absence is sought, and that as a
result the rules of court ought to make provision for a hearing on
the questions of jurisdiction and intimation to the defender /
respondent to take place at the end of a particular period following
on the commencement of the proceedings. But as a result of the
present writer's correspondence with the then junior counsel to the
Lord President, it became clear to him that the junior counsel, and
in fact those advising the Lord President as a whole, did not
consider that it would be appropriate for the rules of court now to
contain provisions for special hearings.
The view of the Lord President's advisers is that, when it is asked
to grant decree in absence, the court can at that stage fulfil what
duties are now incumbent upon it; it is adequate for the rules of
court relating to decree in absence to take account of the courts'
new duties. It is submitted that this is a matter to which those
responsible for the rules of court ought to give further
consideration. It is appreciated that there is a lack of case law,
and that the European Court cannot simply be asked by a national
court - or by the executive in a contracting state - to give a ruling
on a matter such as this. But it is the writer's view that this
matter ought to be pursued by those responsible. For one thing, there
could unofficially be sought the advice of those who are working for
the European Court or the European Commission and are concerned with
the implementation of the Brussels Convention in the contracting
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states. It could also be ascertained what approach to the whole
matter is taken in the other contracting states.
zoi
It is worth noting that the Maxwell Report stated that
it may be necessary for the implementing statute to state expressly
that the court shall have power to declare of its own motion at any
stage in the procedure that it has no jurisdiction.
No such provision was included in the Act, but it is submitted that,
if the courts are not to be required to address themselves to the
questions of jurisdiction and intimation to the defender / respondent
prior to decree in absence being sought, the Court of Session and
sheriff court rules ought nevertheless to state expressly that if the
court becomes aware at any stage that particular proceedings should
be dismissed or sisted on account of the relevant provisions of the
Conventions and Act, 1t should straight away do so.
It seems appropriate at this point to consider the relevant parts of
the rules of court concerning decrees in absence. So far as the
sheriff courts are concerned, on 1 January 1987 additions were made
to the ordinary cause and summary cause rules. Rule 21 of the
Ordinary Cause Rules is concerned with decrees in absence. Para (1)
concerns the relevant procedural steps, and para (2) lists the types
of proceedings in which decree in absence in terms of para (1) cannot
be sought. As a result of the amendment to the rules which came into
effect on 1 January 1987, the pre-existing rules continue to be
applicable in any cause not falling within one of the categories in
para (2)
provided that the sheriff shall not grant decree in the cause unless
it appears ex facie of the initial writ that a ground of jurisdiction
exists under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.
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In the case of a defender domiciled 1n another part of the United
Kingdom or in another Contracting State, the sheriff shall not grant
decree in absence until it has been shown that the defender has been
able to receive the initial writ in sufficient time to arrange for
his defence or that all necessary steps have been taken to that end;
and for the purposes of this sub-paragraph -
(i) the question as to whether a person is domiciled in another
part of the United Kingdom shall be determined in accordance with
sections 41 and 42 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982;
(ii) the question as to whether a person is domiciled in another
Contracting State shall be determined in accordance with Article 52
of Schedule 1 to that Act; and
(iii) the term "Contracting State" has the meaning assigned to it by
section 1 of that Act.
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A new rule, rule 21A, was added. It reads:
Where in any civil proceedings (including proceedings for divorce,
separation and aliment and actions for custody of children), the
initial writ has been served in a country to which the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters dated 15 November 1965
applies, decree shall not be granted until it is established to the
satisfaction of the sheriff that the requirements of Article 15 of
that Convention have been complied with.
In the Summary Cause Rules there are two sets of provisions
concerning decrees in absence. The provisions concerning decree in
absence in proceedings for which no special provision is made are to
be found in rule 18; those concerning decree in absence in actions
Xo
for payment of money are to be found in rule 55. Since 1 January 1987
rule 18 has contained the proviso that the sheriff shall not grant
decree in the cause unless it appears ex facie of the summons that a
ground of jurisdiction exists under the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982. The proviso is followed by provisions in rules
18(8) and 18A which are in substance identical to the provisions of
the Ordinary Cause Rules set out out above concerning the giving of




What was added to rule 55 differs from what was added to rule 18 in
that it does not include the paragraph now to be found in rule 18
(and as rule 21A of the Ordinary Cause Rules) concerning the 1965
Hague Convention. But at the beginning of Part II of the Summary
Cause Rules, which contains the special rules relating to particular
types of proceedings, rule 49 states:
The provisions of Part I of these rules shall apply to the summary
causes for which special rules are provided in this Part, except in
so far as these provisions are inconsistent with the special rules.
So regard should be had to art 15 of the 1965 Hague Convention in
summary cause actions for payment of money as well as in other types
of summary causes.
None of these provisions appears to have been amended subsequent to
its coming into force.
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In the Small Claims Rules, rule 10(1) provides that if the defender
does not lodge a form of response and the pursuer takes certain
steps, decree may be granted. It is provided by para (4) that
[t]he sheriff shall not grant decree under paragraph (1) of this rule
unless it is clear from the terms of the summons that a ground of
jurisdiction exists.
The rules themselves contain no provision relating to the need for
the defender to have been given sufficient notice of the proceedings,
or to the 1965 Hague Convention. But rule 2(2) of the Small Claims
Rules provides:
The provisions of the Summary Cause Rules specified in Appendix 3 to
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these rules shall apply to a small claim insofar as not inconsistent
with these rules.
Rules 18(8) and 18A of the Summary Cause Rules are listed in Appendix
3, so they are effectively incorporated into the Small Claims Rules.
As a result the same approach to decrees in absence in the context of
the Brussels Convention is taken in all three types of proceedings in
the sheriff court: ordinary causes, summary causes and small claims.
So far as the Court of Session is concerned, there are of course
separate sets of rules for proceedings begun by summons and for
proceedings begun by petition. With regard to the first set of rules,
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on 1 January 1987 there was introduced into rule of court 89 a
provision that
[t]he motion enrolled for decree in absence shall state the ground of
jurisdiction of the court.
On 3 August 1987 there were added to these words:
and the domicile of the defender (as determined by sections 41 to 46
to [sicl the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982) in so far as
it is known to the pursuer.
Further amendment took place on 5 January 1988, and the provision now
reads:
The motion enrolled for decree in absence shall state the ground of
jurisdiction of the court and, in a cause to which the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 applies, the domicile of the
defender (as determined by the provisions of that Act) in so far as
it is known to the pursuer.
No parallel petition procedure rule was introduced on 1 January 1987,
i\o
but on 3 August 1987 there was inserted into rule of court 197 the
following provision:
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A motion to grant the prayer of the petition shall state the ground
of jurisdiction of the court and the domicile of the respondent (as
determined by sections 41 to 46 of the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982) in so far as it is known to the petitioner.
Ill
Amendment took place on 5 January 1988; the provision now reads:
A motion to grant the prayer of the petition shall state the ground
of jurisdiction of the court and, in a cause to which the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 applies, the domicile of the
respondent (as determined by the provisions of that Act) in so far as
it is known to the petitioner.
It is emphatically submitted that, particularly if no provision is to
be made in the rules for the matters in question to be considered at
an earlier stage, it is essential for the rules of court concerning
the granting of decree in absence to include provisions relating to
the verifying of the jurisdiction of the court and the ascertaining
of the defender's / respondent's opportunity to enter the process. As
has been seen in the context of the rules of court relating to
averments of jurisdiction, the Act imposes certain duties on the
court. On account of the superiority of statutes to rules of court
found in statutory instruments, these duties undoubtedly exist
whether or not they are referred to in the rules of court. But it is
clearly in the interests of all concerned for them to feature in
appropriate terms in the rules of court. And if the rules make no
provision for hearings at an early stage in proceedings specifically
to cover the jurisdiction of the court and the defender's /
respondent's opportunity to enter the process, the duties should
feature in the rules relating to the granting of decree in absence.
Of course if reference is to be made to the duties in the rules of
court, it is imperative for the rules fully and accurately to cover
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the whole of the court's duty. There should therefore now be
considered the question of what changes of substance and of wording
should be made to the present rules. There are clearly differences
between the present sheriff court rules on the one hand and the
present Court of Session rules on the other. As the duties imposed on
sheriff courts are the same as those imposed on the Court of Session,
the desirabi1ity of having different sets of rules is highly
doubtful. The nature of the courts' new duties was considered above
in the context of averments of jurisdiction in sheriff court ordinary
actions; all that is necessary here is for there to be drafted, and
commented on, the rules which will most efficiently enable these
duties to be fulfilled.
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11 Decrees 1n absence in the sheriff courts
It seems appropriate to begin this section by questioning the value
of incorporating into the Small Claims Rules the Ordinary Cause and
Summary Cause Rules listed respectively in Appendices 2 and 3 of the
Small Claims Rules. While the validity of the incorporation cannot be
doubted, there is a danger that these provisions will be overlooked.
They might moreover be regarded as in some way less important than
the rules to be found in the Small Claims Rules themselves. Where the
rules are designed to facilitate compliance with obligations
contained in an international convention, the result could be
particularly unfortunate.
As the approach taken in the Ordinary Cause Rules, the Summary Cause
Rules and the Small Claims Rules is the same, and as the writer sees
no justification for there being taken different approaches, it is
necessary only to consider the Ordinary Cause Rules. It will be clear
that the writer is in favour of a rule to the effect that decree in
absence should not be granted in any action until the verification of
jurisdiction required by art 20 of the Conventions (and quite
possibly also by art 20 of Sched 4 and rule 8 of Sched 8) has taken
place. He has two principal criticisms of the present provisions of
the Ordinary Cause Rules set out in Chapter 10. Firstly, the
provisions appear to extend to all types of civil proceedings other
than those in one of the categories in rule 21(2). Various types of
subject matter outside the subject matter scope of the Act as a whole
l\Z
are not listed in rule 21(2). To require verification of jurisdiction
in general in actions with one of these types of subject matter is
unnecessary; in the case of actions outside the subject matter scope
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of the Act there 1s no good reason for there to be changed the
traditional approach of leaving questions of jurisdiction to be
raised by the defender. And to require verification of jurisdiction
in terms of the Act in such actions is obviously inappropriate.
The second criticism concerns the words "it appears ex facie of the
initial writ". The writer of course very much doubts that simply by
reading the initial writ the sheriff can fulfil the duty to verify
jurisdiction now imposed on him. The provision should, it is
submitted, rather contain words such as "he is satisfied". It has
been suggested that the relevant rules are in fact ultra vires.
Whether or not this is the case, particularly in the light of the
"negative" way in which the rules are expressed, would appear to be a
moot point. But what is undoubted is that if there is a conflict
between the statutory provisions and the rules, the statutory
provisions prevail. A discussion of the arguments for and against the
rules being held to be ultra vi res would seem to be of very limited
value; discussing possible amendments to the rules is much more
worthwhile.
But it should perhaps be mentioned that if the rules are ultra vires,
they are ultra vires of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Acts
1982 and 1991, not of the European Communities Act 1972. For the 1972
Act is concerned with the "rights, powers, liabilities, obligations
and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the
3113
Treaties", and what is meant in the Act by "Treaties" is, unless the
context otherwise requires, one of the agreements listed or referred
to in the Act or in an amending Act. The Brussels and Lugano
Conventions are not listed in the 1972 Act or in any amending Act.
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Nor are they referred to. There is a reference to "a treaty ancillary
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to any of the Treaties", but this concerns what are loosely speaking
public law agreements. Had the Brussels Convention been such a
treaty, the 1982 Act would have been unnecessary. Nor is this a case
where the context requires otherwise; those responsible for the 1982
Act clearly did not think so.
An argument can be advanced for the rules of court being more
specific than what the writer suggested above. It might be, for
example that two affidavits on the question of jurisdiction should be
required to be lodged prior to decree in absence being sought. There
is now in the English High Court a rule to the effect that one
affidavit should be lodged. Order 13, rule 7B states:
(1) Where a writ has been served....on a defendant domiciled in
Scotland or Northern Ireland or in any other Convention territory the
plaintiff shall not be entitled to enter judgment under this Order
except with the leave of the Court.
(2) An application for leave to enter judgment may be made ex parte
and shall be supported by an affidavit stating that in the deponent's
belief-
(a) each claim made by the writ is one which by virtue of the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 the Court has power to hear and
determine
(b) no other court has exclusive jurisdiction within the meaning of
Schedule 1 or under Schedule 4 to the Act to hear and determine such
claim
Of course one problem with this rule is that it does not take account
of the situation in which the plaintiff wrongly believes that the
defendant is not domiciled in another part of the contracting states.
A rule requiring an affidavit in all applications for leave to enter
judgment would appear to the present writer to be more satisfactory.
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It is conceded that there would be much merit in having rules of
court specifically requiring the lodging of two suitable affidavits
along with any minute for decree. But on balance it is believed that
it is more appropriate rather to have in each of the various sets of
rules of court a simple - but suitably worded - statement to the
effect that, before granting decree in absence, the court must be
satisfied with regard to both its jurisdiction and the giving of the
necessary notice to the defender / respondent. For one thing, it is
not clear precisely what the European Court would consider to be
HQ
adequate verification even in the common types of situations.
Moreover, because the factual backgrounds of actions vary enormously,
it would not be appropriate for those responsible for the rules to
think in terms of two affidavits being lodged in each action. In some
actions the sheriff might feel that he could only do his duty if
three affidavits were lodged, or if complementary submissions were
made by the pursuer's solicitor, or if a parole proof on jurisdiction
took place.
It is submitted that it would be more appropriate for guidance on
what should be considered satisfactory to be included in Practice
Notes. These Notes could be drafted in the light of consultations on
the part of those responsible for drafting the rules with both
officials of the European Commission and the European Court and also
their opposite numbers in other contracting states. It is of course
the writer's view that the various "ingredients" in jurisdiction,
including the domicile of the defender, the lack of an identical
action elsewhere and the lack of a prorogation agreement in favour of
another court, should be referred to in the rules of court concerning
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averments of jurisdiction. There would seem to be no need for these
ingredients to be specifically mentioned again in the rules of court
or Practice Notes concerning decrees in absence. The need for the
points referred to at the stage of averring jurisdiction to be
covered at the stage of seeking decree in absence should be clear.
Finally here, it is worth mentioning that the present rules do not
specifically require a pursuer to make an averment in the initial
writ relating to the defender's domicile. But as has been seen,
whether or not a ground of jurisdiction exists in an action may
depend on the domicile of the defender. The present writer finds it
difficult to understand how, if the domicile of the defender is not
referred to in the initial writ, it can be said that "it appears ex
facie of the initial writ that a ground of jurisdiction exists". And
it is not at all clear how, if he is not told about the domicile of
the defender, the sheriff can fulfil the duty set out in the second
part of the ordinary cause rule quoted above not to grant decree
against a defender domiciled elsewhere in the contracting states
until it has been shown that the defender has been given an
opportunity to prepare a defence. And prorogation agreements and
identical actions are relevant to jurisdiction or the exercise of
jurisdiction; if nothing about these matters is included in an
initial writ, how can it be said that it appears ex facie of the writ
that jurisdiction exists?
Using as far as possible the forms of words used in drafting the
suggested rules of court concerning averments of jurisdiction, it is
therefore suggested that the last part of Ordinary Cause Rules, rule
21(1)(a) be amended to read:
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provided that in any cause which, by reason of its subject matter,
falls within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988
Lugano Convention, and/or Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982, the sheriff shall not grant decree in the cause
unless he is satisfied that a ground of jurisdiction exists.
The question may be asked at this point: What would be the
consequences of the court failing to carry out the duty imposed on it
by art 20 para one of the Conventions, and granting decree in absence
in an action in which it had no jurisdiction? This situation might
arise, for example, in the case of an action in which jurisdiction is
purportedly based on one of the grounds of exorbitant jurisdiction in
Sched 8, and the defender is domiciled in another contracting state
but not in the United Kingdom. It is commonly believed that in such a
situation the pursuer would be unable to have the decree enforced in
another contracting state. But this is in fact generally considered
by the authorities not to be the case - or at any rate not to be
1ikely to be the case.
The Conventions are of course designed to enable persons who have
obtained decrees within the contracting states to have these decrees
enforced in other contracting states in as straightforward a manner
as possible. The number of circumstances in which a court in one
contracting state can refuse to enforce a decree granted in another
contracting state must clearly be kept to a minimum. In particular,
as a general rule the court of the state where enforcement is sought
should not be able to review the jurisdiction of the court which
granted the decree; the contracting states have agreed on common
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rules of jurisdiction and so any consideration of jurisdiction in a
particular case would generally be Inappropriate.
Articles 27, 28 and 29 of the Conventions are concerned with grounds
on which a judgment granted in one contracting state can and cannot
be refused recognition and enforcement in another. Article 34 para
two states that an application for enforcement "may be refused only
for one of the reasons specified in Articles 27 and 28". The one
ground of refusal of recognition and enforcement which might be
thought to be relevant in the present context is that in part (1) of
art 27: "A judgment shall not be recognised if such recognition is
contrary to public policy in the state in which recognition is
sought". But art 28 para three provides that, subject to certain
provisions which are of no relevance here,
the jurisdiction of the court of the State in which the judgment was
given may not be reviewed; the test of public policy referred to in
Article 27(1) may not be applied to the rules relating to
jurisdiction.
Is it the case that, at any rate in the state in which enforcement is
sought, there is no remedy for a defender against whom a decree was
granted in absence on account of the failure of the court to fulfil
its duty and verify its jurisdiction? If so, is there a lacuna in the
Conventions? As we shall see later, there is a remedy for the
defender who was not given an adequate opportunity to defend the
action. But that is a somewhat different matter; we are concerned
here with the situation where the defender knows that the court has
no jurisdiction but, on account of art 20 para one of the
Conventions, feels that there is no need for him to enter an
appearance and point this out.
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If there is no remedy for a defender in this situation, this can be
seen as a weakness in the Conventions; it can be said that the
Conventions are not doing enough to protect persons domiciled within
the contracting states being sued in contracting states in which they
are not domiciled. But of course if the defender could bring up the
whole issue of jurisdiction when enforcement is sought, it would be
zia
said that the free movement of judgments was being impeded. Is there
a satisfactory solution to this dilemma? The question is a difficult
one, but it is submitted that there is an arguable case for the
refusal of recognition and enforcement of a decree granted without
there having been compliance with art 20 para one. In other words, a
further ground of refusal should be added explicitly or implicitly to
the list in art 27.
411
But the view expressed in the Maxwell Report is the one most commonly
expressed by writers on the Conventions:
A Scottish court is bound to recognise and enforce a judgment from
another Contracting State even if that judgment was pronounced in
ignorance or defiance of a prorogation agreement valid under Article
17 prorogating the jurisdiction of a Scottish court.
lio
Anton states that "[t]his result.... is a strange one, and the issue
merits examination by the European Court". "[T]oo much", he believes,
"should not be read into [art 34 para two]". The result postulated by
the Maxwell Committee would indeed be unfortunate, but just how can
it be avoided? How can a court in one contracting state legitimately
consider the jurisdiction of the court in another contracting state
which granted the decree enforcement of which is being sought? It is
appreciated that the European Court favours the provisions of the
Convention being given a purposive interpretation, but how could such
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an interpretation of art 34 para two or any other provision be of
assistance? Two arguments will very tentatively be put forward here.
The first argument is that a refusal of recognition and enforcement
in the circumstances envisaged could be based on art 27(1);
notwithstanding the terms of art 28 para three, recognition and
enforcement could be held to be contrary to public policy in the
state in which they were sought. The reasoning is as follows. In the
state in which enforcement is sought, the enforcing of a foreign
decree granted as a result of a breach of an obligation contained in
an international convention would be contrary to public policy. And
nothing in art 28 para three prevents the application of this rule of
public policy.
With regard to the first part of art 28 para three, it is not the
case that it is the jurisdiction of the court which is being
reviewed; what is being reviwed is rather the fulfilling or non-
fulfilling by that court of its duty to verify its jurisdiction. And,
with regard to the second part of the paragraph, what is meant by
"may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction" is in fact
"may not be used to justify refusal of recognition and enforcement of
a decree granted in an action against a defender domiciled outside
the contracting states in which jurisdiction was based on a local
ground of exorbitant jurisdiction".
The policy of Title III of the Conventions is to have free movement
of all decrees granted within the contracting states - including
decrees granted against individuals domiciled outside the contracting
zi\
states who were the "victims" of exorbitant rules of jurisdiction -
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and art 28 para three 1s simply designed to facilitate this policy.
"[R]ules relating to jurisdiction" just means "rules of
jurisdiction". This is clear from the French language text. The
expression used there in art 28 para three is "regies relatives & la
competence"; in art 3 the expression "dispositions relatives £ la
competence" simply means "rules of jurisdiction", and there is no
reason to suppose that "regies relatives h la competence" means
anything different.
The above argument is only of application in the context of a state
in which the enforcing of a foreign decree granted as a result of a
breach of an obligation contained in an international convention
would be contrary to public policy. But the availability of the
following argument, the present writer's second argument, is not
limited in this way. It is that art 34 para two, which of course
provides that an "application [for enforcement] may be refused only
for one of the reasons specified in Articles 27 and 28" should not be
interpreted literally. It is clear from a reading of Title III of the
Conventions that reasons for refusing enforcement also exist outside
arts 27 and 28.
On account of art 31 para one, for example, enforcement should be
refused if it would not be possible in the state in which the decree
was granted. On account of the same provision, enforcement should be
refused if the person seeking it is not an "interested party". If
there is no compliance with the formalities required by arts 32 and
33, and 46 - 49, presumably enforcement can be refused. Other
situations in which enforcement may be refused are referred to in
in
textbooks on the Conventions. In this context, it is submitted, it
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would not be altogether surprising if the European Court were to hold
that a manifest failure on the part of the court which granted the
decree to fulfil the obligation placed on it by art 20 para one of
the Convention constituted grounds for refusing to enforce the
decree. If the European Court considered that such a decision would
be in the interests of justice, it would not regard itself as having
its hands tied by the wording of the Convention.
One useful approach here might be to hold that in art 34 para two
"application" meant "valid application", and if there had been a
failure to observe a mandatory rule of the Convention - which might
be the rule in art 20 para one concerning procedure prior to decree
being granted or a rule in Title III relating to procedure subsequent
to decree being granted - the application was not valid. In
concluding this section it should be said that there is indeed the
possibility of the approach of the Scottish courts to the
implementation of art 20 para one being the subject of criticism by
either the European Court or a foreign national court. The matter
might also be raised with the British government by the European
Commission or by a government of another contracting state. It is
submitted that it is not a matter in which there is room for
complacency.
Turning now to Ordinary Cause Rules, rules 21(1)(b) and 21A, there is
indeed a need for rules concerning the court's duty to ensure that
the defender has been given adequate notice of the proceedings. Of
course it may well be that, on account of the words "shall stay the
proceedings", the matter ought to be considered prior to decree in
absence being sought. But if it is not regarded as necessary for it
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to be considered at an earlier stage, it should certainly be
considered at the stage of decree in absence being sought. However as
para three of art 20 of the Conventions loosely speaking takes
priority over para two, it is submitted that the order of the present
rules 21(1)(b) and 21A should be reversed.
Article 15 of the 1965 Hague Convention is in a sense incorporated
into the Brussels and Lugano Conventions; but it is not incorporated
into Schedules 4 and 8. So should it only be considered to be of
potential relevance in actions within the subject matter scope of the
Conventions? The answer, it is submitted, should be No. While
consideration of the Hague Convention is outside the scope of this
thesis, it is noted in passing that rule 21A specifically refers to
certain types of proceedings clearly outside the scope of the Act as
a whole. And on general principles the provisions of the Hague
Convention should be applied in any action within their scope -
whether or not it is within the subject matter scope of the Brussels
2Ztf
and Lugano Conventions.
The words "a country to which the Hague Convention....appl ies" might
lead to a little puzzlement; there seems no need to deviate here from
para three of art 20. What the present writer would suggest is for
ordinary cause rule 21A to be given a new heading: "Verification of
defender's opportunity to enter an appearance". The following
modified form of the present rule 21A would appear as rule 21A(1):
In any proceedings in which the initial writ has been transmitted
abroad in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention of
15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, decree in absence shall not
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be granted until it is established to the satisfaction of the sheriff
that the requirements of Article 15 of that Convention have been
complied with.
It might be appropriate for a Practice Note to provide guidance on
the circumstances in which a sheriff may consider that there has been
compliance with the provisions of art 15 of the Hague Convention.
It is now suggested that the present rule 21(1)(b) be deleted (with
rule 21(1)(a) being renumbered simply 21(1)) and that a significantly
modified form appear as rule 21A(2). It should be made clear in the
rule that it is only applicable if the action in question is a
category (i) action. Schedule 8 contains no equivalent of art 20 para
two of the Conventions. So 1n actions outside the subject matter
scope of the Conventions in which use has not been made of the 1965
Hague Convention, the court is not required, at the stage of granting
decree in absence, to consider whether or not the defender had an
opportunity to prepare his defence. So long as service has taken
place and the induciae have expired, and (assuming rule 8 of Sched 8
to be interpreted in the same way as art 20 para one of the
Conventions) it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction, it can grant
decree in absence.
Article 20 para two of the Conventions only applies where use has not
been made of the 1965 Hague Convention. But there is apparently no
similar restriction on the scope of art 20 para two of Sched 4; Sched
4 contains no equivalent of art 20 para three of the Conventions. As
was noted earlier, the general view is that the words "Where a
defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued in a court of
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another Contracting State" should be considered as coming at the
beginning of para two of art 20 in the Conventions; similarly, "Where
a defendant domiciled in one part of the United Kingdom is sued in a
court of another part of the United Kingdom" should be considered as
coming at the beginning of para two of art 20 in Sched 4.
Because the schemes of jurisdiction are - at any rate as a general
rule - not concerned with matters internal to a contracting state /
United Kingdom law district, para two is considered as being
inapplicable if the defender is domiciled in the state / law district
of the forum as well as in another contracting state / law district.
As a result it would not be possible for art 20 para two of the
Conventions and art 20 para two of Sched 4 both to be applicable in
the case of any one defender. It should also be said that although
art 20 para two of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and art 15 of
the Hague Convention will never both be applicable in the case of any
one defender, the same cannot be said about art 20 para two of Sched
4 and art 15 of the Hague Convention. For if the defender is
domiciled in England and Wales but service takes place abroad in
accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention, it would
appear to be the case that there should be compliance with both art
ZK
20 para two of Sched 4 and art 15 of the Hague Convention. A further
point to note here is that the subject matter scope of Sched 4 is
smaller than that of the Conventions.
One result of all this appears to the present writer to be that there
would be much merit in art 20 para two of the Conventions and art 20
para two of Sched 4 being the subject of separate provisions in the
rules of court. It is suggested that the new rule 21A(2) read as
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folTows:
(i) In any proceedings (a) which, by reason of their subject matter,
fall within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, (b) in which a defender is domiciled in another
contracting state but not in the United Kingdom and (c) in which the
initial writ has not been transmitted abroad to that defender in
accordance with the Convention referred to in rule 21A(1), the
sheriff shall not grant decree in absence against that defender until
it has been shown that he has been able to receive the initial writ
in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, or that
all necessary steps have been taken to this end.
(ii) In any proceedings (a) which, by reason of their subject matter,
fall within the scope of Schedule 4 to the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982 and (b) in which a defender is domiciled in
England and Wales or in Northern Ireland but not in Scotland or in
another contracting state, the sheriff shall not grant decree in
absence against that defender until it has been shown that he has
been able to receive the initial writ in sufficient time to enable
him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been
taken to this end.
(iii) In this rule "domiciled" shall be construed as "domiciled in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982", and "contracting state" has the meaning assigned
to it by s 1 of that Act.
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12. Decrees in absence in the Court of Session
The first point which should perhaps be made in this chapter is that
there was no good reason for there to be included on 1 January 1987
provisions applicable in the context of proceedings begun by summons
but not in the context of proceedings begun by petition. As stated
above, the Conventions and Sched 4 apply in principle irrespective of
li¬
the name and nature of the document instituting the proceedings.
Prior to the most recent amendment of the rule applicable to
proceedings begun by summons, the writer pointed out to the junior
counsel to the Lord President that the domicile of a natural person
in another contracting state is, in terms of art 52 para two of the
Conventions, a matter for the law of that state alone. (An exception
to this rule has of course existed in the case of persons with a
21%
domicile of dependence.) He suggested that a reference to art 52 be
included in the rule. But as the Conventions are incorporated into
Scots law by the Act, and art 52 is to be found in Sched 1 to the
Act, the 5 January 1988 amendment would appear to clear up this
point.
It might be said that whereas the sheriff court rules relating to the
verification of the jurisdiction of the court place a duty on
sheriffs, the Court of Session rules appear to place a duty on
practitioners. It is provided in effect that a sheriff must ask
himself whether it appears ex facie of the initial writ before him
that a ground of jurisdiction exists. But on the other hand it is
provided that in Court of Session proceedings the person enrolling
the motion for decree in absence must ascertain the ground of
jurisdiction of the court. The thinking would appear to be that the
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Court of Session judges are sufficiently well aware of their duty in
terms of art 20 para one of the Conventions and Sched 4 and also of
rule 8 of Sched 8. If the practitioner concerned states the ground of
jurisdiction of the court and the domicile of the defender /
respondent in the motion for decree / to grant the prayer of the
petition, the judge can then without any difficulty fulfil his duty.
But this is of course a matter which is seriously doubted by the
present writer.
For one thing, the practitioner will already have set out the
jurisdiction of the court in the summons or the petition. Why should
he be required to do so again? Are his words more credible if they
appear twice? The practitioner is unlikely to expand on his initial
averments in his motion for decree / to grant the prayer of the
petition. Moreover it cannot be said that he is supplying the court
with the most up to date information. For in answering the question
of whether there is jurisdiction over particular proceedings, the
crucial point in time is when the proceedings were begun, not when it
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is sought to have them concluded.
If the writer were asked simply to improve the present rule, he would
first of all suggest that its subject matter scope be restricted in
two respects. The first part of the rule, relating to the ground of
jurisdiction of the court, should only apply to category (i) and
category (ii) proceedings; the second part, relating to the domicile
of the defender / respondent, should only apply to category (1)
proceedings. For, as considered above, in category (iii) actions it
is left to the defender / respondent to raise the matter of a lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court seised. And in actions outside
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the subject matter scope of the Conventions, but inside that of Sched
8, the domicile of the defender will only be of relevance if it is
loosely speaking central to the jurisdiction of the court, in which
case it is required to be mentioned by the first part of the rule.
The writer would then wish to make the point that proceedings may
have more than one defender / respondent, and each defender /
respondent may have more than one domicile. The drafters of the
present rules did not take account of these possibilities. What would
be necessary would be a rule similar to that suggested in the context
of averments of jurisdiction - where each defender / respondent had
to be considered separately, and only the domicile "closest" to the
forum needed to be referred to. While the importance of the domicile
of the defender is being recognised in the Court of Session rules in
a way which it is not in the sheriff court rules, the wording of the
reference to that domicile is unsatisfactory.
But although various improvements in the drafting of the present
rules could be made, the writer considers that the rules should be
replaced by rules along the same lines as those to be found in the
sheriff court rules, and with wording corresponding to that of the
revised shheriff court rules which he is suggesting. It should be
made clear in the rules that there is a duty incumbent on the court,
and the rules should contain no requirement for those acting for a
pursuer / petitioner to repeat in their motion what they have already
set out in the summons / petition. It is suggested that the new rules
applicable in the context of proceedings begun by summons and in that
of proceedings begun by petition be as follows:
In any cause which, by reason of its subject matter, falls within the
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scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano Convention, and
/ or Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, the
Court shall not grant decree in absence unless it is satisfied that a
ground of jurisdiction exists.
In any proceedings which, by reason of their subject matter, fall
within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, and / or Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982, the Court shall not grant the prayer of the
petition unless it is satisfied that a ground of jurisdiction exists.
Unlike the sheriff court rules, the Court of Session rules contain no
provisions based on paras two and three of art 20 of the Conventions
and para two of art 20 of Sched 4. Of course the court is bound by
these provisions whether or not they are referred to in the rules of
court, but this does not seem to justify the present lack of any
reference to them. It does not seem to be appropriate for procedural
matters to be regulated purely by provisions of international
agreements. It might also be said that the issues are effectively
covered elsewhere in the rules of court, but it is submitted that
this is just not the case.
Reference might be made to the rules of court concerning the induciae
in a summons. It is now provided by rule of court 72 that in the case
of citation in another part of Europe, the induciae are to be twenty-
one days after the date of execution of service; in the case of
citation outside Europe, the period will as a general rule be forty-
ZZO
two days. Anton and Beaumont comment that rule 72 "reflects the
requirements of Art. 20(2) of the 1968 Convention and of Art. 15 of
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the 1965 Hague Convention...." But, it is submitted, in considering
whether the defender has had an adequate opportunity to enter an
appearance, the court should consider the whole circumstances of the
case; the length of the induciae is just one factor.
Reference might also be made to rules of court 89 (concerning
proceedings begun by summons) and 197 (concerning proceedings begun
by petition). In rule of court 89 provisions concern the superseding
of the extract of a decree, and the intimating of the interlocutor
granting the decree, in the case of a defender outside the United
Kingdom. Rule 89(d) provides:
Where a copy of the summons has been served on a defender outside the
United Kingdom under Rule 74B and decree in absence has been
pronounced against that defender because he has not entered
appearance, the court may, on the motion of that defender, recall the
decree and allow defences to be lodged if -
(i) the defender, without any fault on his part, did not have
knowledge of the summons in sufficient time to defend;
(ii) the defender has disclosed a prima facie defence to the action
on the merits;
(iii) the motion is made within a reasonable time after the defender
had knowledge of the decree; and
(iv) the motion is not made after the expiry of one year from the
date of the decree.
Part (i) is clearly of relevance in the present context. But it is
submitted that this rule represents a totally unsatisfactory response
to art 20 paras two and three. For one thing, rule 89(j) states:
The recall of any decree under this Rule shall be without prejudice
to the validity of anything already done or transacted, or of any
contract made or obligation incurred, under and in virtue of the
decree recalled, or of any appointment made or power granted therein
or thereby.
But, more fundamentally, what the provisions of the Conventions state
is that where a defender has not been given adequate opportunity to
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defend the action against him, it should not be allowed to proceed to
decree. If it had simply meant that such a defender could have a
decree against him recalled, it would have said so.
Article 27(2) of the Conventions is of relevance here. It provides
that
[a] judgment shall not be recognised where it was given in default of
appearance, if the defendant was not duly served with the document
which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in
sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence.
Article 34 para two provides that an application for enforcement of a
judgment "may be refused for one of the reasons specified in Articles
27 and 28". So, if a pursuer were to obtain in the Court of Session a
decree in absence against a defender domiciled 1n another contracting
state, and the court had taken no steps to comply with art 20 of the
Conventions and ascertain that the defender had had an adequate
opportunity to defend the action, in the event of the pursuer trying
to enforce the decree in another contracting state he might find
himself involved in proceedings which focused on art 27 para two.
This would of course be an unsatisfactory state of affairs for all
concerned. It would not be a happy day for the Court of Session if it
were found, either by a national court of another contracting state
or by the European Court, to have failed to set up machinery for the
fulfilling of obligations imposed on it by the Brussels Convention.
It is worth mentioning that the wording of art 27(2) follows that of
art 20 para two; "in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his
defence" forms part of both provisions. So it would seem that if the
court in which proceedings are brought correctly applies art 20 para
two, recognition and enforcement cannot be refused on the ground set
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out in art 27(2). But what if, on account of art 20 para three, it is
art 15 of the 1965 Hague Convention rather than art 20 para two of
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions which is applicable? Might it be
the case that the requirements of art 15 were correctly held by the
first court to be satisfied, but the second court, the court in which
recognition is sought, holds that on account of art 27(2) recognition
should not take place?
The first point which should be made here is that, in applying art
27(2), the second court may, irrespective of any finding of relevance
made by the first court, hold that the defender was not given
adequate notice of the proceedings. The second court is not bound by
a finding of the first court that there has been compliance with art
20 para two of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions or with art 15 of
the Hague Convention. This was made clear by the European Court in
Klomps v Michel and then in Pendy Plastic v Pluspunkt. As the precise
meaning of the words "in sufficient time" in art 20 para two and in
art 15 is far from clear, disagreements between the two courts
involved in a particular action are far from inconceivable.
On account of the parallel wording of the two provisions, a court in
which recognition is sought could not hold (a) that there had been no
need for the proceedings to be stayed by the first court in terms of
art 20 para two but (b) that on account of art 27(2) the judgment
should not be recognised. However, might there be circumstances in
which art 20 para three and art 15, rather than art 20 para two, were
applicable, where it would be appropriate for the court in which
recognition is sought to hold (a) that there had been compliance with
art 15 but (b) that nevertheless on account of art 27(2) the judgment
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should not be recognised? In other words, 1f there was going to be
reference to art 15 in the jurisdiction part of the Conventions,
should there also have been reference to it in the recognition and
enforcement part?
It would be most unfortunate if the European Court were obliged in a
particular case to hold that the first court involved had proprerly
fulfilled its duty in terms of art 20 - in particular in terms of art
20 para three - but the second court nevertheless was correct in
holding that, on account of art 27(2), recognition should not take
place. But it is the writer's view that the provisions concerned need
not be, and in fact should not be, given an interpretation which
allows this situation to occur. In art 15, para one sets out the
general rule. This is that where a summons has been sent abroad in
accordance with the Hague Convention, and the defender has not
entered an appearance, decree in absence cannot be granted until it
has been established (a) that service / delivery of the summons took
place in terms of the provision and (b) that "the service or the
delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to
defend". It is submitted that, on account of its particular wording,
if it were held that there had been compliance with this provision in
a particular action, it could not then be held by the same court that
art 27(2) required the application for enforcement of the ensuing
decree to be refused.
But matters are complicated by art 15 para two. This provides that,
notwithstanding the provisions of para one, a state may declare that
it is open to a judge to grant decree in absence "if all the
following conditions are fulfilled -"
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(a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for
in this Convention,
(b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate
by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of
the transmission of the document,
(c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every
reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through the competent
authorities of the State addressed.
The United Kingdom has made a declaration in terms of art 15 para
two. It is condition (b) which 1s significant in the present context.
"[Ajdequate", it is submitted, means "sufficient time to enable the
defendant to arrange for his defence". This is (with the substitution
of "the defendant" for "him") the form of words used in art 20 para
two and in art 27(2). So if a court holds that the art 15 conditions
have been satisfied, in the writer's opinion it cannot then hold that
recognition of the ensuing decree should be refused on account of art
27(2). As a result if in any proceedings the Court of Session
correctly applies either para one or para two of art 15, recognition
of the resulting decree should not be refused in another contracting
state on account of art 27(2). But, it is submitted, as the words
central to art 15 para two and to art 27(2) are not identical, in any
Notes for Guidance on the interpretation of the 1965 Hague Convention
it might be considered appropriate for it to be pointed out that what
the court of the state in which enforcement is sought may be asked to
hold is that "the defendant was not duly served with the [summons] in
sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence".
Rule 197(b), it should be said, contains a provision relating to
petition procedure very similar to rule 89(d); rule 197(c)
corresponds to rule 89(j).
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In an attempt to avoid an unfortunate situation such as envisaged
above, it is submitted in conclusion that there should be introduced
into the Court of Session rules along the same lines as the modified
sheriff court rules previously suggested. The rules concerning
proceedings begun by summons would read:
(i) In any proceedings in which the summons has been transmitted
abroad in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention of
15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, decree in absence shall not
be granted until it is established to the satisfaction of the court
that the requirements of Article 15 of that Convention have been
complied with.
(ii) In any proceedings (a) which, by reason of their subject matter,
fall within the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention and 1988 Lugano
Convention, (b) in which a defender is domiciled in another
contracting state but not in the United Kingdom and (c) in which the
summons has not been transmitted abroad to that defender in
accordance with the Convention referred to in [the previous sub-
rule], the court shall not grant decree in absence against that
defender until it has been shown that he has been able to receive the
summons in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence,
or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end.
(iii) In any proceedings (a) which, by reason of their subject
matter, fall within the scope of Schedule 4 to the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgments Act 1982 and (b) in which a defender is domiciled in
England and Wales or in Northern Ireland but not in Scotland or in
another contracting state, the court shall not grant decree in
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absence against that defender until it has been shown that he has
been able to receive the summons in sufficient time to enable him to
arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been taken
to this end.
(iv) In this rule "domiciled" shall be construed as "domiciled in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982", and "contracting state" has the meaning assigned
to it by s 1 of that Act.
Equivalent provisions would be introduced into the rules concerning
proceedings begun by petition.
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